AJIT DOVAL'S PERSPECTIVES

26/11 versus Samjhauta: One does not justify other

2011-09-22T06:29:00.000-07:00

26/11 versus Samjhauta: One does not justify other
16 Jan 2011
The Asian Age
http://www.asianage.com/india/2611-versus-samjhauta-one-does-not-justify-other-447

By Ajit Doval
The killing of Salman Taseer, Governor of Punjab in Pakistan, is not unique but highly significant. Important public figures have been assassinated, both in Pakistan and outside, in the past and their voices silenced. The event — more importantly its aftermath — is however, important for making glaringly visible the trajectory of Pakistan that could have far reaching implications for regional and global security.
The muted response of frightened political leaders, the clergy’s refusal to perform his last rites, people honouring the assassin as a national hero and security agencies looking the other way to suggestions of sanitising their own house by purging undesirables are indicative of the dangerous precipice where Pakistan is standing today and the uncertain future it is heading for.
It points to the emergence of a nuclearised state heading for anarchy where government is fast losing control, civil society is partly seized and partly stunned to silence by violent armed groups, there is absence of any ideological or political thought-stream to counter Islamic radicalism and political parties are lacking both the will and the organisation to stand up to the Islamists. More sinister, the army which is in the driving seat, increasingly appears to be lacking both the capacity and intent to counter the jehadis — selectively calibrating their response on the basis of their targets, region, affiliations and agenda of terrorist groups.
Pakistan for long has been a source of serious security concern for India but what is discernible now is qualitatively different and much more dreadful. Pakistan, in India's security calculus has presented three sets of threats,. The first emanated from Pakistan's military posturing, exacerbated by army occupying a lead role in managing affairs of the state, particularly when they relate to India. Their compulsive hostility led to four military engagements, the last being their intrusion in Kargil. Aggressive posturing also manifested in Pakistan weaponising itself beyond its legitimate security needs, its pursuing India-specific nuclear and missile programmes, its heavy defence acquisitions on the pretext of fighting terrorism.
The second set of anti-India actions can be grouped as strategico-political initiatives. Starting from their joining military alliances like CENTO and Baghdad pact in the 50s it includes their recent mechanisations to exclude India from Afghanistan, becoming a willing proxy of China aimed at strategic encirclement of India.
The third set of threats pertained to its use of covert action against the asymmetric adversary that it could not take on militarily. These covert actions included sponsoring and supporting terrorism, insurgencies, acts of sabotage and subversion. The intelligence offensive in Kashmir and violence perpetrated in different parts of the country to bleed India were part of this grand strategy. For their covert actions in India and Afghanistan, they extensively used multiple radical Islamic groups that have now started threatening the very existence of Pakistan; a collateral cost that Pakistan’s strategists failed to factor in.
Pakistan is now faced with a situation where its civil society is crumbling and wilting under pressure of armed groups of various hues.
Numerical majority of religious moderates is irrelevant in this game whose outcome will now be determined by power of the guns and their unpredictable directions. The army, which is in the driving seat, suffers from three major infirmities. Firstly, it is still playing a duplicitous game vis-a-vis jehadis - fighting a few and appeasing the rest; calibrated selectivism is keeping jehadi culture alive, providing it legitimacy, respectability and new converts. The second problem is the fast eroding will within the Army to take on the jehadis.
On the political front, no political party has either the will or the capacity to mobilise the public to take on the radicals, their drawing-room denunciations notwithstanding. Political, sectarian and religious conflicts, compounded by serious economic crisis, are taking Pakistan to an uncertain future, possibly a civil war. The nation while faced with multiple conflicts — like battle lines drawn between moderates and Islamic hardliners; ethnic unrest among Pashtuns, Sindhis, Mohajirs, Baluch, Saraikis, etc; conflict between Deobandi and Barelvis; violence between Shias and Sunnis, etc, is still obsessed with India. It is still infiltrating terrorists in Kashmir, keeping the terrorist infrastructure intact and reluctant to take action against perpetrators of Mumbai attacks.
There is, however, a subtle shift. In the past people calling the shots though strongly anti-India belonged to elite middle class and not Islamic fanatics. They used Islam and the jehadis as expendable commodities to subserve their purpose, keeping full strategic and tactical control over their organisations, resources, leaders and operations. This phenomenon now appears to be reversed. Slowly but surely the radicals are acquiring the critical mass to dictate the terms and forcing the State to carry out its diktats. If the Islamists want government of Pakistan to refrain from taking any action against perpetrators of 26/11 Mumbai attacks, the government feels compelled to comply.
If Lashkar-e-Tayyaba wants the Pakistan government to defend Hafiz Sayeed in a US court the government of Pakistan finds it difficult to ignore. The strings of power, directly or through their proxies,
slipping into the hands of Islamic radicals in this nuclear state is now the real danger. The killing of Salman Taseer is indicative of this change.
(The author is a former IB chief and director, Vivekananda International Foundation, New Delhi)

Recent Developments in Nepal: The Way Forward

2011-09-22T06:28:00.002-07:00

VIVEKANANDA INTERNATIONAL FOUNDATION
Seminar on
Recent Developments in Nepal: The Way Forward

(January 6, 2011)

Inaugural Session
Welcome Speech by Director Mr. Ajit Doval
Honourable Deputy Prime Minister of Nepal, Your Excellency, the Ambassador of Nepal to India, Shri C.D. Sahay, dignitaries, distinguished scholars, ladies and gentleman; it is indeed my great pleasure to welcome you all to Vivekananda International Foundation. This non-partisan and independent Foundation, aims at studying, analyzing and researching events and issues that have a bearing on India’s national interests, the interests of our neighbourhood, global peace and harmony. The Foundation particularly focuses on issues of strategic and security interests, foreign policy issues and matters pertaining to economy, governance and civilisational studies. We are so grateful that all of you have been able to spare your very valuable time and have come here despite your busy commitments.
We are delighted that we are starting the New Year with this dialogue on Nepal and I take this opportunity to wish all of you a very happy and successful 2011. I hope that the New Year brings greater prosperity and happiness to the people of the two countries and promotes better understanding and cooperation between them. Starting the New Year with a discourse on Nepal is probably the most rightful thing to happen. We enjoy a very special mutual relationship – a relationship built on strong fundamentals whose constants are something that have remained and are going to remain with us irrespective of ups and downs of politics and short term perceptional variations. In this very unique relationship, we cannot overlook or overstate realities of our geographical proximity, civilisational and historical links, close people to people contacts and our intertwined interests of security and stability.
We are aware that Nepal in its process of political evolution, is undergoing a period of momentous change and transformation and we earnestly hope that a great future is in the offing for her. The process of change can, at times, be ridden with uncertainty and in any major and fundamental process of change there are bound to be twists and turns, problems and challenges galore, but given the will and determination they are not insurmountable. I have no doubt that at the end of the tunnel there is a mighty light of hope, stability and progress awaiting the people of Nepal. But, there is one point, however, that I would like to underline. It is a point that transcends governments and events that tend to blur our vision and obfuscate issues – it is the reality of huge goodwill of the people of India and its civil society for the people of Nepal and vice versa that provides a solid bedrock to our unique relationship which has perhaps few parallels in the world. We can build on this strength to help each other, particularly in trying times like the present ones.
I would like to underline that in these difficult times, the need for this people-to-people relationship assumes special significance. It is important therefore that thinkers, intellectuals and opinion builders converge and try to discover or evolve ways and means by which the problems could be better comprehended and analysed and result in their communicating to the civil society views and perceptions that are informed, well analysed and done with a greater sense of objectivity and responsibility. In Vivekananda International Foundation (VIF) we highly value this necessity of an informed dialogue to help resolve contentious issues. Probably, the people of India feel as much troubled as the people of Nepal if situations and events do not develop the way they ought to, lose their envisaged trajectories or lead to sufferings and hardships to common people. And I do feel that the common man in Nepal also feels the same way about India. Such an empathetic relationship imposes a certain responsibility on the intellectuals, opinion makers and thought leaders on both sides of our borders. Such a sense of responsibility gives rise to the question, what can we really do to contribute towards resolving the problems, ending uncertainties and strengthening the forces of peace and stability. The VIF initiative to hold this seminar stems from this sentiment. It is premised on the assumption that ultimately the resilience of the civil society, civilisational values and will and determination of its people dictate the traction of any nation’s future, and Nepal is inherently strong on these basics.
The last few years have been seeing history in the making in Nepal and the landmark was reached in May 2008 when it became a republic. But it is not only Nepal becoming a republic that was important, that was indeed a historic watershed, but there was something much more significant and they were the offshoots of that epochal event. Firstly, it ignited the hopes and aspirations of all sections of the people who felt that a new Nepal in the offing promised a great future for them and their progeny. The second important factor was that it created the building blocks for the reconstruction of Nepal. These cardinal building blocks were conflict resolution through dialogue, harmonizing diverse views and interests and promoting understanding. It was, in essence, the acceptance of democracy and political pluralism as the guiding principles of the new Nepal. The third was a unanimous faith in constitutionalism as the basis on which it decided to traverse it journey ahead.
It is unfortunate that today some of the hopes and expectations have been belied. The euphoria has subsided and has started showing signs of despair. The cause of concern is not that some of the deadlines have not been met; they are not consequential by themselves but rather what is consequential is something much more important and subtle and it is that the building blocks on which the future was to rest have been lost somewhere on the way. The faith and trust in them have started getting eroded. The intensions and integrity of the actors who brought about the change have started being questioned. The spirit of common purpose is probably not as intense now as it was earlier. The challenge before Nepal and all those who wish it well is how best to reverse the trend.
Where does the future lie? The future lies in rediscovering these lost building blocks. Placing them back on track and providing the process with the traction with which it had initially begun. If we can find the right answers to the causes of derailment and how to rectify them we would have solved half the problem. The goal will always remain elusive in case we, either by default or design, advance and believe in wrong causes or extend spurious excuses for narrow political gains. The danger of seeing the problem where it does not exist and of ignoring where it really does compounds the vulnerability manifold. The ghost of external conspiracy for internal failings may be both a shortsighted strategy and bad tactics.
We in the Foundation very strongly believe that all solutions to Nepal’s present day problems lie within Nepal – with its people, its leadership, its political parties and its intellectuals. People in India, thinkers, intellectuals as well the common man strongly feel that Nepal must get out of the existing morass as fast as it can and the capacity to do this rests only with people of Nepal. India as a friend can at best facilitate the process.
In this seminar we are only trying to provide a platform where all shades of opinion holders in Nepal can interact freely and candidly and have a better appreciation of each other’s view points. Sharing of their perceptions by Indian scholars may highlight some new aspects enriching the discourse. The holistic broad spectrum awareness may help appreciate each other’s point of view better facilitating the process of conflict identification and resolution. During the deliberations here, can we move a step forward in identifying the real problems and the bottle necks, evaluate the grave costs and consequences of continued instability and understand implications for Nepal of failure of democracy and absence of constitutionalism? If we do we will consider this seminar a success.
I once again welcome all of you to discuss these issues confronting Nepal. We have gathered here some of the best brains and informed people about Nepal - people with great experience and best of intentions. We do hope that after two days of interactions and exchange of ideas, we should be able to find the ways and means by which the stalled political process could gain a new lease and direction. I would like to reiterate that the people of India have a tremendous amount of goodwill for Nepal and are ever eager to hear any good news emanating from there.
I express my profound gratitude to all of you once again and particularly to the honourable Deputy Prime Minister who, despite her extremely busy engagements, has agreed to grace the occasion and participate in the seminar. With these words, I request her to deliver the inaugural address.

India’s Plundered Money Abroad – Can we get it back?

2011-09-22T06:28:00.001-07:00

Sent to Mr. RNP Singh on 21 Feb. 2011 for publishing in Eternal India

21 Feb. 2011

India’s Plundered Money Abroad – Can we get it back?

Ajit Doval, KC

In common parlance, all the money generated through illegality – ranging from heinous criminal activities to white collar tax avoidance and tax evasions is nomenclatured as ‘Black Money’. The basic problems that India faces are twofold. Firstly, a continuing rise in the share of black money that has acquired alarming proportions and secondly a substantial portion of it getting stashed in tax havens abroad. What compounds the problem is the fact that the state is seen as lacking both the capacity and the intention to reform the system or deter the wrong doers. A nexus between the black money and those exercising power is suspected by the people, weakening the national will and raising the level of public cynicism. Contrary to expectations, liberalization and economic growth, rather than abating, has multiplied the phenomenon manifold. Ironically, during the last five years, when the country witnessed a high economic growth, had an economist Prime Minister donning the mantle of ‘Mr. Clean’ and global environment was relatively conducive to track the dirty money, growth of black money and its illegal movement abroad has been the highest. The Global Financial Integrity (GFI) has estimated that more than two-third of the Indian money stashed abroad has been generated in post liberalization period after mid nineties. The Supreme Court of India observed it to be not just tax evasion but “Theft” and “Plunder” of Indian money.

Size of the Problem:

The first estimate of black money in the country was made in 1955-56 by Prof. Calder of Britain. He calculated it to be around Rupees 440 to 500 crore, 4% of the then GDP. Over the years, the share of this black money kept on increasing and by mid nineties touched nearly 40%. Today, it is estimated to be to the tune of 50% of the GDP. Prof. Arun Kumar of JNU has observed that, “Today, policy failure is writ large and governance is failing all around. This is due to the growth in size of the black economy from about 4 percent of GDP in 1955-56 to the present 50 percent… For illegality to flourish on such a vast scale, those involved in overseeing the functioning of society have to be systematically complicit.”
The Global financial Integrity GFI, a highly credible non-profit research organization, working in the area of Tax Havens has estimated that the present value of illegal Indian money held abroad is to the tune of $500 Billions. Most analysts estimate it to be a gross under estimation for want of adequate research. In money terms, it means 15 years of our defence budget and eight times of our plan budget at 2009-10 level.
What is a matter of greater concern is that the black money continues to grow at a staggering rate and so does the movement of money to tax havens abroad. Generation of black money in such large volume, besides lack of probity and integrity in public life, is a consequence of faulty policies, inadequate laws, institutional decay and lack of transparency in governance. Almost every economic activity in the country from sale of agricultural produce by farmers to procurement of defence equipments, is plagued with bribery, speed money, corruption or kick backs. The malice, which is both systemic and systematic, not only affects the government and the public sector but also the private sector.

How does it hurt?
Black money not only leads to economic deprivation and degeneration of a country but seriously undermines the authority of the government and the rule of law. Black money in India has tended to corrupt democratic polity of the nation as large amounts of it get siphoned to political parties and personalities for electioneering and personal favours. The money power in elections is one of the banes of Indian democracy and its containment is necessary for the growth of a healthy democracy. Control of unaccounted money that sustains terrorism, insurgencies, drug trafficking, organized crimes etc. will also go a long way in Internal Security management of the country.
The drain of scarce national resources to foreign coffers bleeds the country in diverse ways and erodes its Comprehensive National Power (CNP). In a country where more than 30 crore people live below the poverty line, it deprives the country of resources required for upliftment of their survival status. Most of the neglected areas of national growth like health, education, roads and communications, tribal welfare, housing etc., could be addressed by utilization of these funds. A large number of internal conflicts like Left Wing Extremism originating due to economic deprivation and non inclusive growth could be effectively dealt with. The country’s defence preparedness that has been hamstrung for want of adequate resources could be brought to the level where it could cope with emerging military challenges from our two nuclear neighbors.
India’s economic strength today is one of the major contributor to its Comprehensive National Power that has catapulted India into a new power orbit. If the huge amounts of Indian money stashed abroad could be ploughed back and their future out flows prevented, it will greatly enhance our national power. India would also be able to take advantage of having world’s biggest youth bulge by providing them gainful employment, totally revolutionizing the country and its economy. However, the failure to do so can turn it into a liability and a source of serious internal turmoil.

How is it generated?
Indian black money that find its way to tax havens abroad originates in diverse forms; following being the major contributors:
(a) One of the major sources is huge amounts of money paid as bribes to corrupt politicians, bureaucrats and middlemen in major deals and projects. The cuts and kick backs are hidden in the project costs of these mega deals or procurement orders. Through various dubious ways they are channelised to accounts of corrupt politicians and bureaucrats or their proxies. Favours in Defence deals, licenses and permissions for mega projects, grant of infrastructure contracts, amending or formulating rules and procedures that provide undue benefit to a particular company etc. are the considerations for payment. As most of these big companies or their subsidiaries maintain foreign accounts the movement of money goes undetected. It is estimated that nearly 60 per cent of the illegal money stashed abroad comes from this source.
(b) Business malpractices through which black money is created include evasion or taxes, under and over invoicing, violation of provisions of Foreign Exchange Management Act (FEMA) etc. While major portion of this black money stays within the country and is used for acquisition of properties at under valued prices, hoardings of gold and silver, various forms of wasteful expenditures etc, a portion of it is channelised out of the country through hawala or other illegal transactions. After reaching foreign destinations it is moved to banks and tax havens which assure total secrecy. Nearly 15 – 20 % of the money stashed abroad originates from these sources and mostly belongs to business men and companies existing only in paper.
(c) Another source of black money pertains to organized crime mafias who engage in large scale property deals, drug trafficking, gunrunning, human trafficking, terrorist related activities etc. Nearly 10% to 12% of the illegal money stashed abroad is through these sources.
(d) Other miscellaneous sources include the money earned by Indian nationals abroad but parked in tax havens to avoid heavy taxes in the West. A section of affluent Indians moving parts of their savings to foreign banks for security also at times prefer tax free destinations. All these miscellaneous sources account for nearly 8 to 9%.
In the recent issue of India Today [31-01-2011] it was mentioned that "Sometimes, the money is physically transferred abroad. The CEO of a Mumbai-based equity firm says that the money is flown abroad in "special flights" or chartered aircraft out of Mumbai and Delhi airports to Zurich. Perhaps this is one reason behind the demand for private planes." This reveals the gigantic dimension of the problem.

Scams and black money:
Scams are intricately intertwined with creation of black money as also illegal stashing of Indian money abroad. Scams in government are characterized by large volumes of money and important functionaries of the government being involved. According to a study made by Prof. Arun Kumar, a noted authority on black money, “While the 1980s saw eight major scams, in the period between 1991 and 1996 there were 26 and during 2005-08, there were around 150 scams.” The graph is co-terminus with increase in the volume of black money and the Indian money stashed abroad.
During the regime of Rajiv Gandhi, Bofors erupted as a major scam involving purchase of artillery guns for the Indian Army. The scam was valued at rupees 64 crores. This paled into insignificance when compared to Harshad Mehta scam during Narsimha Rao’s Prime Ministership in 1992. According to Janakiraman Committee report the loss suffered by the state was to the tune of rupees 3,000 crore; which most experts estimate to be a gross undervaluation. When Harshad Mehta was manipulating the market in 1990s and the matter witnessed a heated debate in the parliament, the then Finance Minister, said he would not lose sleep over it. He probably felt that it was a temporary and an affordable aberration of the liberalization process which over the period of time will eliminate itself. History, however, was to prove him wrong and hit the country with vehemence under his Prime Minister ship. During the decade of 90s more than 2,500 companies that got registered in the stock market disappeared in the thin air with public money. The loss suffered by people was estimated to be several thousand crores but the government could do nothing to prevent it or punish the guilty. This not only emboldened the unscrupulous businessmen but also led to emergence of an unholy nexus between the political class and others in positions of authority and these financial criminals. This nexus took diverse forms from outright bribery to political funding and ‘taking care of the comforts’. The major scams of the recent years include the Satyam scam of 2009 involving nearly 8,000 crores, the mining scams running into thousands of crores, the Madhu Koda scam of 2008 estimated to involve nearly 4,000 crores, Common Wealth Games, Aadarsh Society scam, the Deemed Universities imbroglio etc., to name a few in the long list.
The 2G spectrum scam of 2008, however, came as the greatest shocker to the country. The Comptroller and Auditor General of India estimated the loss to the tune rupees 1,76,000 crore. It is not only the astronomical figure but also the blatant manner in which it was done that shocked the nation. The fact that the Prime Minister during a press conference on February 16, 2011, tried to explain away the phenomenon as compulsion of coalition politics is illustrative of the level of degeneration in governance and raises some serious questions about the viability of the political system itself.
One of the major areas of concern in recent years has been serious erosion in the credibility of investigating agencies and their political misuse. Appointment of a Chief Vigilance Commissioner despite being an accused in a criminal case, handling of corruption cases by CBI against Lalu Prasad Yadav, Mayawati, Mulayam Singh etc. turning the heat on and off to meet political requirements, Additional Solicitor General becoming an instrument to get the funds of Quattrochi released from his London bank account are illustrative of the serious morass the country finds itself in.

What could be done?
To get back the money stashed abroad is a painstaking and time consuming task. The nation will have to design a well thought out multi-pronged strategy ranging from enacting appropriate laws, empowering its investigative and intelligence agencies, using political and diplomatic pressures and leveraging its new economic clout to achieve its goals. Most importantly, a political
consensus and national will have to be created to achieve this national objective. The government of India can consider following measures:

a) Taking cognizance of reports of the IMF, GFI etc, the Government of India should enact a law emphasizing that huge Indian capital has been illegally stashed away and needs to be ploughed back. It should be a penal law so that all the defaulters could be treated as criminals. On the strength of this law the government should declare itself as the sole owner and beneficiary of all Indian monies, assets and bank accounts held abroad by or the dependants of Indian nationals without due declarations to the Indian authorities. The law may provide that where the Indian national are able to prove that the assets held by them have been acquired through proper means and the non-declaration was merely a technical default, the government should restore the assets back to the claimant. It, however, should shift the onus of proof on the person who holds undeclared wealth abroad. On the strength of the said law, the Government of India can ask the world governments and the foreign banks, like the Swiss Banks, to recognize Indian government as the beneficiary of the undeclared wealth and freeze the accounts till owners of the wealth are able to prove that they had acquired it by fair means and from legally valid sources.
b) On the basis of various expert reports and other credible information available, there are reasonable grounds to infer that a substantial portion of Indian illegal money stashed in foreign banks owes its origin to criminal activities like corruption, misappropriation of government funds, fraud, cheating, activities of organized criminal gangs, drug mafias, terrorist financing, ransoms etc. All these are cognizable offences punishable under criminal laws of India including the Indian Penal Code, Prevention of Corruption Act, The Conservation of Foreign Exchange and Prevention of Smuggling Activities Act, Foreign Exchange Management Act, The Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, Money Laundering Act, The Smugglers and Foreign Exchange Manipulators Forfeiture of Property Act etc.
Government of India should suo moto register an omnibus criminal case against suspected unidentified persons who have been indulging in criminal activities and unauthorizedly transferring the money to tax havens abroad. The case may be transferred to a special team of the CBI and investigated under supervision of the Supreme Court. They must register the FIR under varios sections of the IPC, money laundering and anti-terror laws etc. Registration of the criminal case will enable the investigating agencies to summon people for questioning, interrogate suspected persons, seize incriminating documents, conduct raids, make arrests, examine documents etc.
This would also enable the Government to get assistance of foreign police and investigating agencies for gathering requisite evidence and information. Most importantly, this will empower the government to approach different banks abroad, as also the concerned governments, for information regarding the money trail as they pertain to criminal cases.
c) Lots of monies of Indians in secret bank accounts have been appropriated by the banks, as the account holders cannot by legal and open documentation bequeath them to their progenies and most of them die without informing their progeny about the account. This may run into billions from the 1950s. Such monies should be declared by a special law as and vested in government of India with a provision that the progenies of the account holder may claim the same by providing requisite evidence to show that the monies in such accounts were sourced in legal business.
d) Indian political system needs to recognize that India is already a leading economy and an emerging geo-political power. In the shifting economic centers of gravity in the new world order, countries, particularly the tiny tots like Switzerland, will have enormous stakes in our country. The present and potential power of India should be leveraged, like US and Germany, did to reclaim the black monies of its nationals stashed abroad. Switzerland has billions of dollars of investments in India that they would not like to jeopardize by ignoring our laws or undermining our bonafide national interests. If our geo-political power was properly exercised, the Swiss government could never have behaved the way it did in Hasan Ali case.
e) Every electoral candidate should file an affidavit before elections that he does not hold illegal money abroad. The same should be applied to senior appointees in the Government like RBI Governor, SEBI Chairman, CBI Director, Cabinet Secretary, IB Director, RAW Chief, CVC etc. By an act of Parliament, persons who have accumulated funds abroad should be barred from holding any public office and getting loans from banks etc. as a form of punishment.
f) India must join global efforts against tax havens and secret banking. Recently there was a Task force meeting of the Financial Integrity & Economic Development— in Bergen Norway on 28-29 September, 2010. Our Finance ministry representatives also attended the conclave but remained a passive participant. The Task Force, a consortium of more than 60 governments, NGOs and foundations, is focused on the need for greater transparency in the global financial system for the benefit of both developing countries and industrialized nations. Governments participating in the Task Force include Norway, Germany, Denmark, the Netherlands, France, Spain, Chile, Canada and the Paris-based Secretariat of the 59 government members of the Leading Group on Innovative Financing for Development. Global Financial Integrity leads the Task Force. We are currently full member of the FATF [Financial Action Task Force] that gives us more elbow room from being an observer than in the past. The FATF provides opening to us for taking up national interest financial issues at global fora as also the type of actions we could initiate at the domestic front. India should play a lead role in all these initiative.

We are living in extra ordinary times – with possibilities ahead both of great opportunities and historic blunders. As a nation, we owe it to the deprived and ordinary people of India and future citizens of India the sacred duty of unearthing these vast national resources which has the potential to transform the country into a developed nation much sooner than we can otherwise. India is not only a country, but, also a great civilization, which has from time immemorial propagated non conflicting ideas and practiced non-conflicting methods. As a rising nation, we need to set proper standards for ourselves so that we become the alternative model for the world of conflict in search of peace and harmony. Being viewed as a corrupt and dishonest nation, and being seen as a nation of buccaneers who bolt away with billions of Dollars when a vast population of our country is living in abject poverty will hardly give us the moral and ethical authority to be of example to the world. The time is propitious and we need to act displaying highest degree of national will to get our looted money back.

(The author is Director, Vivekananda International Foundation)

Remote Control Rebels

2011-09-22T06:27:00.000-07:00

Opinion
Remote Control Rebels
Why China’s meddling in the Northeast should worry Delhi

Outlook Magazine | Feb 07, 2011

http://www.outlookindia.com/article.aspx?270225

Ajit Doval

Nations accustomed to making episodic responses to high-profile security events run the risk of missing out subterranean trends and realities. Wang Qing, a Chinese woman spy masquerading as a television reporter, was recently arrested and deported after she visited the headquarters of the NSCN(IM), a Naga rebel group, in Hebron, some 30 km from Dimapur. But the news attracted little attention. The authorities say she admitted to being a spy for the People’s Security Bureau, a Chinese intelligence agency. She had had a four-hour-long closed-door session with T. Muivah, a rebel leader who is holding talks with the Indian government. The rebel group, however, would have the Indian government go by what its spokesperson Phunthing Shimrang says—that “the general secretary (Muivah) has made it clear we are holding talks here and have no relations with China”.
Of late, the security discourse pertaining to the Northeast has been marked by good news: peace engagement with the rebels, improved cooperation from Bangladesh, dissent within insurgent groups and so on. But, in a region that has a 5,215-km international border as opposed to just one per cent of that with the Indian mainland, the external factor, though pivotal, is often glossed over. China, with which India has an uneasy security relationship, shares a border of nearly 1,561 km with the northeastern states. It has a dubious record of meddling with insurgent groups there. There was a lull since the mid-’80s, but there is increasing evidence of China reviving its covert offensive in the region. Chinese support to rebel groups has waxed and waned in accordance with the content and direction of our bilateral relations, their evaluation of the strength and grit of New Delhi, the viability of insurgent groups.
Naga rebels were the first to establish transborder contacts, in the early ’60s. The 1962 Indo-China war only catalysed the process. Facilitated by Pakistani intelligence in Dacca, Kughato Sukhai, the self-styled Naga prime minister, wrote to Chinese leaders on May 29, 1963, alleging persecution and oppression by India. He exhorted China to “honour and follow their principle of safeguarding and upholding the cause of any suppressed nation of Mongolian stock”. In November 1966, China welcomed a 300-strong contingent of Naga rebels led by Thinusilie and Muivah. Trained, and laden with huge quantities of arms and equipment, the contingent returned in January 1968 and established a huge camp in the Jotsoma jungles. When Indian forces attacked it in June that year, they recovered Chinese weapons and incriminating documents.
These initial interactions of northeastern insurgent groups with China gradually expanded. Soon, it came to patronise, train and arm Mizo, Meitei, Kuki and Assamese insurgents. Procurement of weapons from China’s Yunnan province, their transportation into India across Myanmar or via the sea route, arrangements for money transactions, liaison with Thai insurgents—all this got institutionalised over the years.
Recent developments, though coming after a long lull, indicate a major policy shift on part of China, one that should give India cause for worry. In October 2007, on the invitation of the Chinese authorities, Anthony Shimray, in charge of the NSCN(IM)’s foreign affairs, visited China and met Lee Wuen, head of the intelligence unit of Yunnan province (of which the deported spy was an operative) and other officials in Dehong Mangshi, near Kunming. He handed over to the Chinese a letter from Muivah, self-styled “prime minister” of NSCN(IM), naming Kholose Swu Sumi, a Sema Naga from Zunheboto, their “permanent representative” in China. The Chinese welcomed this and wanted Kholose to keep them updated on the movements of the Indian army, particularly in Arunachal, the activities of the Dalai Lama and Tibetans and on the NSCN(IM)’s peace talks with the Indian government. In April 2009, it was the turn of Isak Chisi Swu, the NSCN(IM) president involved in talks with New Delhi, to visit China.
Paresh Baruah of ULFA, too, visited China in 2010. Reports say he led a group of 80 cadres which received training and weapons in Yunnan province. This is significant, for the Maoists are known to be sourcing weapons from ULFA.
China’s renewed interest in insurgencies in the northeastern states cannot be wished away, coming as it does in the backdrop of its increasing aggressiveness, military activities in border areas, claims on Arunachal Pradesh and the links of the Maoists with insurgents in the Northeast. Engaging the rebels in talks will alone not suffice. New Delhi must display greater clarity of vision. Mistaking talks with insurgent groups as an end rather than a means to an end will push us into a self-made strategic trap.
(The writer, ex-director of the Intelligence Bureau, now heads the Vivekandanda International Foundation, Delhi.)

Internal Security – Need for Course Correction

2011-09-22T06:26:00.000-07:00

Sent to Dr. Shiv Shakti Bakshi on 3 Feb. 2011 for publishing in Magazine ‘Kamal Sandesh’
3 Feb. 2011
Internal Security – Need for Course Correction
Ajit Doval, KC
(Director, Vivekananda International Foundation)

India is on a surge; a great destiny awaits it. If there is one single factor that could negate or retard it, it will be its failure to govern itself. Ensuring safety and security of its people, upholding the rule of law, managing change with order and ensuring legitimacy of power by those who wield it shall be critical components of that governance. Should it fail to happen, history will once again lament India couldn’t do what it could.
In post war period, internal security has become primary source of degradation, destabilization and retardation of the states as against external aggression. More than 80% of the states during this period faced state failure, disintegration, break down of their political or constitutional systems consequented by internal conflicts and violence. The causative factors leading to internal security dysfunction ranged from political turmoils, sectarian violence, economic deprivation or social breakdowns. Significantly, while the internal fault lines provided the basic munition, the external factor often catalyzed the process to make it decisively unmanageable. Failure to address the external factor in internal security management made the states to lose their capacity to control the avalanche that initially appeared as a trickle. In the evolving security setting, the conventional law and order approach is increasingly proving to be grossly inadequate to meet the new generation Internal Security threats.
Management of Internal Security – New Realities:
India, in architecting its internal security doctrines, systems and policy needs to factor in the following:
(a) Wars are increasingly proving to be cost ineffective instruments of achieving strategic and political objectives. With the emergence of Fourth Generation Warfare (4GW), a fight against an invisible enemy, hidden within the civil society, the consequences of wars can be highly unpredictable with no assured guarantee of success to the stronger. Defeat of Soviet Union by religious irregulars in Afghanistan, American experiencing in Vietnam, Iraq and Afghanistan, Pakistani army losing out to Shanti Bahini in Bangladesh etc. are illustrative of the limits of military power against Fourth Generation Warfare.
(b) Civil society has become the battle grounds whose control is sought both by the violent anti state groups and the state. It has given rise to the doctrine of proxy war. Hostile states, to bleed their adversaries, are increasingly patronising armed groups operating in their enemy countries. It has opened a new window of opportunity to weaker powers to take on their more powerful adversaries in what we call as asymmetric warfare. In these, weaker states can bleed their more powerful adversaries through Covert Action (CA) at a low cost, in a sustained manner and claim deniability.
In the Indian context, Pakistan that harbours compulsive hostility against India but lacks the capability to achieve its political and strategic objectives, militarily or otherwise, has made CA as an instrument of its state policy. Pakistan has leveraged its geographical proximity, radical Islam, India’s soft governance, nuclear blackmail, military alliances etc. as tools to capitalize over India’s internal security vulnerabilities.
(c) Phenomenal up-gradation in capabilities, resources, international linkages and support bass of violent groups is another disturbing phenomenon. Countering them requires security infrastructure much beyond and complex than required for maintaining peace and order in civil society and enforcing the rule of law. With the emergence of large well armed and organized armed groups the states are facing erosion in their monopoly over coercive power. With the sophisticated weapons systems, modern communication equipments, huge financial resources, access to modern technology and support of rogue states, activities of these groups have placed internal security in a different orbit altogether.
In the Indian context, the Islamic terrorist groups not only are patronized and supported by Pakistan but maintain close nexus with gun runners, drug traffickers, organized crimes, hawala racketeers, currency counterfeiters etc.
(d) Diminishing efficacy of conventional response policies and systems and inability of states to keep pace with them is another infirmity. The conventional response, particularly in liberal democracies, treats acts of violence (no matter how gruesome) as normal crimes, punishable through due process of law, and not as acts of war. This jurisprudence is heavily weighed in favour of the wrong doer and is practically inoperable against those who operate from foreign lands. Instruments of state, its laws, police, judicial systems and even militaries, find themselves grossly inadequate to prevent, protect and penalize the wrong doers.
Besides above, in India, soft governance, political factor and corruption have further eaten into the vitals of state power. Political factor has started casting its ominous shadow, both over enactment of right laws and their enforcement with full political will. The withdrawal of Prevention of Terrorist Activities Act (POTA), Centre’s reluctance to approve Special Acts against organized crimes in Gujarat, Madhya Pradesh etc. are illustrative of politicization of internal security management.
(e) Role of non state actors like the Media, Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs), think tanks, etc., have also added to complexity of the situation. Publicity is the oxygen of terrorism and media inadvertently plays in their hands by giving them undue coverage. As perception management is an important aspect of internal security management, ability of these groups to influence the public opinion, without any corresponding responsibility, only confounds the problem.

India: Slow to Transform
India is not unique in experiencing this paradigm shift. What singles it out is the fact that having paid the highest price in battling against terrorism, insurgencies etc. in terms of over 90,000 human lives lost and nearly 14,000 security personnel killed and huge drain on its scare financial resources; it has been the slowest, if at all, to change. Globally, the response has been swift and decisive while in India it has been delayed, half hearted and often lacking political will. The systems, doctrines, methodology, laws, empowerment and enablement of security apparatus have by and large remained unchanged. Within 48 hours of September 11 (9/11) strike, the US took the policy decision to revamp the whole system and bring in the huge new infrastructure, concepts and laws to create Department of Home Land Security and institution of Director National Intelligence. President Bush announced that “It values individual freedom but should it get in conflict with supreme national interest, the latter will prevail”. Instead of systematic improvements we merely resorted to quantitative response hoping that enhanced force level without change in training, systems, equipment etc would be sufficient to counter terrorism and fight insurgencies.
The expenditure on state police forces and central para military forces cumulatively have increased in last few years from Rs. 15,092 crores nearly to Rs. 26,000 crores, depicting an increase over 70%. In terrorist and insurgency affected areas 22% troops are tied on duties to protect themselves and other 45% on protecting the VIPs and vital installations. With 11% force personnel on leave and training reserves and 5% engaged on administrative duties; what is really left to mount field operations is less than 20%. For want of powerful laws, enhanced operational level intelligence, bold political decisions, lack of new strategic and tactical ideas, we have got entrapped in conventional stereotype of numerical response to internal security. The dogma of ‘time-tested methods’ has become a doctrine to resist change.
India’s internal security landscape in recent decades has undergone a paradigm shift. The conventional pattern of civil disorders, communal disturbances, social and economic turmoil, political conflicts etc. have seized to be the nation’s primary internal security concerns. They have been substituted by externally sponsored covert offensives by hostile powers targeting country’s internal fault lines to achieve their strategic objectives. While country’s democratic polity, economic growth, and social transformations are steadily bringing down conventional threats, except probably the Left Wing Extremism, the external factor has been an important catalytic factor in promoting terrorism, insurgencies, espionage, subversion, cyber space violations, currency counterfeiting, Hawala transactions, demographic invasion etc. India considering its Comprehensive National Power (CNP), has failed is politically and diplomatically leverage it to its best security advantage.

Jehadi Terrorism:- Kashmir and Beyond
Pakistan which, during the Afghan war through Western assistance, had acquired formidable covert capabilities, re-positioned the elaborate infrastructure to bleed and destabilize India through terrorism. It wanted to replicate Afghan model in Kashmir, hoping to make it a theatre of Jehad for all the Muslims and force India to a settlement acceptable to Pakistan. Though it failed to achieve this objective, over the years Jehadis have became integral part of Pakistan’s war-machine and a low cost instrument in its hands to bleed India. Pakistani researcher Sabina Ahmad in her report to International Crisis Group (ICG) calculated 11,500 Pakistani nationals having been killed in India in terrorist operations from 1990 to 2005. This is indicative of the scale and intensity of Pakistan sponsored Jehadi terrorism.
Growth of Jehadi forces, perceiving India as its target, both in India’s western and eastern neighbourhoods, is a serious security and ideological threat given India’s large indigenous Muslim population. While sizeable population of Afghanistan, Pakistan and Bangladesh has come under its spate, desperate attempts are being made to spread its tentacles within India. Superimposition of this exported variant of Islam constitutes a high potential long term threat for India and will have to be countered – ideologically, politically and physically.
Besides J&K, hundreds of Muslim youth drawn from other parts of the country have been trained and motivated for subversive activities in Pakistan. A large number of Pakistani youth trained by the ISI and disguised as Indians have been positioned as part of an intricately networked covert apparatus. Mushrooming of Madrassas and Islamic institutions in large numbers propagating an ideology of hate and exclusiveness, particularly in the border areas, is another disturbing trend. An imaginative policy initiative and counter measures would have to be taken to meet this threat.
The 26/11 terrorist action at Mumbai depicted a new order of lethality in Pakistan’s unabated covert offensive against India. For almost three decades, India has passively accepted such provocations. It has failed to retaliate in a proactive manner that could raise costs for Pakistan and compel it to roll back its anti-India terrorist infrastructure. India ceded the strategic and tactical initiative to Pakistan some three decades ago and needs a course correction before it poses an existentialist threat. India’s tolerance threshold should not be unrealistically raised in the backdrop of nuclear blackmail as Pakistan has its own vulnerabilities many times higher than India and in its strategic calculus it cannot ignore the threat that India can pose should the conflict grow beyond a point. India also needs to revisit its no first use nuclear doctrine.

Left Wing Extremism:
Left Wing Extremism has emerged as country’s most serious internal security challenge. After its cyclic rise and fall, it assumed serious proportions after 2004 when PWG and MCC, along with other splinter groups, merged together to form the CPI (Maoists). The spatial growth of the LWE thereafter has been meteoric and alarming. Maoists for furtherance of their political objective of seizing power through gun have exploited alienations caused by issues like denial of social and economic justice to deprived sections of society, large scale displacement of tribal populations by major hydro-electric projects and extensive mining in tribal areas. This has led to their influence rising from 53 Districts in 9 states in 2001, to nearly 203 Districts in 18 states by 2010. Among these the core of insurgency is focused in Chattisgarh (Abujmar Region) and Jharkhand with significant activity levels in Bihar, Andhra Pradesh, Maharashtra and Orissa. The movement has been substantially militarised with 16,000 armed cadres, some 15,000 assorted weapons (including 900 AK-47 Rifles, 200 Light Machine Guns and locally fabricated Rocket Launchers), over 85 camps where they are able to impart training in tactics and field craft and strong financial back up to pay regular salaries to members of its so called ‘People’s Liberation Army’.
The Left Wing Extremism embodies many features that make the problem intractable. A large inaccessible and scantily governed terrain that is difficult to dominate or sanitize no matter what force levels are pumped is one major problem. Further, to their advantage, the Maoists have a large alienated population that has suffered decades of social and economic neglect and are easily susceptible to motivated propaganda of the Maoists who promise to establish an order that will deliver justice, freedom from exploitation, jobs and protection of their way of life. A corrupt and callous governance further makes the people an easy prey to Maoist propaganda. They are able exploit all local grievances and conflicts to gather support by promising different things to different people. It may range from exploiting caste conflicts in Bihar, resentment against land lords in Andhra, sentiment against forest laws and practices in tribal areas, unemployment among youth or Islamic sentiment among sections of Muslims telling them all that Maoism provided solutions to all their woes. Availability of large sums money to pay regular salaries; to their cadres in areas where there are large bodies of uneducated and unskilled who are not only unemployed but for most jobs unemployable.
However, they have some high vulnerabilities as well. Illustratively, like the most ideology driven movements, Left Wing Extremism is controlled by less than a dozen top kingpins and nearly 30 commanders of its armed cadre. They determine the political line, control the resources and design the strategy. The bulk of 16,000 odd armed cadres and many times more supporters are only gullible tribals and poor people misled by vicious propaganda, frightened by the gun or lured by the money. For the leaders, who live in conditions of safety and comfort, they are easily replaceable commodities. Neutralization of top leaders and activists in four decade long history of Left Extremism has invariably led to ideological dilution, dissensions, and demoralization giving a blow to their image of invincibility and surfacing of doubts about viability of the movement to achieve its goals through violence. At tactical level, it has led to struggle for leadership, disruption in sources of funding and abandonment of plans in the offing. Further, the questioning of top leaders has often provided strategic and tactical inputs which, when pursued imaginatively, substantially weakened the movement.
Devoid of its ideological plank the movement stands reduced to a problem of organized crime. A credible, focused and sustained psy-war offensive to expose the movement as anti-people will be hard for them to bear.
Money factor is another important element that is empowering the Left Wing Extremism to raise new cadres, procure weapons and expand their arc of influence. A freshly recruited youth is being paid rupees 2,000 to 2,500 per month, which in a poverty stricken area attracts many youth. It is estimated that the left wing extremist are able to collect nearly rupees 1200 crore a year, which is a huge money resource in tribal and backward areas. Maoists raise these funds through extortions, collections from corrupt government officials, protection money, levies on rich landlords, businessmen, contractors, transporters etc. Paradoxically, increase in government outlays for development activities in affected areas has strengthened them financially as enhanced outlays are not backed up by effective and accountable administrative machinery. Their dependency on funds is a vulnerability and it is possible to take series of steps to minimize if not totally eliminate it though strong administrative and legal actions against the fund providers.

North-East:
North East security discourse, of late, has been marked by good news of peace engagement with the rebels, improved security cooperation from Bangladesh, dissensions within insurgent groups etc. However, external factor in a region that has 5,215 kms contiguous international border with other countries and only about over 1% with the Indian main land though pivotal is being glossed over. External factor has and will continue to remain a vital factor in our management of North Eastern security.
China, with which India has uneasy security relationship, shares a border of nearly 1,561 kms with NE states. It also has a dubious track record of meddling with local insurgent groups till mid eighties. After a long lull, there is increasing evidence of China reviving its Covert offensive in the North East. Chinese support to the rebel groups has waxed and waned depending on content and direction of bilateral relationship, their evaluation of the strength and grit of people in power in Delhi, viability and reliability of insurgent groups etc. It is also noteworthy that whenever assistance from erstwhile East Pakistan, and later Bangladesh, to NE insurgents became difficult, the Chinese stepped in to fill in the gap.
There are definite indications that, after a long lull, there is major policy shift in China. In October, 2007, on the invitation of Chinese authorities, Anthony Shimray in-charge foreign affairs of NSCN(IM), visited China and held meetings with Lee Wuen, head of intelligence of Yunnan province and Chang local intelligence head at Dehong Mansi near Kunming in China. Shimray, handed over a letter to the Chinese authorities signed by Muivah, self styled Prime Minister of NSCN(IM), holding peace talks with government of India. The letter informed Chinese of appointment of Kholose, a Sema Naga, as their permanent representative in China. Chinese welcomed this institutionalized arrangement and wanted Nagas to keep them informed about (i) Activities and movements of Indian Army, particularly in Arunachal Pradesh, (ii) Intelligence regarding activities of Dalai Lama and Tibetans in India and (iii) Progress of peace talks with India. Chinese also tasked them to keep track of other NE insurgent groups and progress of their peace parleys with India. One of the major responsibilities of Kholose was procurement of weapons from China.
In April 2009, the self styled President of NSCN(IM), Isak Chissi Swu, leader of group talking to India, accompanied by Shimray visited China for which the Visa was arranged by the Chinese intelligence in Philippines. They held a high level meeting with one General Lee and three senior Chinese intelligence officers. The Chinese while assuring them of Military cooperation, again reiterated their earlier requirement regarding information abut army movements in Arunachal, activities of Dalai Lama etc. NSCN(IM) leadership subsequently initiated follow up actions in Delhi, Dharmshala, Arunachal Pradesh and NSCN(IM) headquarters to meet Chinese intelligence requirements. Steps in the meantime also commenced to ship 1000 weapons from South Chinese port of Beihei to Cox’s Bazaar in Bangladesh for the NSCN (IM).
Paresh Baruah of ULFA after being pressurized by Bangladesh security agencies, also visited China in 2010. Reports indicate that he led a group of about 80 that after receiving training in Ruili in Yunnan was provided substantial quantities of weapons. It is significant that ULFA has been a source of procurement of weapons by Left Wing Extremists and possibility of some of the Chimes weapons reaching them through ULFA channels can not be ruled out.
Reality of Chinese renewed interest in NE insurgency can not be wished away in our security calculus. It assumes special import in the back drop of China’s emerging aggressiveness, military activities in border areas, claims on Arunachal Pradesh and linkages of Left Extremists with NE insurgent groups. The government in pursuing its policy of engaging the rebels in peace talks needs to display greater clarity of vision, well defined objectives and strategic precision. Mistaking the talks as an end rather than means to an end can push India into a self made strategic trap. While the rebel groups are enhancing their capabilities, establishing trans-border linkages, procuring new weapons and recruiting new cadres, the government appears to be calculating publicity mileage and possible electoral advantages as their sole gains. This can be a self defeating strategy.

Illegal Immigration:
The size geographical location and porosity of our borders makes large illegal migration to India from neighboring countries possible. People of all neighbouring countries share at least one important ethnic, religious or linguistic commonality with a section of the Indian population, which makes it possible for them to find easy shelters and go undetected. Economic opportunities afforded by relatively higher economic growth, freedoms of a liberal democratic polity, corruption, shortcomings of Indian political, administrative and judicial systems etc. have all contributed to make illegal immigration a major internal security problem.
Demographic invasion from Bangladesh, has already assumed alarming proportions. In many of the bordering districts of Assam and West Bengal it has brought about a total demographic transformation, forcing the original inhabitants to sell their lands and flee. Instead of abating, the last two years have witnessed an unprecedented increase in the inflow – the new migrants becoming more abrasive and emboldened, considering their illegal migration almost a matter of right. Subdued though, voices in support of greater Bangladesh have started surfacing both in Assam and Bangladesh.
The illegal immigrants from Bangladesh, who well exceed 2.5 million now, are no more confined to bordering states of Assam, West Bengal, Meghalaya etc. but have found new habitations in depth areas of the country. Most of them have been able to acquire identity documents with local political patronage and connivance of corrupt officials. The local Muslims in some areas are facilitating their settlements and helping them in procurement of ration cards, identity documents, jobs and political patronage.
This large scale migration is no more only a cause of demographic change, social conflicts, denial of economic opportunities and civic amenities to our own poor people but has become a security concern. The Islamic terrorists from Bangladesh readily find local shelters in length and breadth of the country. These immigrants also bring with them deeply ingrained anti-Indian ideas and seeds of fundamentalism. The border is porous and the infiltrators get full support from Bangladesh Border Forces. This unending stream of migrants is likely to become much more pronounced in the times to come, given the push factor in Bangladesh and the pull factor on the Indian side.
Illegal migration from Pakistan and Afghanistan is relatively small but its security implications are much greater. Pakistan as part of a long-term covert action programme, is trying to establish modules in different parts of the country with well trained and highly motivated Pak residents masquerading as Indians. A large number of Pakistanis who enter India with regular visas frequently go under ground and become untraceable.
Unemployment in Youth:
Though, essentially an economic and not a security issue if left unattended large scale youth unemployment can have serious security implications. India currently has a population of nearly 1.2 bn, 62.9% of which is in working age group. By 2026, India’s population profile is likely to grow even younger (68.4%in working age group) and the total population at 1.4 bn will overtake that of China. This translates into one billion people in the working age group that will need to be gainfully employed. Any failure will make large sections of unemployed youth vulnerable to forces of destabilization, disruption and destruction – both indigenous and foreign inspired. Channelised constructively, they can catapult India into a new power orbit making its human resource capital in the ageing world as a non-competeable CNP component for many decades ahead.
The total sum of jobs presently in India’s Public and private sector (including those in the unorganized private sector) work out to barely 300-350 million. India’s economic liberalization, so far is only producing the miracle of jobless growth. Most Indian industries have been imitating the Western corporate model – downsizing the workforce to maximize the profits. The Jamshedpur Steel plant of the Tatas that employed 80,000 workers some three decades ago with a production of 1 million tons per annum halved it to just 40,000 in the 1990’s and the output rose to 5 million tons per annum by automation. The plan is to further reduce the work force to just 20,000 but raise the production to 10 million tons per years. While to achieve global competitiveness India cannot afford to produce at high costs, it at the same cannot afford to keep its millions out of a job. A paradigm shift in over growth strategy is required and heavy investments need to be done in areas that can create large employment opportunities; nearly 700 million jobs by 2026. Man power intensive industries like ship building, infrastructure projects, rural employment schemes etc. will have to be accorded high priority. Generation of new and upgradation of existing skills through massive vocational training programmes need to be launched substituting the conventional educational pattern that churns out youth who are educated but unemployable. One of the ironies of Indian employment market is that while there are large numbers of youth with 10 to 16 years of formal education, most of the industries and employers find it difficult to get appropriate manpower that hardly requires training of two years or less beyond two years beyond basic 10 to 12 years of schooling. Non inclusive growth, large scale unemployment, huge income disparities etc. can be potential causes of internal instability and degradation. In national economic planning the strategico- security factors need to be given its deserved importance.

“How Deep Are the Roots of Indian Civilization -An Archeological & Historical Perspective?”

2011-09-22T06:25:00.000-07:00

Sent to Ms. Neera Misra on May 16, 2011 for publishing

Address by Shri Ajit Doval to seminar on
“How Deep Are the Roots of Indian Civilization -An Archeological & Historical Perspective?”
at Vivekananda International Foundation on Nov.25-27, 2010

Esteemed Prof. B.B. Lal, Shri K.N. Dixit, Ms. Neera Mishra, dignitaries on the Dias, Distinguished Scholars, Ladies and Gentlemen, It is indeed a great pleasure for me to welcome you all to the Vivekananda International Foundation.

It is most heartening for the Foundation to have such a galaxy of eminent scholars from India and abroad congregating here to deliberate on issues which are of great vital importance – both academic and empirical. Its import transcend from scholars like you to the common man like me, from present to the coming generations and from cradle of this ancient Indic civilization to human heritage of which we are a part. Though seized of its importance, let me confess that when it comes to history and archaeology I am no authentic voice on the subject and least qualified to address this august gathering. Nevertheless, I bring with me the perspective of a common man – least informed as a civilizational inheritor the primacy stake holder.

I earnestly believe that the only way to handle the future is to understand the past- its achievements, failures, thought processes and events that influenced the course of history. But all this is possible only if we knew the history right - the right facts, the right cause and effect relationships and the right interpretation of events, devoid of bias and subjectivity. ‘Learning lessons from history’ may will be a worthless cliché if history that we are made to read and imbibe if it is distorted, motivated or based on selective half truths. Half truths are more vicious than ignorance as people often find themselves sticking to the wrong half.

One is often dismayed by controversies surrounding restructuring of history curriculums in India, England or other parts of the world, revisiting standards of National History in the USA, disputes over the contents of history textbooks in Japan, China, Korea, Pakistan, Israel, Germany etc. Why the invasion of Latin American countries by the Europeans, the development of new curricula in the successor states of the former USSR or rewriting of history textbooks in Russia following collapse of the former USSR have generated raucous voices among the scholars, thought leaders and political elite alike. It’s because, across the board, there is a realization that the way the past is seen and projected is going to have a bearing on the future. It has a relevance for the nations and societies not only in the contemporary context but more so for their progenies. Unfortunately, India appears to be oblivious to this realization and, at times, some scholars pride themselves in reinforcing motivated stereotypes without striving to find truth and counter what I may call psy-war through distorted history.

There is a popularly held view that antiquity lends respectability and sense of continuity to human societies. The contrarian view that grandeur of the past neither provides panacea to problems of the present nor is a guarantier of better future tomorrow is advanced by utilitarian thinkers with equal vehemence. Both these viewpoints have some arguable justifications but suffer from the infirmity of evaluating contribution of history from scholar’s point of view and not the common man and the civil society. History provides people a mindset through which they consciously or otherwise navigate themselves, individually and collectively, in seeking answers of who they are, why they are, what they are and where will they be should the history repeat itself. In answers to these questions lay the whole spectrum of collective and individual experience of the past on one hand and their choices of the future on the other. The triumphs and tragedies of societies, failures and successes of governments, political ideas, religious beliefs and practices, art and architecture, cultural practices and rituals, educational systems, customs and traditions etc. are few among the endless list of domains – that influence and get influenced by the historic process. This connection between the past and present has been aptly brought out by noted historian E.H. Carr who in his book What is History asserts that: “The past is intelligible to us only in the light of the present; and we can fully understand the present only in the light of the past.” He further adds that history is needed to increase his mastery over the society of the past and to increase his mastery over the society of the present.

Historical and civilizational issues are not exclusive preserves of scholars and historians as it has equal relevance and utility for the common man and civil societies. The human societies - the way they think, resolve or sublimate their conflicts, interact with other societies, their faith systems and beliefs all are largely conditioned in the incubator of history – whether conscious by or otherwise. Even when one is not a part of the intellectual exercise one compulsively remains part of civilisational and cultural process – their DNA imprints are indelible?

For me the idea of importance of history and heritage comes from yet another vantage point. Often I wonder if the historical and civilizational issues were not all that relevant why some people in a systemic and painstaking manner take all the trouble to distort it. The importance of history and its linkage to a society and also the causes why people resort to distortions has been best summed up by historian, Arthur Marwick, who says: “Individuals, communities, societies could scarcely exist if all knowledge of the past is wiped out. As memory is to the individual, so history is to the community or the society. Without memory, individuals find great difficulty in relating to others, in finding their bearings, in taking intelligent decisions–– they lose their sense of identity. A society without history would be in a similar condition. A society without knowledge of its past would be like an individual without memory. It is only through a sense of history that communities establish their identity, orientate themselves, understand their relationship to the past and to other communities and societies. Without history (Knowledge of the past), we, and our communities, would be utterly adrift on an endless and featureless sea of time.”

I hardly need to explain or to elaborate the above quotation. Historical distortions are resorted to by the interested parties because they know that distortions are necessary to achieve something to sub-serve their interests of today and agenda of tomorrow. They deliberate with diligence to conjure up contrived images of the past and make them appear as real – particularly in the minds of those whose history stands mutilated. It allows manipulation of the minds of those who are wronged in a manner that suits vested interests of the intellectual manipulators. Their self view of who they are, their ethos, identities, values, beliefs, failures and achievements renders vulnerable to manipulation by others.

It is also important to flag that the way people define their identity, existence, world view and creation stories, and how they value, interpret, manage and transmit their past differ from society to society. The method of recoding and interpreting the past also differs. No set of subjective yard sticks and a judgmental approach to evaluate other societies- could be justifiable. Can a s huge treasure of civilizational and cultured wealth declared as untrustworthy and worthless just because it does not conform to some set of arbitrary parameters set up by alien cultures and civilizations. Can few victories in the wars or temporary political controls be justifiable reasons to condemn the wealth of human heritage as non-existent?

I am greatly delighted that VIF is organizing this three day international seminar on “How Deep Are the Roots of Indian Civilization - An Archeological & Historical Perspective?” Indeed it will be a matter of great privilege to hear the discourses from eminent scholars and others participants. In terms of time and space we shall be talking about the continuity of people living in this geographical region and how deep their historical and civilizational roots are?

I would like to thank Neera Misra ji and her Draupadi Trust for their untiring efforts, Ministry of Culture, Government of India for their support, and Archaeological Survey of India for their deep involvement in this effort. I do hope that as suggested by Dr. Lal, Archeological Survey of India will undertake an intensive five year research project to explore new findings along the course of forgotten river Saraswati. Thanks are also due to my colleagues here in Vivekananda International Foundation, especially my colleague Mr. Mukul Kanitkar, for making various logistic arrangements. My special thanks also to Prof. B.B. Lal whose presence here provides us a great motivation and sense of purpose.

Last but not the least I thank all the participants, from India and abroad, who have taken all the trouble to come here from distant parts of the world and submitted valuable papers for discussions during the seminar.

West outsourcing Afghanistan to Pak

2011-09-22T06:24:00.002-07:00

Interview

West outsourcing Afghanistan to Pak
Source: Deccan Herald, 10 March 2010,
Author: Ajit Doval

Retired director of Intelligence Bureau, Ajit Kumar Doval, has spent several years in the vexed North East and Jammu and Kashmir, besides the conflict zones of Pakistan...
He was the main negotiator when the then NDA government reached a settlement with terrorists at Kandahar, Afghanistan, to set free passengers of a hijacked Indian Airlines plane in 1999. Excerpts of an interview with B S Arun for Sunday Spotlight:

Does the latest terror attack in Kabul, apparently aimed at Indian nationals, warrant India’s pull-out from Afghanistan and stoppage of aid.

Pull-out is a security-related construct normally in the context of military presence or existence of military linked facilities. India has none of these in Afghanistan. What exists is a normal nation to nation civilian cooperation under which India has been extending to Afghanistan economic and humanitarian assistance. Except during the Taliban rule – a regime that was not recognised by India, India consistently maintained friendly relations with different governments that existed there. Following the Taliban rule, Afghanistan was in need of support and assistance to rebuild its degraded economy and social infrastructure. India, realising that socio-economic uplift was necessary for stability, security and development that would enable a democratic government to subdue the extremist forces, responded.

Just because the Indian Embassy in Kabul has been attacked twice, we won’t be ending our diplomatic presence there. It holds true for our other activities as well. Security threats have to be met by providing enhanced security cover and not abandonment or appeasement. Of course, the security element has also to be factored in.

Is Indian intervention in Afghanistan a means of curbing Pak terrorism within India? Will the attacks vitiate Indo-Pak peace talks?

Af-Pak region as an epicenter of jihadi terrorism is a matter of global concern. For India, it assumes very special import as India has been its victim for nearly two decades. Pakistan which has integrated use of covert action as a low cost instrument of state policy against India, its asymmetric adversary, has been maintaining a collaborative relationship with many terrorist groups, particularly those targeting India. In Afghanistan, Pakistan wants to exercise its control by leveraging terrorist groups like that of Jalaluddin Haqqani, Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, Hafiz Gulbahadur etc., that are amenable to it by branding them as soft Talibans. It is these so-called soft Talibans that have been used by Pakistan to target Indian interests. Problem for India is compounded when ideological, infrastructural and operational linkages start developing between these two sets of terrorist groups on account of Pak intelligence operating as common centre of command, control, motivation and infrastructural support. As proximity of these groups with Pak establishment have not only been reported by Afghan authorities but widely commented internationally, any incident of terror perpetrated by them are bound to cast their shadow on Indo-Pak talks. Pakistan government cannot expect India to pursue a peace initiative in the face of continued hostile activities against India in India.

Is India biting off more than it can chew when it has failed to curb the LeT in India? Is Let behind the attacks in Afghanistan?

I think India is not being as hard as it should be, both in dealing with Pakistan and handling terrorism within. The pressure built against Lashkar-e-Toiba following 26/11, which at one time was being trumpted as a major diplomatic victory, has proved to be short-lived. LeT linkages in Afghanistan with pro-Pak terrorist groups are known.

Pakistan is opposed to India’s role in Afghanistan and reiterated it at the recent London conference.

Pakistan is quite disturbed by the goodwill that has developed for India in Afghanistan, that it considers to be an area of its strategic depth. Since 2001, Indian has offered $1.2 billion for Afghan reconstruction making it the biggest donor in the region. Its successful completion of Zaranj-Delaram Highway in Afghanistan near the Iranian border and the progress on Chahbahar port in Iran that eventually may be linked to Afghanistan through road is seen adversely by Pakistan. It will reduce Afghanistan’s total dependency on Pakistan, which desires to give Afghanistan, a land-locked country, access to the outside world only through it.

Pakistan has been assiduously trying to keep India out of Afghanistan and has been black-mailing the Western powers that any foot hold given to India would adversely affect their capability to take on the jihadi elements in the disturbed Af-Pak region. It is unfortunate that India could not use its political clout and diplomatic skills first during Istanbul meeting and later during the London conference to assert that India was an important stakeholder and developments there had a bearing on its security interests. The current developments in the backdrop of Obama’s declaration to pull-out from Afghanistan and the policy of ‘strategic calibration’ implies West largely out-sourcing management of Afghanistan to Pakistan. It may hurt India’s security interests.

How do you view US pull-out of Afghanistan? What will be its implications to the region and to India?

I feel the US pulling out of Afghanistan is premature as they have not yet achieved the objective for which they came there. In recent years not only the situation in Afghanistan has become highly volatile but now the menace of jihadi terrorism has engulfed large areas in Pakistan. If the past experience is any indicator, Pakistan cannot be trusted in carrying forward the battle against terrorism that will serve the regional or global interests. It would try to manipulate the situation to maximise its own gains. Further, it will extract a formidable price not only in terms of economic aid but also military hardware and funds for augmenting its military capability on the pretext of fighting terrorism. These enhanced capabilities will pose direct threat to India. As is evidenced by Pak Army chief Gen A P Kayani’s assertion in February last, just before India offered peace talks, that India was “our natural and long term enemy”.

This new offensive needs new response

2011-09-22T06:24:00.001-07:00

This new offensive needs new response
Ajit Doval,

Aug 8, 2010, Times of India

http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/home/sunday-toi/special-report/This-new-offensive-needs-new-response/articleshow/6272641.cms

The situation in Kashmir is grave but quick-fix solutions can make it worse. A government is in crisis when it doesn't know what to do (crisis of ideas and decision making) or is unable to do what it wants to (crisis of action and capacities). In Kashmir, the government is facing both. The Army chief was right when he recently said that opportunities were squandered by the local government when militancy was low.

We need a proper strategic plan. The NDA government's 1998 Kashmir plan has neither been updated nor replaced. The current crisis is being blamed on political mismanagement, insensitive governance, faulty assessment of ground realities and low capacity to deal with mobs. But, there is more. Such a widespread, well coordinated and determined action with precision timing and uniform action can not be spontaneous. It is part of Pakistan's covert subversive offensive.It assumes importance as Pakistan, unable to achieve its objectives through military means or terrorist actions, now embarks on a new course.

Beginning 2008, Pakistan has been targeting civil society and exploiting the local people's grievances to cause disaffection and instability in the Valley. The offensive is designed to degrade India's legitimate claim over Kashmir. With international disapproval, domestic compulsions and decreasing support for militancy in Kashmir, terrorism is increasingly becoming unaffordable. The new offensive is premised on the assumption that emotive consolidation of Kashmiris can be better achieved with slogans exploiting local grievances than a larger political agenda. Once it assumes a critical mass, demands can be raised for MLAs to resign, government servants to boycott offices and the right for self-determination.

The movement has become so big because different sets of local interest groups are directly or indirectly supporting it for different reasons, becoming unwitting pawns in somebody else's grand strategy. For the opposition, the agitation means the fall of Omar Abdullah's government and fresh elections. For the separatists, it signifies an opportunity to denounce India's claim of enjoying the people's support and press for a political settlement acceptable to them (read Pakistan). And then, there are common people who are incensed by certain actions of the security forces. Pakistan is using its agent-provocateurs to bring all these groups together and using terrorists in disguise to raise the ante of violence. Pakistan is trying to convince the West that the de-radicalization of Pakistan and its people's support against terrorism is not possible without providing them comfort on the Kashmir issue.

We will be falling into the enemy trap if we try to tackle the subversive offensive with tools used to combat terrorism. Winning the trust of a civil society is a different ball game. The present phase of violence may abate after a while but the task of tackling civil society should not be forgotten. It may return with vengeance because Pakistan will continue to upgrade its tactics and the international setting may change to our disadvantage after the US starts to drawdown its troops from Afghanistan in July 2011.

Ajit Doval is former director of the Intelligence Bureau

Read more: This new offensive needs new response - The Times of India http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/articleshow/6272641.cms?prtpage=1#ixzz0yvAF6brT

Complicated encounters

2011-09-22T06:23:00.000-07:00

Complicated encounters
Ajit Kumar Doval

Posted online: Wed Aug 04 2010,

Indian Express
http://www.indianexpress.com/story-print/655825/

Beware of half truths — because you may be holding the wrong half. After having seen and read so much about the Sohrabuddin episode in the last five years, one might believe one knows it all. Sohrabuddin is now cast as an innocent victim of police excess.
However, it would be worthwhile to explore the real facts about Sohrabuddin, the nature of police encounters, and the real issues at stake. Sohrabuddin was an underworld gangster who was involved in nearly two dozen serious criminal offences in states of Gujarat, Rajasthan, Madhya Pradesh and Maharashtra. He maintained transnational links with anti-India forces from the early ‘90s onwards, until his death in 2005. Working with mafia dons like Dawood Ibrahim and Abdul Latif, he procured weapons and explosives from Pakistan and supplied them to various terrorist and anti-national groups (had it not been for his activity, at least some terrorist acts could have been averted). Sohrabuddin was solidly entrenched in the criminal world for a decade-and-a-half. Around the time he was killed, the Rajasthan government had announced a reward on his head. In 1999, he had been detained under the National Security Act by the Madhya Pradesh government.
In a 1994 case investigated by the Ahmedabad crime branch, he was co-accused along with Dawood Ibrahim and convicted for five years, for waging war against the Government of India, planning an attack on the Jagannath rath yatra in Orissa, and other offences under the IPC, Arms Act, etc. During the investigation, 24 AK-56 rifles, 27 hand grenades, 5250 cartridges, 81 magazines and more were seized from his family home in Madhya Pradesh. In 2004, a fourth crime was registered against him by Chandgad police station of Kolhapur district in Maharashtra under sections 302, 120 (b), and 25 (1) (3) of the Arms Act, for the killing of Gopal Tukaram Badivadekar. As fear of him often silenced people from reporting his whereabouts, let alone deposing against him, the Rajasthan government had to announce a reward on his head after he killed Hamid Lata in broad daylight in the heart of Udaipur, on December 31, 2004. So much for Sohrabuddin’s innocence.
However, irrespective of who Sohrabuddin was and what he did, the use of unaccountable force against him is indefensible is the public view of many (often at variance with their private view). There are many who feel that there is a higher rationale for such actions in compelling circumstances, as the law of the land has repeatedly found itself helpless in dealing with individuals bent on bleeding the country. Their argument, that the rule of law is a means to an end and not an end in itself, often finds support in the jurisprudential principles of salus populi est suprema lex (the people’s welfare is the supreme law) and salus res publica est suprema lex (the safety of the nation is supreme law). Even the Supreme Court of India, in the case of D.K. Basu vs. State of West Bengal [1997 (1) SCC 416] accepted the validity of these two principles and characterised them as “not only important and relevant, but lying at the heart of the doctrine that welfare of an individual must yield to that of the community.” The validity of the principles of salus populi est suprema lex and salus res publica est suprema lex could have been part of an enlightened national discourse, and what could be the governing instrumentalities, empowerments, legal checks and stringent processes if these principles were to be invoked. It is better to accept reality as it is and then strive to change it for the better, rather than what we wish it to be. Feigned ignorance is the worst type of hypocrisy.
But there is another vital question that needs to be addressed. While pursuing the Sohrabuddin case, was the government really serious about stopping the menace of fake encounters, or was it pursuing a different agenda? Encounters have been taking place all over the country under all regimes, at times degenerating into what are called fake encounters. Between 2000 and 2007 there have been 712 cases of police encounters in the country with UP topping the list at 324, and Gujarat figuring almost at the bottom with 17.
In some of the cases there was not much on record, even to establish the criminal past of those killed. Settling political scores through security and investigative agencies like the CBI is not only bad politics, but also destructive for the nation’s security. To convey the impression (explicitly or implicitly) that Sohrabuddin was targeted for belonging to a particular community, thereby creating a sense of insecurity in a section of society, is detrimental to national interests. It is little known that a large number of Sohrabuddin’s victims were Muslims while a good number of his closest associates (including Tulsiram Prajapati, who was also killed in a similar encounter), were Hindu. William Blake could not have been more right when he said that “a truth that is pursued with bad intent beats all the lies you can invent”.
The other negative impact of the Sohrabuddin case is the impression it is creating that all encounters in which police and security forces are involved, are fake. Society needs to be reassured that the majority of encounters are genuine and mostly in response to murderous attacks on security personnel. The fact that, on average, over 1,200 policemen get killed every year grappling with terrorists, insurgents, underworld mafia and other anti-social elements, bears ample testimony to this fact. Playing up a few aberrations and blowing them out of proportion and presenting them as the only truth is not in the national interest.
The other downside of the publicity around such cases is that it erodes the people’s trust in governance. Administrations begin to be seen as instruments of repression and self-aggrandisement and politicians as perceived as manipulating their power for political and personal gains. This erosion can lead to a dangerous delegitimisation of the polity. Democratic politics is an exercise in regime-legitimisation, and to lose the confidence of the governed would set the government on a self-destructive path.
The writer is former director of the Intelligence Bureau

'Time to stay a step ahead of terrorists'

2011-09-22T06:22:00.000-07:00

'Time to stay a step ahead of terrorists'
Last updated on: October 23, 2009 16:15 IST
Rediff.com
Link: http://news.rediff.com/interview/2009/oct/23/inter-time-to-stay-a-step-ahead-of-terrorists.htm

The November 26 terrorist attacks in Mumbai [ Images ] last year revealed the chinks in India's security setup. From poor intelligence to lack of preparedness, a lot was spoken on how to prevent another carnage of this magnitude.

Ajit Kumar Doval, former director of the Intelligence Bureau , discusses with rediff.com's Vicky Nanjappa the intelligence scenario post 26/11. Doval says it is 'ridiculous' that the Mumbai police is still in denial about a local link in the deadly attacks.
Do you think that the capabilities of the Intelligence Bureau have changed in the aftermath of 26/11?
Capabilities of the intelligence agencies do not change overnight. The IB is constantly upgrading its skills and capabilities -- both operational and analytical -- to meet new challenges. Structural changes are also being brought about when required.
Our adversaries are changing and multiplying at a very fast rate. However, the changes that the agency makes do not necessarily and proportionately reduce threat levels. In fact, there is a marked improvement in its functioning. But both the direction and speed of the change calls for an orbital shift.
Could you please explain the concept of 'change'?
The construct of change in India is reformative in nature. When there is a failure and mistakes are detected, reforms are brought about to ensure that those mistakes are not repeated. However, I feel that the changes in the framework of reformation, though necessary, are inadequate.
Take the Mumbai attacks for instance in which five-star hotels were attacked. The change in security systems and drills in hotels across the country may make the hotels secure but do not reduce the overall terrorist threat. A terrorist outfit may not necessarily carry out an attack on hotels again. There is a need to change so as to cope with the changing capabilities and intentions of terrorists. There is a need for a forward-looking approach.
If we assess that a terrorist organisation will strike with weapons of mass destruction, then there is a need to gear up for that too. They may even think of hitting at defence and nuclear installations. Terror groups keep improvising and modifying their field craft to surprise the adversary. And, when they fail to do so -- they get surprised and are neutralised.
They keep changing their targets, their modus operandi and may even use people from another country to carry out a terror strike. The construct of change should be transformative. Change your techniques, technology and tradecraft fast and on unpredictable lines -- not necessarily linked to the last failure.
Time-tested methods have no place in the game of intelligence -- the trick lies in ever inventing something new and something least expected. Be innovative enough to remain a step ahead of them. And that requires ability to think like a terrorist and changing innovatively and imaginatively.
There was a lot spoken about the local angle in the Mumbai attack. However, the Mumbai police refuses to acknowledge this. What is your opinion?
For millenniums we did not know the existence of uranium in nature. That did not mean that there was no uranium. An operation of the scale of 26/11 could not have been carried out by semi-literate foreign terrorists in an alien setting with so much of precision, sense of time direction and space without local support.

Just because the Mumbai police was not lucky or smart enough to find something about this that does not mean that the local angle was non-existent.
Let us analyse all major, or even minor, incidents of terrorism perpetrated by the foreigners in the past and see how many were there without local support.
Do you think that there is still scope to probe the local angle?
I think the battle ends only when we win. The effort should continue; and I think there is still scope for this.
Do you think Pakistan is under any pressure to act against terrorism? Do you think that they have acted on it?
As far as India is concerned, Pakistan is not under any real pressure. Over the years, Pakistan has developed immunity to international condemnation. It is not bothered about the sullying of its image. The tangible pressure is only for taking surgical actions against the groups or individuals, who potentially can hit Western interests or targets. I don't think that there is any pressure on them to shut down India specific terror camps, prevent infiltration, take action against the gun runners, currency counterfeiters or India linked radical organisations.
Although I do feel that there is a desire on the part of the Western countries to make Pakistan and Afghanistan terror-free states. India, unfortunately, does not figure high in the pecking order.
What about the Lashkar-e-Tayiba [ Images ]? Do you think that they have disintegrated after the Mumbai attack?
Not at all! The LeT has not been subjected to any degradation though it has been tactically advised to lie low following international pressure. Their infrastructure, sources of funding, catchments for new recruitment and religious schools under Markaz-Dawa-ul-Irshad to produce jihadis, production of jihadi literature, sources for procurement of weapons, etc. are very much intact.
What about outfits like the Students Islamic Movement of India and the Indian Mujahideen [ Images ]? They are relatively quiet as of now. Does this mean they are finished?
The SIMI [ Images ] and IM are very much present; they have not vanished. Maybe as a group they may not be as well organised and active as before. However, there are individuals who still maintain their trans-national linkages and can be exploited by forces inimical to India
There has been a rise in incidents involving Hindu organisations. What do you have say about this?
I do not think there is any serious possibility of any Hindu organisations taking to violence in a big way. However, any such trend must be countered and curbed.

Terrorist threat and response capability - India a year after

2011-09-22T06:20:00.000-07:00

Terrorist threat and response capability - India a year after

Nov 22, 2009
Deccan Herald
Link: http://www.deccanherald.com/content/37211/

Ajit Doval

Except the speculators, no one can bet their money on the truth about police’s response mechanism and terrorists’ real capabilities.

Causation proves co-relation but co-relation does not prove causation. Non-occurrence of any major incident following 26/11 has co-relation with terrorism but its absence does not prove disappearance of threat. Event centric assessments often lead to such simplifications as human mind is designed to simplify complex issues to bring them within the limits of what it can comprehend.

The assertion by Maharashtra Director General of Police during “Security Summit” in battered Trident Hotel of Mumbai on November 14, 2009 that “Police’s response mechanism has improved drastically and we are much more confident now” is heartening but has to be taken with a pinch of salt.

A statement purported to have been issued by Mustafa Abu-al Yazid, one of the top Al Qaeda functionaries, early this year that “The Islamic nation that produced the audacious and heroic martyrs of Bombay, who struck you in the midst of your homes and humiliated you, is able to produce thousands more like them,” is also a tall claim for affect and not a measure of their real capabilities. Except the speculators, no one can bet their money where the truth lies. Rather than crystal gazing, this calls for a professional approach.

For meaningful risk assessment changes, if any, two independent vectors that determine security quotient need to be analysed. The first relates to the ‘Stimulant,’ i.e profile of the source of threat. Shift in threat levels is largely determined by changes in the capability and intentions of the source of threat. The other, relates to ‘Response,’ i.e ability of the threatened entity to destroy, deter or prevent the threat.

Disadvantage India

The Stimulant analysis first. As assessed in the light of disclosures made by David Headley and Tahawwur Rana, interdiction of HUJI and LeT activists in Bangladesh targeting Indian High Commission in Dhaka, investigations of counterfeit Indian currency cases indicating ISI linkages, unabated infiltrations and attacks in Jammu and Kashmir, disclosures by arrested jihadis from different parts of the country etc., it is evident that there is no lowering of threats from terrorist groups and their mentors.

However, while intentions remain unchanged and capabilities intact, there are two changes in last one year that will affect Pakistan’s capability to convert its diabolical intentions into ground actions. The first being compulsions created by a
virulent insurgency using terrorism as its tactics and secondly Pakistan coming under heavier international scanner on terrorism front, making it difficult to operate with impunity as in the past.

Contrary to a simplistic assessment, these factors do not lower the threat but may change its character to India’s disadvantage. The new plans will be more devious and circumspect trying to leave no scent of its involvement. It will also make Pakistan give greater autonomy to act, without withholding resources to groups enjoying their patronage, a freedom that can hurt India. Further, wrongly suspecting India to be responsible for its woes, it may goad LeT, HUJI, HM etc. to retaliate. As operational capabilities of these outfits remain intact and so do their striking capabilities, it would be wrong to assess that changed setting will bring down the threat level.

Musharraf was honest in telling to CNN early this month that “Always, in every group, there is an ingress of the ISI. And that is the efficiency, the effectiveness of the ISI. You must have ingress, so that you can influence all organisations and use them to Pakistan’s own advantage.”

Recent moves indicate futuristic use with greater tactical circumspection and diabolism like operating through third country bases, recruiting local youth for operations, extending networks to smaller townships, providing sleeper cells with ostensible covers, issuance of strict instructions to LeT, HUJI and others on communications etc., are illustrative. The threats are not reduced but are changing their character.

Response analysis

Now, the response. In last one year, some changes have been brought about mainly to rectify gaps and infirmities of the past. Should Mumbai recur, the Indian response may be better. Introduction of quick response teams, acquisition of latest weaponry, redeployment of National Security Guards (NSG), formation of National Investigation Agency (NIA), providing combat vehicles equipped with latest arms and global positioning systems etc. in some high vulnerability areas will provide speed, better fire power and tactical advantage to our forces, albeit in limited areas. The protective security of vulnerable targets has also been strengthened with better technology support.

However, a country of India’s size, diversity and freedoms cannot be protected only in a defensive mode. Cases of Headley and Rana are indicative of unaffordable chinks in our armour.

Very little achieved

The nation’s safety levels cannot be increased unless the capacities of terrorist groups are degraded, their collaborative linkages with gun-runners, financiers and underworld are severed, sleeper cells demolished, and over-ground support bases eroded through a planned and sustained effort.

Very little has been achieved or capacities built to meet these goals. India cannot depend for its security on hopes of the adversaries falling prey to their own contradictions or foreign initiatives reducing threats to India. The new threats may hit us in places where we are least prepared and in forms we expect least and the country has yet to prepare itself for that.

(The writer is former Director, Intelligence Bureau and first Indian police officer
to get the Kirti Chakra; also Director, Vivekananda International Foundation.)

Threat lingers

“Every day I receive intelligence reports saying that terrorists based in Pakistan are planning other similar acts.” - Prime Minister Manmohan Singh on whether he worries about another 26/11-like attack.

Why Policy Response to Terrorism Deludes India?

2011-09-22T06:16:00.000-07:00

Why Policy Response to Terrorism Deludes India?
DENOUEMENT, January-February 2009
Ajit Doval
Former Director Intelligence Bureau

Absence of a coherent and time consistent counter-terrorist policy is responsible for India's failure on terrorist front is a common refrain of many well meaning critics. Drawing parallels with US success in securing homeland security following September 11, 2001 attacks, as against repetitive attacks in India, are largely attributed to this infirmity. While the logic of two comparisons is faulty on the fundamentals, it cannot be denied that despite having been bled profusely, India's response to terrorism has not been in pursuance of a grand policy, like US and many other terrorist affected countries. Indian response generally has been episodic and disjointed mostly reacting to situational challenges; particularly in the after math of major terrorist actions. Short term and tactical, they are primarily driven by an anxiety to reduce political costs in the wake of popular resentment and the media onslaught, achieve quick results in identifying and neutralizing the culprits and dish out brave statements to boost the morale of people, hoping that they will be seen as government's bold new policy initiatives.
Arguably, this is the time for fast and smart tactical actions to generate heat on the terrorists and not for policy making which is a long and cumbersome exercise of defining objectives, building capacities, redefining inter-agency role and responsibilities, restructuring systems etc. While one can justify ' immediate' taking precedence over 'important' to meet the problem at hand, what baffles one is that even after the initial outburst have subsided the 'important' continues to remain as elusive as before. The system settles down to the rut of the routine till the next event triggers the cycle all over again.
Despite having been bled profusely, India's response to terrorism...has been episodic and disjointed mostly reacting to situational challenges; particularly in the after math of major terrorist actions.
People start believing that the government lacks the intention, capability or the both to address the problem. Their belied expectations from the government of grappling the problem from a higher plane with a long term policy perspective, strategic vision and systems driven coordination give rise to wide-spread cynicism. They desire time-failed systems, non-performing policies and disjointed actions to be substituted by coherent policies and new capacities.
It would be absurd to presume that any government in power would not wish it to happen - if for no other reason for its own political benefit. It also cannot simply be attributed to bureaucratic apathy or insensitivity of the security apparatus. Probably, they are the worst sufferers of non-policy and would very much like to be led by definitive policy guidelines, if they only had the capability and opportunity of having one. The question that begs an answer is why in India, the world's biggest victim of terrorism, it fails to happen. There has to be something more fundamentally amiss in the Indian system which is responsible for this. It is important to identify these causes to bring about required correctives.
Policy making in government is a process through which those in power translate their political vision into plans and programmes to achieve certain defined objectives. Existence of political vision is thus at the centre of policy making. In the contemporary fractious Indian polity the political vision has been overcast by considerations of electoral calculations and pandering to the perceived sensitive of vote banks. Maximizing electoral advantages by serving the national interests best is no more considered politics that pays. Commitment to national good and ideological convictions, visible in early years of independence, has been taken over by politics of compromise and short term expediency. In recent times, coalition compulsions have further accentuated the problem constricting policy making only to a small residual area which does not hurt political interests of even a small constituent, where withdrawal of support could lead to collapse of the government. This minimal area of consensus is too small to formulate policies in respect of challenges which require national response at maximal level. As many security issues, including terrorism, fall in this category they have been the worst hit.
To take an illustration, North East is India's most vulnerable strategic region with more than 99% of its boundary being international. Over 88% of this international border is with the countries with which India faces one or the other security related problem. Due to geo-historical reasons, the area is still secluded from national main stream and has witnessed more than two dozen insurgencies is last six decades of India's post-independence history. It also provides an easy route for smuggling of weapons from Pacific-rim countries and drugs from golden triangle area. In this setting, securing its borders and making them impregnable should have been nation's prime security priority. However, what we did was just the opposite. In 1984, Assam which was worst hit by the massive demographic invasion was taken out of the purview of Foreigners Act through enactment of Illegal Migrants Determination by Tribunal Act (IMDT Act). The Act facilitated uninterrupted illegal migration of Bangladeshis in Assam and, from there, to rest of the country. The illegal emigration also provided an opportunity to the jehadi terrorists to find easy access to India. These illegal immigrants were helped in getting enrolled as voters thereby constituting a major vote bank, a consideration which for Congress took precedence over national security interests.
The creation of a National Investigating Agency, though a move forward, will prove to be inadequate unless all counter-terrorist intelligence tasks are placed under a unified command-and-control system.
After 21 years of passing of this Act, the Supreme Court in July, 2005 was constrained to observe that the Act was "wholly unconstitutional and must be struck down". Calling it as an "aggression", the apex court verdict added that "The presence of such a large number of illegal migrants from Bangladesh, which runs into millions, is in fact an aggression on the state of Assam and has also contributed significantly in causing serious internal disturbances in the shape of insurgency of alarming proportions. The IMDT Act and Rules had been so made that innumerable and insurmountable difficulties are created in identification and deportation of the illegal migrants" The serious security implications of millions of illegal immigrants settling down in a region, challenged by high internal and external threats got eclipsed on narrow electoral considerations. But what was more alarming was to see that immediately after such a severe indictment by the Supreme Court, the Foreigners Tribunal Order was issued on February 10,2006, reintroducing the provisions of the IMDT Act through the back door for not losing the political advantage. It took another Supreme Court intervention on a public interest litigation to strike down the order.
There can no effective policy making in security matters unless those in power develop a political vision in which national security takes precedence over short-term political gains. In a competitive electoral politics, this will entail pursuing a bi-partisan approach so that national interest approach does not become politically unaffordable. A political discourse at a higher plane among major political parties on critical security issues, including terrorism, would be necessary for achieving this objective.
Even in the settings where political will and vision exists, policy making does not accrue as an automatic by product. It requires an institutionalized knowledge base, expertise both of the issues involved and the art of policy making, capacity to optimally leverage given constants and variables to nation's best advantage and a highly competent and committed civil service. The Indian security management system is deficient in this respect. Though there are individuals with high capabilities and commitments, but as a system, they are not able to achieve what the nation otherwise is capable of. This invites the snide remarks of India being a soft-state implying that its policy making and policy executing capacities are disproportionately low to the sum total of its comprehensive state power. Both policy making and policy execution in India is mired in a bureaucratic morass where there are more brakes than accelerators. Policy making has to pass through cumbersome processes which are slow, militate against change, are fettered by antiquated rules and procedures whose rationale has long been lost and is beleaguered by inter-department rivalries. Worst still, at different stages it is handled by people who lack required knowledge and skills, decision making capability, and are not accountable for causing delays and their other acts of Commission and omission. They are not the state holders in the success or failure of the policies, a burden that has to be born by the executive agencies. They are safe as long as they do not violate the rules and procedures.
In today's world, policy making has evolved itself into a fine professional discipline. The changes have, however, eluded Indian system of governance. To compound the matters, modern security issues are no more unidimensional in character and require multi-disciplinary understanding and application. For instance, tackling of terrorism in India would require a sound understanding of plans and strategies of neighbouring countries sponsoring terrorism and nuances of their intricate politico-strategic relations with India, ideological and collaborative linkages of the terrorist groups, inter and intra-group relationships, tactics and technology of modern day terrorists, an understanding of center-state relations, Criminal Laws and Criminal Administrative System of the country etc. Moreover, there is plethora of knowledge and ideas outside the government which should be factored in imaginatively for good policy making. In a democracy this should further include trends in public thinking, views of political rivals and interest groups, opinions of think tanks etc. Policy making today has thus become a much more complex and multi¬dimensional exercise than in the past.
With the declining standards of governance, a perceptible decline in these capabilities is discernible at a time when security challenges have become most acute.
The next problem in counter-terrorist policy making emanates from the structural architect of India's legalo-constitutional frame work itself. When designed, it did not foresee the type of complex internal security problems, like terrorism, emerging with trans-national and inter-state connectivities. With wars increasingly becoming cost ineffective and unpredictable instrument of achieving politico-strategic objectives, the modern world is witnessing emergence of forth generation warfare -a warfare against an invisible enemy- as a substitute. Even the small and weaker states can take on their more powerful adversaries in this asymmetric warfare which largely targets internal security with terrorism as its most favoured weapon. India has been witnessing the Pakistani onslaught of Covert Action now for nearly there decades.
Strong anti-terror laws — substantive and procedural — are necessary. It is gratifying that the government has almost re-enacted POTA-the NIA Act and the amendment to the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967. However, in the new law, inadmissibility of disclosures made before the police remains a lacuna. How can the police get evidence of the planning, preparation and logistics that lie beyond their reach and jurisdiction? Making admissions even before senior police officers inadmissible will only help the terrorists.
How can a society unwilling to trust its police against a foreign terrorist expect a policeman to lay down his life to protect it?
An immaculate integration of the three functions that go in fighting terrorists
— developing operation-grade intelligence, coercive action to pre-empt or prevent terrorist actions and investigation — is required. One of the reasons why terrorists are able to display greater surprise, speed and success in their operations, despite low human and material resources, is that each terrorist group synergises all the functions that go into perpetrating a terrorist act. A unified national response will check the menace of passing the buck that has cost the nation for so long.
The creation of a National Investigating Agency, though a move forward, will prove to be inadequate unless all counter-terrorist intelligence tasks are placed under a unified command-and-control system. An investigating agency, at best, may get a few more convictions in the courts. But a 'war against terrorism' cannot be won in the courts. What we need is a National Counter-Terrorist Agency with stand¬alone capacities to fight terrorism.
For empowerment of the state police, states should be encouraged to enact laws to control activities of organised criminals, counterfeiters, gun-runners, drug syndicates etc. who have collaborative linkages with terrorists. It is regrettable that the Centre has not accorded its concurrence to many anti-terror state legislations like those in Gujarat and Madhya Pradesh for years, even as such a law exists in Maharashtra.
It matters to a nation what happens to it. But what is more important is how it responds to it. Today a national consensus can be the driving force for
bringing about many changes that are long overdue. Let us turn a calamity into
an opportunity and force best comprehensive changes when it comes
to securing our nation. ■
DENOUEMENT January-February 2009

Jammu & Kashmir – Emerging complexities

2011-09-22T06:14:00.000-07:00

Article sent to Ms. Puja Raina Mahaldar for publishing in DSA on August 11, 2009 ( published under the caption of “The right path for India” in October 2009)

Jammu & Kashmir – Emerging complexities
Ajit Doval, KC
Issues become complex when their loci is determined by intertwined and mutually conflicting variables. Kashmir, one of the longest enduring conflicts of the modern times is a classic case in point. What makes the problem intractable and the response difficult is that any initiative taken to address one vector has collateral impact on the others, often unfavorable.
It started as a simple problem of addressing the concerns of a recalcitrant Maharaja of a princely State - more personal then politico-strategic. In last six decades, both Pakistan and India have added new variables – former to have a locus-standi on an issue that it had none and the later guilty of faulty assessments of Pakistan, politics of Kashmir and their own capabilities. Time inconsistent and segmental approach in the past not only added new complexities to the problem but expanded the scope and intensity of existing ones. Illustratively, to deal with an obstinate Maharaja, Nehru brought in Sheikh Abdullah and his National Conference to counter him, though they had no locus-standi under the accession arrangement. This linked local politics to an issue which had national security, sovereignty and territorial implications. The wrong approach was evident when Sheikh Abdullah had to be kept under prolonged detention and the problem did not end with signing of accord with him in 1975. To gain support of the Valley Muslims, Article 370 was introduced which created complexity in relationship of union with the state and instead of achieving emotional integration only helped divisive forces. By allowing the state to have its own constitution, Criminal law and ill defined relationship with the union, the integrative process got negated.
Pakistan, the original sinner, complicated the issue by adding variables of ‘religion’ and ‘violence’ when in the name of Islam it conceived, resourced and mounted a proxy invasion by the Razakars in 1947. No better evidence than Maj. General Akbar Khan, who was incharge of the entire operation, himself narrating the entire story in his book ‘Raiders of Kashmir’ giving full details of Pakistan’s involvement in arming, organizing, coordinating and financing the operation can be adduced. Nehru gave unwarranted locus-standi to Pakistan in India’s internal affairs by engaging Pakistan in talks and correspondence over Kashmir when he should have squarely focused on vacating the aggression and driving the invaders out from the entire area that legally had ceded to India. He thus made state of Pakistan a stake holder. By unilaterally declaring in an All India Radio broadcast on November 2, 1947, much before he took it to the UN that, “We are prepared to have a referendum held under international auspices like the United Nations and shall accept their verdict”, he not only internationalized the issue but declared that its accession to India was only tentative and conditional. On January 1, 1948 when India took the matter to UN Security Council it fell into the trap of Pakistan of making Kashmir an international territorial dispute to India’s disadvantage. Since then, at every turn of events, the situation has got further complicated Prime Minister Manmohan Singh’s Joint Communiqué in Sharm-el-Sheikh being the latest goof up in the series.
While the old complexities continue to haunt us in their original or mutated form, the new ones have emerged. First in the list is use of terrorism by Pakistan as an integral part of its state policy to achieve its strategico-political objectives in J&K. Militancy in J&K is essentially a low intensity external aggression launched by Pakistan, an asymmetric adversary, using Jihadis, to bleed India. Organized under the banner of different Tanzims (religious outfits), youth are indoctrinated in ISI supported seminaries, trained in camps run by their supplicant organizations like Hizbul Mujahideen and Lashkar-e-Toiba, weaponized and financed by the ISI and launched into Indian territory through Line of Control with the help of Pakistani Rangers or third countries by providing them travel documents. ISI also facilities their collaborative networking with underworld criminal gangs, gun-runners, drug traffickers, currency counterfeiters, border smugglers, radical Muslim outfits etc. that which provide them logistic, infrastructural, intelligence and at times, financial support. It also calibrates the level of violence, selection of targets, timings of major terrorist depredations and coordination of activities of various Jihadi groups to meet their strategico-tactical objectives. Irrespective of the heavy rate of degradation, ISI has been able to maintain the numerical strength of terrorists in J&K between 2,800 to 3,300 uninterruptedly for nearly two decades. Similarly, notwithstanding large quantities of seizers of weapons and explosives, fencing and other border strengthening measures taken by the security forces, they have been able to ensure unhindered supply of terrorist hardware to the militants. Since the inception of militancy despite 22, 064 terrorists killed and nearly 82,000 weapons seized, mostly AK series of rifles, sub-machine guns, and rocket launchers etc., ISI has been able to replenish the losses on continuing basis. This singularly has been their greatest success.
There has, however, been a decline in the intensity of violence since 2001. To interpret it as a change in Pakistan’s strategic objectives or their denouncement of terrorism as an instrument of state policy would, however, be a gross strategic miscalculation. The first factor responsible for this decline is that Pak ISI estimates that raising the ante of terrorist violence in J&K does not pressurize the Government of India to the extent the incidents in the hinterland do. Consequently, since 2001 they had been focusing more on the main land taking on targets like urban areas, economic centers, religious places etc. It is significant that while terrorist violence by Pakistan sponsored Islamic groups in the main land were almost non-existent till 2001 (except 1993 Mumbai bomb blasts following demolition of Babri Mosque), casualties inflicted outside J&K after 2001 have been as high as 1,023 killed and over 4,000 injured in nearly sixty terrorist incidents. The second factor has been that with the declining role of Kashmiri militant out-fits following 1996 assembly elections, they have been predominantly banking on Pakistani Jihadi groups like Lashkar-e-Toiba, Harkat-ul-Ansar, Jaish-e-Mohammad etc. to bleed India. These terrorist groups did not enjoy tactical advantage and people’s support in Kashmir to the extent the Kashmiri groups did and hence were more effectively deployed in the hinterland that provided vast areas to operate with relatively lesser pressure of security agencies. Thirdly, after September 11, 2001 Pakistan came under heavy international pressure and had to use their terrorist assets more circumspectly to ensure higher deniability. Estimating that operating through third country bases like Bangladesh, Nepal, Middle-East etc., with no direct evidence of their involvement, could reduce pressure on Pakistan they exercised this option. They used local surrogate radical outfits like Harkat-ul-Zihad-e-Islami, with which ISI had enjoyed long association. Even within India, they converted SIMI from a radical Muslim youth organisation to a terrorist outfit by training a section of its cadres, financing and indoctrinating them and developing their linkages with terrorist tanzims in Pakistan and Bangladesh. For these non-Pakistan based groups, it was relatively easier to operate in India’s hinterland than in the J&K. The deteriorating internal situation in Pakistan leading to declining support for the militancy in J&K was another contributing factor.
It needs to be emphasized that decline in terrorist incidents in J&K notwithstanding, Pakistan’s strategic intentions on Kashmir remain unchanged. The India specific terrorist infrastructure remains in tact and Pakistan army’s fight against domestic and anti-west Islamic groups is part of an entirely different transaction and a source of little comfort to India. The India specific groups should be seen more as intelligence resource of Pakistan operating under Islamic cover. Occasional tactical readjustments in location, size and organisation of the training camps and infrastructure as also so-called counter-terrorist initiatives are a mere eye wash to hoodwink India and international opinion. General Officer Commanding in Chief, Northern Command informed the media on January 15, 2009 that, “A member of terrorist training camps are still active in Pakistan”. Pakistan’s Islamists reserves targeting India like Lashkar-e-Toiba, Hizbul Mujahideens, Harkat-ul-Jihad-e-Islami, Jaish-e-Mohammad etc. continue to receive Pak intelligence patronage in one from or the other.
Pretensions of peace notwithstanding, Pakistan’s provocative firing along the LOC has continued unabated during 2008 and 2009. Mostly, it is meant to facilitate crossings by the terrorist groups by diverting the attention of Indian troops deployed along the borders; forcing them to concentrate on the firing rather than coming out routine border patrolling providing opportunity to the terrorists to infiltrate. A. K. Anthony, Defence Minister, informed the Parliament on October 20, 2008 that “Pakistan had violated the five-year old pact on cease-fire 58 times since the ceasefire agreement came into effect from November, 2003. And since January 2008, Indian position on the LoC has been fired upon 34 times, while the total cease-fire violation by Pakistan has occurred on 58 counts.” The year 2008-2009 also witnessed intensified infiltration bids.
Another new vector that has compounded complexity of the Kashmir issue is nuclearisation of Pakistan. It considers it as a strategic asset that immunizes it against any military retaliation by India, giving it a free space to indulge in anti-Indian activities like terrorism, sabotage, subversion, espionage and other internationally unaccepted activities. It also feels that its nuclear possessions sufficiently hedge it against the world allowing it to become a failed state and whatever its follies, will sustain it politically and economically. It both subtly and blatantly capitalizes on the global fears of nuclear assets falling into the hands of Islamic radicals posing serious threat to global security. It estimates that it will force the world not only to keep it politically and economically going but even allow it space to tackle Kashmir issue on its terms. Its recent effort to proliferate its nuclear arsenal, when it is embroiled in serious internal turmoil and faces no external threat, is part of its hedging exercise. The west’s fears of the worst make them lower their strategic sites and remain content with whatever little Pakistan delivers and at whatever costs to safeguard their security interests. For them, even undermining India’s legitimate security concerns is an affordable cost. The doctrine that resolution of conflict in Kashmir with some concessions given to Pakistan will de-radicalize Pakistan and isolate the terrorist groups though completely untenable has some takers in the West. India has not been able to demolish this precarious myth.
The changing diplomatic setting at bilateral level is another important vector having a bearing on Kashmir issue. At bilateral level, India’s handling of Pakistan has left much to be desired. Pakistan has almost succeeded in restarting the dialogue process with India, after profusely bleeding it in Mumbai terrorist depredation of November 26, 2008, thereby getting away without paying the attendant cost of a most reprehensible act of international terrorism. Covert Actions (CA) come with a price tag, albeit with a difference – act now pay later. The cost to be paid is determined by the aggrieved party’s capacity and will to punish the delinquent state at one end and its diplomatic skills and capability to isolate and pressurize it internationally on the other. Through terrorist depredations, Pakistan conveys the high cost that Pakistan can inflict on India for retaining Kashmir and having done so, it tries to minimize the retaliatory cost to itself by denouncing the act of terror, swearing to fight the menace together and urging to state the dialogue process-to which Kashmir is central. Propounding the root cause theory, it asserts that not much can be achieved in tackling terror till the root cause i.e. Kashmir is resolved amicably. Believing that for such messages to have an impact they have to be persistently repeated talks and preparations for the next attack go concurrently. As Pakistan lacks military capabilities to achieve its strategic objectives it takes recourse to the bleed-talk-bleed mode which it is not likely to abandon. As per its calculations, after voicing empty threats, meant more for domestic consumption than part of any well considered national strategy to counter it, India will dither, blink and talk.
While preparing for the other attack, it uses the time allowed by the peace process to hoodwink international opinion, portraying itself as a terror victim instead of a terrorist sponsoring state and concurrently redoubles its efforts to internationalize Kashmir issue and raise the hopes of secessionists. This strategy helps Pakistan to achieve its objective of bringing Kashmir to international focus, projecting it as the root cause radicalizing Pakistan and thus catalyzing international terrorism. Musharraf’s assertion in his autography that “I would like to state emphatically that whatever movement has taken place so far in the direction of finding a solution to Kashmir is due considerably to the Kargil conflict” is indicative of this mind set. Kargil was seen by Pakistani strategists not as a military debacle but a success vis-à-vis its policy objective in Kashmir. Mumbai may be acclaimed by some one some day as a policy success as it enabled Pakistan to accuse India of a terrorist sponsoring state and India agreed to have a bilateral talk on the subject. Opening of this discourse weakens India’s argument on Kashmir and its accusation of Pakistan branding exported terrorism as an indigenous freedom movement. If Pakistan genuinely wants to withdraw support to terrorist groups, it needs no joint acceptance through talks, talks are needed only when they want to link it to resolution of Kashmir and it is wrong for India to fall in this trap. India agreeing to talk also helps Pakistan regain its eroded legitimacy as a terrorism sponsoring state even after repeated acts of terror.
The other important dimension of the vexed Kashmir problem relates to its internal politics, governance and handling of civil society. Derailing the constitutional democratic process in J&K has been central to Pakistan’s Kashmir policy. Derailing of democratic process and destabilizing elected governments was necessary in their strategic calculus to project an externally sponsored terrorism as a people’s popular freedom movement. They wanted both indigenous and Pakistani, terror groups to terrorize the political leaders, parties and the voters through violence, intimidate the free press and stun to silence the common man and orchestrate the cumulative effect to be seen as people’s rejection of Indian Constitution and democracy. All Party Hurriayat Conference (APHC) was raised by Pakistan to articulate this distorted political version with its representatives in US, UK, Brussels and Middle-East. Hurriyat was effectively commandered by Pakistan and given wide international publicity despite its lacking any mass support. India also helped giving them the legitimacy and status that they did not deserve by initiating dialogue with them at highest political levels. They partially succeeded in this attempt in early years of militancy but the successful holding of elections in October, 1996 started undoing of the process. Notwithstanding, terrorist violence, threats and intimidations to disrupt the poll process, since 1996 the democratic process has continued uninterrupted, demolishing Pakistan’s and its surrogate APHC’s, propaganda that J&K was witnessing a violent freedom movement that India was trying to suppress through oppressive military means. State Assembly elections in 1996, 2002,2008 and the Parliamentary elections in 1998, 1999, 2004 and 2009 with sizeable voter turn out ranging up to 62% (2008 Assembly elections) vindicated India’s position, both internally and externally. 2008 Assembly elections were particularly significant in strengthening democratic process in the state. Record number of 1,353 candidates contested for 87 constituencies as against 709 in 2002 and 547 in 1996. Since the advent of terrorism, record number of 4,277 political meetings was held by various parties that included 2,281 in the troubled valley and 1,996 in Jammu. The voter turnout averaged around 63 per cent as compared to 43.6 per cent in 2002. This all was inspite of the fact that.
Hurriyat with its factionalism, poor public image and low credibility of its propaganda has lost much of its steam. On the internal front, India has, however, achieved substantially though the reach and quality of governance calls for major improvements. The local politicians need to be more responsible and responsive, particularly when addressing issues with high emotional contents. The secessionist forces often are able to seize the initiative from them and turn public protests and agitations violent to promote anti-India sentiments or disrupt communal harmony.
In the above backdrop, in formulating our national policy towards J&K following vectors need to be factored:
a) Expediency and tactical posturing notwithstanding, Pakistan harbors a compulsive hostility against India which is a complex product of psychological and religious fixation constituting Pakistan’s state idea, and its vision of emerging as ‘fortress of Islam’. There is no evidence of emergence of a new state idea to substitute this. Apparent moderation in approach is due to compulsions and expediency and not by strategic shift and hence have short time consistency coterminous with continuation of the compulsion. India should develop a long term vision and strategic plan to deal with its recalcitrant western neighbour having a national consensus cutting across the party lines.
b) J&K is a Muslim majority state and religious factor will continue to play an important role in political proclivities of the people, their perception of Pakistan and Pakistan’s temptation to exploit religious demography to its advantage. With changing ground realities the form and direction may vary but the fundamentals will endure;
c) Nuclearisation of Pakistan has limitized India’s conventional military options. Pakistan estimates that India has been forced to raise its tolerance threshold many notches high providing, Pakistan near immunity from Indian military response. Pakistan will continue to use the cost effective option of covert action against asymmetric India. India will have to think of building capabilities that works as effective deterrent against Pakistan exercising this option. Should they still venture it the attendant costs should be made unaffordable through a well fore thought action plan.
d) India with its exploitable socio-political fault-lines, size and diversity, soft governance and democratic liberties provide scope and opportunity for subversive and disruptive activities at an extensive scale. Bangladesh getting fast radicalized and subversion of a small section of Indian Muslims opens new operational opportunities for Pakistan. Global conflicts of Islam and revolution in informatics have started influencing the mind set of Muslims globally and Indian Muslims can not be insulated from this phenomenon. Pakistan is aware of the possibilities that it offers and have started entrenching itself through multi role covert modules which have serious security implications for India.
e) The existing status quo in J&K, though not in conformity with India’s legitimate claims, should not be allowed to be altered to India’s disadvantage. The present position in terms of territory, political and constitutional arrangements, management and control of borders, access control etc. should constitute the minimum acceptable position in any settlement. Pakistan, if not punished for waging a covert offensive against India should, at least, not be rewarded for it. Any concessions, even national, by India will be seen as India’s susceptibility to terrorist pressures, and will strengthen the forces of terror, violence and fundamentalism in the long run. Till a final settlement is firmed up on all points of detail, India should not prematurely dilute its principled position. The Indian position on J&K exists as defined under Article 1(3) of the Constitution of India encompassing the entire state of J&K, including POK. This is further reinforced by the Constitution of J&K and all party Resolution of the Parliament;
f) Rolling back of terrorism and dismantling its infrastructure in Pakistan should constitute a pre-requisite to carry forward any political process. The assurances of action taken must be verifiable and impact implicitly visible on the ground. Pakistan handing over the Indian nationals wanted in various heinous offences and enjoying Pakistani hospitality should be the minimum test of Pakistan’s sincerity and changed intentions;
g) War against terrorism must be fought with total determination. Any slackening of the effort or thinning out the troops till normalcy is restored would be inadvisable. No confusing signals should be given to Pakistan, the terrorist cadres or people of J&K through ambiguous moves and statements. Dragging of feet by the Government in executing the sentence awarded by the apex court to Afzal Guru is a case in point. The safe return of Kashmiri Pundits to the valley would be the empirical test to judge that the area has been freed from the forces of violence and terror;
h) Any implicit or explicit suggestion which undermines India’s absolute sovereignty over areas under its control in J&K should be jettisoned from any agenda of bilateral talks. This includes right to deploy and maintain troops, management of borders, exercise of legislative, executive and judicial functions as laid down by country’s laws and constitution etc. Sovereignty is indivisible and cannot be shared. As far as devolution of powers to the states is concerned, in a democracy it is an ongoing process and purely a matter of internal political management. Pakistan can not be allowed any space in dictating or influencing it.
i) Hurriyat has no representatory character and should not be accepted as an articulator of wishes and aspirations of the Kashmiri people. While efforts should be made to bring them in main stream national politics, it will be a folly to accord them the legitimacy and credibility through our acts of commission and omission. Their self proclaimed role as a ‘bridge’ between India and Pakistan or ‘Crusaders of Kashmiri unity’ should be snubbed;
j) On national security issues, like J&K, India should exercise total decisional autonomy. No third party intervention, prompting or pressure to influence the decisions should be allowed;
Kashmir is a real test of India’s comprehensive state power and ability to exercise it. If despite its size, economic strength, military capabilities, technological advancement and international clout, it is unable to protect its legitimate interests against a small delinquent failing state, it will reflect too poorly on the capabilities and vision of those who are at helm of affairs. History may judge them too harshly.
(The author is Director of Vivekananda Kendra International and former chief of Intelligence Bureau)

People want real action now, not mere promises

2011-09-15T10:22:00.002-07:00

People want real action now, not mere promises
Ajit Doval, DNA, Saturday, July 16, 2011
One of the infirmities of our national security discourse is our skewed approach to issues. We get disproportionally focused on the threat — its intensity, manifestations, damage caused, etc — rather than on the response required. National security essentially pertains to what the state does, or should do, to effectively meet anticipated threats, both at the strategic and tactical levels. Correct threat analysis and anticipation is an important prerequisite of this exercise but not a solution by itself, unless followed by a correct, determined response. Solutions come when the state displays political will, mobilises its best human and material resources, brings about systemic improvements, and builds capacities to neutralise threats. That is precisely what is not happening in India.
The recent terrorist carnage in Mumbai is tragic not only for the innocent lives lost and people injured but, more importantly, for the failure of the government to build systems and capacities to meet a threat that has been bleeding the nation over and over again. When terrorist depredations take place, ritualistic promises by the highest in the government that they will leave ‘no stone unturned’ and complimenting the people for returning to normal life are cruel jokes.
Following the 26/11 attacks, the government failed to come out with any innovative responses, security policies, legal and administrative reforms, or strategic initiatives that could degrade the capabilities of the terrorists, deter their mentors — both within and outside the country — deny soft targets to them through proactive and preventive actions, or modernise the working of the central and state security agencies. Worse, whatever little it assured it failed to take any determined steps to execute.
On May 20, 2009, Prime Minister Manmohan Singh said he had a plan ready to “overhaul and modernise” the internal security mechanisms. Claimed to be a 100-day internal security plan, the document purportedly aimed at creating a networked national security architecture to address a gamut of shortcomings that plagued the internal security structure of the country. A key component of the plan was to set up a National Counter Terrorism Centre (NCTC) that was to become operative within 100 days.
Where is the prime minister’s plan? The proposal to form the NCTC, whose need and urgency the home minister has never tired of emphasizing, has not even been placed before the cabinet committee on security.Was the government just bluffing and saying things that it did not mean, or is there some substance to the grapevine that differences in the cabinet sealed the fate of the plan with the prime minister remaining a helpless spectator?
It is time for the country to ponder how much we have done in real terms to set our house in order to manage our internal security. The government’s assurances have lost credibility. People want to see action on the ground that delivers results that are visible.
The counter-terrorism laws in our country are weaker when compared to even those where terrorism poses little or no threat. POTA, though by itself a weak counter-terrorism law as compared to laws in other affected democracies, was repealed — the first action on the counter-terrorism front that the UPA government took on assuming power in 2004! It not only weakened the state to deal with terrorism but demoralised the security agencies and sent a wrong signal to the terrorists and their mentors.
Lack of a consistent and firm policy in dealing with Pakistan has projected the country in a poor light. The government repeatedly asserted that no talks will be held with Pakistan till it punishes the perpetrators of 26/11. Today, while by its own admission the government feels that Pakistan has failed to deliver in respect of the culprits of 26/11, it has not only resumed a full-scale dialogue but is even prepared to have exclusive confabulations on Kashmir. The country has yet to get over the shame of Sharm el-Sheikh.
The government’s lack of credibility is a serious matter, more so when it relates to security matters, because lack of credibility translates into lack of legitimacy.
The author, former IB head, is now director of the Vivekananda International Foundation
http://www.dnaindia.com/analysis/column_people-want-real-action-now-not-mere-promises_1566204

5/1 does a 9/11 on Osama

2011-09-15T10:22:00.001-07:00

5/1 does a 9/11 on Osama
Ajit Doval | Tuesday, May 3, 2011
The death of Osama bin Laden is a watershed point in the Islamist terrorist movement that has affected the world the last decade and a half. Events can take several directions based on what happens on the ground in the months to come.
Al Qaeda had ceased to be a terrorist organisation before bin Laden’s death. For radical Muslim groups and Islamist outfits it served more as an inspirational and ideological guide. It was basically a rallying point for anti-Western Islamic feeling.
As a consequence, many groups started coming close and forming networks of allegiance to one another. These groups will no doubt start operating in their respective areas to hit at Western or other international targets. For instance, the Lashkar-e-Toiba may hit in India, Abu Sayyaf in the Philippines or Jemaah Islamiyah in Indonesia.
Retaliation will no doubt now take place against multiple Western targets and Pakistani targets. There is also the possibility that other groups which are not yet terrorist groups but are localised radical Muslim groups, may take up retaliatory terrorist action. The next few months are a time for security agencies around the world to be on the alert for acts of vengeance for the Osama bin Laden killing. Again, these may be undertaken by affiliates, and not by al Qaeda itself.
Secondly, there is a vacuum left by Osama bin Laden that could either be filled by Arab or Egyptian leaders, or by Afghan or Pakistani leaders. If the leadership moves to Arab or Egyptians, then Iraq, Palestine and other such issues will continue to be at the top of their agenda. If it moves to Afghans or Pakistanis, however, then besides the fact that it will have direct implications for India it will also make their movement more violent, more strategic and more tactical.
Arab leaders, like Osama bin Laden, are more long-term, more strategic in their thinking. The Arabs would be more interested in getting a Weapon of Mass Destruction, whereas the Afghans or Pakistanis would be more interested in an attack like the one in London on July 7, 2005. A leader like Ilyas Kashmiri, one of the men India wants for 26/11, could move up in the al Qaeda core group, and then India would have to be much more vigilant.
Thirdly, Islamabad is now at a crossroads. Osama being killed deep inside their country means that despite their denials over the past decade, he was inside Pakistan; now Pakistan stands exposed. Its credibility in the international community is at stake.
This is a watershed moment for Islamabad, for it to realise that this is the end of the story for its policy on terrorists; it could decide to follow global counter-terrorism efforts without differentiating between different leaders of different terrorist groups.
If it does so, it may be able to stabilize itself internally. If not, then the world will have to take a more active role with regard to Pakistan’s policy. Globally, the Americans already had plans for leaving Afghanistan by 2014, and were looking for ways to wind down Operation Enduring Freedom. Now they’ve got a justification for leaving. But this will bank heavily on Pakistan’s policy; the Americans will seek to outsource their counter-terrorism to Pakistan.
That can lead to either of two things: either Pakistan will take it on in earnest, or Pakistan will use the US money and resources for their local concerns, primarily against India. Even if the US tries to remote control an outsourced counter-terrorism, it may do real damage to India.
So India’s policy should be to use its political and diplomatic clout to persuade Pakistan to give up terrorism, and show it that continuing its policy of support for some terrorist groups will not be worthwhile. Pakistan should also be made to realize that with the convergence of global terror groups, there will be a reaction to Osama’s killing, and that within Pakistan, violence levels are bound to go up unless it takes the fight against terrorism in all sincerity.
http://www.dnaindia.com/india/column_5-1-does-a-9-11-on-osama_1538784

Involve Kashmiri Pandits in Peace Talks: Doval

2011-09-15T10:21:00.000-07:00

Involve Kashmiri Pandits in Peace Talks: Doval
PTI | Hyderabad | Oct 10, 2010
Former Intelligence Bureau chief Ajit Doval today said Kashmiri Pandits should be made party in all negotiations for resolving the problems in Kashmir.
"On the negotiating table to articulate your views... having the legitimacy that the victims... The people of Kashmir are represented, the Kashmiri Pandits should also be made the stakeholders. So that they can represent effectively on their many concerns," Doval said.
Participating as the principal speaker at a seminar on 'Turmoil in Kashmir — Root-cause and Remedies' here, the former director of the IB said, "they (Kashmiri Pandits) have been evicted from their homes for several years, but, so far not accepted as the stakeholder. We have to make them a party in the whole process seeking solution to Kashmir problem. Any settlement without considering Kashmiri Pandits would be incomplete."
He said the mindset of India, Pakistan and Kashmiri separatists has also contributed to (Kashmir) turmoil in its own way.
Doval also criticised Jammu and Kashmir Chief Minister Omar Abdullah's recent statement in the Assembly that J&K had not merged with India but only acceded to it.
He said the campaign by separatists seeking withdrawal of Armed Forces (Special Powers) Act from the Valley was only aimed at demoralising the security forces.
"Separatists are trying to demoralise the security forces through their campaign," he said.
Forum for Integrated National Security (FINS) Andhra Pradesh Chapter chairman Major General (Retd) A B Gorthi said Pakistan was waging a proxy war against India by sending terrorists into Kashmir from across the border.
"Pakistan is carrying out a clandestine operation against India and also getting local support in Kashmir. The situation in Kashmir is grim and we (people in other parts of the country) should be aware of the problems faced by Kashmiri people," Gorthi added.
Filed On: Oct 10, 2010 22:52 IST , Edited On: Oct 10, 2010 22:
http://news.outlookindia.com/item.aspx?696714

Political Will Vital to Tackle Maoists: Ex-IB Chief

2011-09-15T10:20:00.000-07:00

Political Will Vital to Tackle Maoists: Ex-IB Chief
PTI | Thiruvananthapuram | May 24, 2010
A joint political offensive by all parties having faith in democracy is essential to effectively tackle the Maoists, according to former Director General of Intelligence Bureau, Ajith Kumar Doval.
"Maoists can not be tackled with a soft approach. Firm political will, clear-cut plans, meticulously worked out strategies and stern decisions are vital for that",he said at a lecture organised by pro-RSS Vichara Vedi here last evening.
He said the strength of Naxalite groups, as the ultra leftist outfits in India are known, had doubled in the country in the last six years. Once confined to isolated pockets, they had expanded their presence to 203 districts in 14 districts and the number of armed cadre gone up to at least 15,000 from 7000, he said.
More importantly, the Maoists had succeeded in acquiring sophisticated weapons and training cadres in using them in their war against the state, Doval noted.
"At the same time the Centre and state governments have not been able to effectively counter the threat posed by Leftist ultras, who have been receiving support from all sorts of anti national elements in their subversive activities," he said.
The prevailing situation required a joint political offensive against the Maoists by impressing upon the masses, the need to defend democracy, which was the best political system available to them, he added.
Filed On: May 24, 2010 18:34 IST , Edited
http://news.outlookindia.com/item.aspx?683064

Government’s Credibility Seriously at Stake – Aftermath of 13/7 Mumbai Attacks

2011-07-20T04:52:00.000-07:00

18 July 2011

Government’s Credibility Seriously at Stake – Aftermath of 13/7 Mumbai Attacks

Ajit Doval, KC
Director, Vivekananda Internal Foundation

One of the infirmities of our national security discourse is our skewed approach to the issues involved. We get disproportionally focused on the threat – its intensity, manifestations, damage caused etc. than the response required to address them. National security essentially pertains to what the state does, or should do, to effectively meet the anticipated threats - both at the strategic and tactical levels. Correct threat analysis and anticipation is an essential prerequisite but by itself provides no solution. It is useful only when followed by a determined and real time response. This happens when the state displays political will, mobilises its best human and material resources, brings about systemic improvements and builds capacities to neutralise the threats. That is precisely what the government has miserably failed to do.
The recent terrorist carnage in Mumbai is tragic not only for the innocent lives lost and people injured but, more importantly, for the failure of the government to build systems and capacities to meet a threat that has been bleeding the nation over and over again. When terrorist depredations happen ritualistic promises by the highest in the government that they will leave ‘no stone unturned to meet the threat’ and complimenting the people for returning to normal life is a cruel joke over hapless people. Following the 26/11 attacks the government failed to come out with any innovative ideas, security policies, legal and administrative reforms or strategic initiatives that could degrade capabilities of the terrorists, deter their mentors – both within and outside the country, deny soft targets to the terrorists through proactive and preventive actions or modernise the working of central and state security agencies. Worst, whatever little was assured, it failed to take any determined steps to execute them.
On May 20, 2009, Prime Minister Manmohan Singh said that he had a plan to “overhaul and modernise” internal security mechanisms. Claimed to be a 100-day internal security plan, the document, purportedly aimed at creating networked national security architecture to address a gamut of shortcomings that plagued the internal security structure of the country. A key component of the plan was to setup a National Counter Terrorism Centre (NCTC) that reportedly was to become operative within 100 days. Where is the Prime Minister’s plan on the ground to modernise internal security mechanisms? The proposal to form a National Counter Terrorism Centre, whose need and urgency the Home Minister has never been tired of emphasizing, has not even been placed before the Cabinet Committee on Security. Was the government just bluffing the country and saying the things that it never meant or is there some substance in the grapevine that differences in the cabinet sealed the fate of the internal security plan with the Prime Minister, remaining, as usual only a helpless spectator.
This is the time for the country to ponder how much we have done in real terms to set our house in order to manage our internal security. The government assurances and promises have lost their credibility. People want to see actions on the ground that deliver and results that are visible. The counter terrorist laws in our country are weaker even when compared to those where terrorism poses no or very little threat. POTA, though by itself a weak counter terrorist law as compared to other affected democracies in the world, was repealed – the first action on counter terrorism front that the UPA government took on assuming power in 2004! It not only weakened the state to deal with terrorism but demoralised the security agencies and sent a wrong signal to the terrorists and their mentors. Lack of a consistent and firm policy in dealing with Pakistan has projected the country in a very poor light. The government repeatedly asserted that no talks will be held with Pakistan till it punishes perpetrators of 26/11. Today, while by its own admission, the government feels that Pakistan has failed to deliver in respect of culprits of 26/11, it has not only resumed a full scale dialogue but is even prepared to have exclusive confabulation on Kashmir. The country has yet to get over its shame of Sharm-al-Sheikh while…………….
There is another vital dimension of 13/7 attacks that deserves closer scrutiny. When a government fails to prevent, identify or neutralise the terrorists, it indicates inefficiency and systemic inadequacies. But when the perpetrators refuse to own responsibility, the causes are much more complex and, often, sinister. Terrorism is violence carried out in pursuit of some cause – political, religious or any other and the terrorists want the whole world to know about their existence, cause and the evil power. When terrorists strike but do not seek publicity they are usually working as somebody’s proxy and motives have more to do with the principals than the perpetrators.
Going by information coming from the government sources and open channels, there are strong indications that it was the handiwork of Indian Mujahedeen (IM) and the underworld working in collusion with some external forces. If so, it is an early warning of a serious internal security threat that the country appears to be heading for in the light of following reasons.
Firstly, after 26/11 SIMI, of which Indian Mujahedeen is only a deceptive front to mislead the security agencies, has been extremely active on organisational front during last two years. Government’s soft policies have led to the reluctance of security agencies to initiate action against anti-national elements unless they were involved in specific and serious cognisable offences. Repeal of POTA while on one hand emboldened SIMI on the other handicapped the law enforcing agencies from taking firm action against potential wrong doers. In a meeting following September 13, 2008 attacks in Delhi, a decision was taken by SIMI leadership that the organisation should take advantage of the contemporary favourable environment to reorganise and recruit cadres for Jihad. They also decided to refrain from sporadic acts of terror till they had strengthened themselves and acquired capabilities for spectacular actions. While they deepened relations with Pakistan through LeT and the underworld their role on terrorism was by and large confined to assist Pakistani terrorists. The first cause of worry is thus the new strengths gained by SIMI/IM, their good ground knowledge and local contacts and a wide ground spread. Inadequacy of laws, thin presence of an ill equipped police force on the ground and absence of political will to deal with the threat has compounded the problem manifold.
Secondly, SIMI/IM is only a motley group of youth recruited and motivated by Pakistan for the indigenisation of terror in India. It has negligible support of Indian Muslims and all Muslims outfits have denounced their ideology and activities. But for a vague slogan of waging Jihad for Islam, it has no specific political demands or cause. Its genesis lies in post 9/11 predicament of ISI when the latter compulsively realised that in the changed global environment it needed tactical change in its strategy of using terrorism as an instrument of state policy. For higher deniability, they targeted SIMI to be their front organisation to carry out their diktats. Using Dawood Ibrahim, CAM Bashir, a SIMI leader from Mumbai, was called to Dubai in 2001and the process of converting a radical Islamic youth organisation into a Pakistan controlled terrorist outfit started. However, SIMI’s terrorist performance fell far short of Pakistan’s high expectations and many were accused of making money without doing much. 26/11, however, forced Pakistan to resurrect it. 26/11 was rated by ISI as a successful covert operation but for the exposure of Pak nationals that made the overall cost non-affordable. It made ISI to re-double its efforts to re-organise SIMI hoping to increasingly use it for direct actions rather than merely for support actions. 13/7 is a manifestation of this effort. For ensuring deniability, SIMI is being accessed, financed and controlled through locations in Middle-East and the underworld is being primed to enhance its striking capabilities. The second cause of worry in thus SIMI/IM emerging as an empowered converging point of ISI, crime syndicates, radicalised local youth etc. to bleed India.
Thirdly, should Pakistan and the radical forces supported by it succeed in its nefarious design of indigenising terror; it potentially can generate communal conflicts with larger component of violence ingrained. This has been a long cherished objective of Pakistan that has been eluding it for decades. Our response should be imaginatively architected and calibrated to deny it to them.
The next problem emanates from the fact that our counter terrorist doctrines, structures and systems have over the years evolved around threats from foreign terrorists. Apprehending political fallout the government has even been on denial mode on local participation. Accepting the realities as they are and not as we wish them to be, the focus, particularly of intelligence agencies, will have to be expanded to cover activities of domestic players. This increases the role and responsibility of district and local level intelligence units of the state governments which are generally in a state of neglect. The government’s initiative of a National Intelligence Grid, though delayed, is a welcome step and needs to be pursued at a war footing.
In the emerging scenario the role of religious, social and civil society leaders of Muslim community assumes a critical importance. Both on their own and with support of the government, they should deepen their contacts with members of their community and deny any space to foreign inspired subversive elements. It is important that while taking firm actions against anti-national elements the innocents are fully protected and collateral damages avoided. The Muslim community leaders should be co-opted in this exercise by the law enforcing agencies who, when taken into confidence, in the past have been more than willing to cooperate.
Lastly, the role of political parties is going to be crucial. Politicising terror in all situations is bad but can be catastrophic if we have to face its indigenous variant. Temptations of resorting to vote bank politics would do immense harm to the country. The comment of Shri Digvijay Singh giving a communal slant to Mumbai carnage was, to say the least, a cruel joke on the nation.
Mumbai 13/7 may be an early warning of a more serious long term internal security threat looming on the horizon. We have many things in our favour and the nation is quite capable of meeting the threat provided the political parties start looking at the problem from a national and not electoral perspective. Lack of credibility of the government is a serious matter. It becomes all the more so when it relates to security matters as lack of credibility may lead to the erosion of legitimacy; potentially threatening the country’s stability. The country can ill afford that.

Right kind of strategy can defeat the Maoists

2009-09-06T00:32:00.000-07:00

Right kind of strategy can defeat the Maoists
by Ajit Doval
July 18, 2009
Mail Today
LinK: http://epaper.mailtoday.in/epaperhome.aspx?issue=1872009

THEY HAVE VULNERABILITIES THAT CAN BE EFFECTIVELY EXPLOITED
WHEN the government proclaims Left Wing Extremism as the most serious security threat faced by the country, the obvious question that arises is: What exactly determines the seriousness of a security threat in comparable terms? It is determined by the viciousness of the enemy’s intentions and its capability of causing damage and destruction to achieve its objectives. In this context, intentions include political and ideological objectives that can undermine the established politicoconstitutional order.
Capabilities encompass a wide range of factors — weapons holdings, skills and motivation levels, financial strength, collaborative linkages, quality of leadership, organisation etc.
This, however, is only half the truth. A security threat also depends on the comprehensive power of the state and its ability and will to exercise it, the strength of its institutions to convert state objectives to ground realities, and the capacity of its leadership to optimise its gains from available resources. Often threats assume a seriousness disproportionate to their intrinsic strength not because they are per- se formidable but because the response is deficient. Left Wing Extremism is a case in point.
Left extremists enjoy many advantages like vast and inaccessible terrain which is difficult to dominate or sanitise no matter what force levels are pumped in. Remember how long and what all it took to neutralise one Veerappan in a relatively much smaller area? Further, they have to their advantage not only a huge alienated population that has suffered decades of social and economic neglect, but a setting where the extremists enjoy reach and credibility that no other state or non state actor, including political parties, do. Their other strength is availability of an ideology easy for the extremists to package and sell in the backdrop of the poor credibility of “ democratic” political parties and their leaders.
Leaders
The extremists are able to project the existing political order as being responsible for their suffering and offering their brand of communism as the sure and only answer. With no counterview projected, they are able to exploit caste conflicts in Bihar, resentment against landlords in Andhra, sentiment against forest laws and practices in tribal areas, unemployment among youth or radicalism among sections of Muslims simultaneously, putting Maoism before all of them as a panacea. Their other strength lies in large scale rural unemployment — increasing every year with a rising youth population. With availability of money to pay as regular salaries, they have more people willing to join their People’s Army than they are capable of training and handling.
However, the story does not end here — they have some high vulnerabilities as well. Like most ideology driven movements, the Left Wing Extremists are controlled by less than a dozen top kingpins and nearly 30 commanders of its armed cadre. They determine the political line, control the resources and design their strategy. The majority of the 13,000 odd armed cadres and the many more supporters are gullible tribals and poor people misled by vicious propaganda, frightened by the gun or lured by the money. For the leaders — who themselves live in conditions of safety and comfort — they are easily replaceable commodities.
Neutralisation of top leaders and activists in the four decades long history of Left Extremism has invariably led to ideological dilution, dissensions, demoralisation, giving a blow to their image of invincibility, and creating doubts about the political viability of the movement and achievability of victory through violence. At the tactical level, it has led to a struggle for leadership, a disruption in sources of funding and weapons and the abandonment of plans in the pipeline.
Further, the questioning of top leaders has often provided strategic and tactical inputs, which, when pursued imaginatively, have substantially weakened the movement. Inherent in intelligent interrogation of top functionaries lie answers to questions that can lead to degradation of the movement.
At times, they become part of the government’s counter terrorist effort and whenever that happens their contribution is substantial. Targeted operations against them are also much more cost effective than frittering away the forces too thinly on the ground and exposing them to dangers with little corresponding gains.
The other vulnerability of Left extremism is its discredited ideology, which has not only been discarded all around the world, but goes against the Indian ethos and civilisational mindset.
Devoid of its ideological plank the movement stands reduced to a problem of organised crime. The leadership fears nothing more than losing its revolutionary halo, though a good number of them lead a life of comfort and, amongst many, even ideological conviction is not as strong as generally believed.
The demolition of this contrived self image is their high vulnerability. A credible, focused and sustained psywar offensive to expose the movement as anti- people will be hard for them to counter. The people should be made to realise that the movement is nothing but a pipe- dream of a few to acquire power through violence.
Mainstream
Contradictions in their ideologies and stories of the ordinary people’s suffering under totalitarian regimes, too, need to be highlighted. There are also many aspects of their collaboration with the rich and powerful to collect funds, instances of moral turpitude, the use of high handed methods to deal with dissent, which need to be given wide publicity. They may not produce instant results but credibly structured, imaginatively packaged and widely disseminated, they can produce spectacular results over a period of time.
It is noteworthy that people are attracted to Left extremism not so much by its ideology as on account of their high personal alienation. The political parties have an antidote to outdo the Left extremists in this game by accessing the people, mobilising them against extremist ideology, redressing their grievances and allaying their fears — real or imaginary — by democratically acceptable means.
Unfortunately, the divisive politics of the country, thriving on the faultlines of caste, religion, language, ethnicity etc are more a cause than cure of the problem. Further, quite often the political parties arrive at a secret political understanding with the extremists for electoral gains. At times, they buy peace by surrendering to their unreasonable demands like allowing them to raise funds or transferring upright and honest officers.
Political parties which for the last six decades have mobilised people under all conceivable faultlines of caste, ethnicity, language, religion etc. should, shift their focus now and use all their equations and influence to defend democracy and national interests.
Shift
The money factor is another important element helping Left extremists to expand and intensify their activities.
It enables them to raise their cadre strength by recruiting unemployed youth on regular salaries. A fresh recruit is paid Rs 2,000 to 2,500 per month, which in a poverty stricken backward area is a big attraction. Similarly, with accretion in financial resources, they are able to procure more sophisticated and greater quantities of weapons, adding to their firepower and lethality.
It is estimated that the extremists are able to collect nearly Rs 1200 crore a year, which is big money, for carrying out a subversive warfare in tribal and backward areas. It is able to raise these funds through corrupt government officials, protection money collected from rich landlords and businessmen, by intimidating contractors, transporters etc. and the imposition of levies on forest and coal produce etc.
Paradoxically, the increase in government outlays for development activities in affected areas also strengthen them financially because these enhanced outlays are not backed up by an effective and accountable administrative machinery.
Naxal violence is different from other conventional terrorist models in its tactics which provide much larger space for security and intelligence agencies to operate. Unlike terrorists who work through small conspiratorial groups, maintaining utmost secrecy, Naxal violence is carried out through mobilisation of large bodies of men running into several hundreds. Intelligence penetration in such situations is much easier and can open up various possibilities to counter their actions.
The doctrine of using time tested methods of pumping in more paramilitary forces without a definite plan, enhancing modernisation grants without monitoring how they are being used, and building ever new platforms for better coordination may be correct, but they are not adequate to tackle the problem. A strategic shift is necessary to turn the tide in our favour.
The writer is former chief of the Intelligence Bureau

Will the national terror outfit become just another agency?

2009-09-06T00:31:00.000-07:00

Will the national terror outfit become just another agency?Times of India
Ajit Doval
12 January 2009, 04:43am IST
Link: http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/articleshow/msid-3965720,prtpage-1.cms

Establishing a national counter terrorism agency is a positive idea whose time had come quite some time back but got registered only when it came riding on the tragedy of Mumbai. It was heartening that the law makers seized the opportunity to constitute a national agency to counter terrorism. However, the way in which it is being conceived and designed, it may belie the high expectations.

Demand for an effective National Counter Terrorism Agency emanated from national dismay that when reasonably good intelligence was available, when the country had instrumentalities to counter the terrorists, when there was a coordination mechanism in place, why did Mumbai happen? And when it did, why was the response so flat-footed?

It required no great genius to discover that the fault lay in the system itself where multiplicity of agencies prevented any one agency to have the total picture; disabling any single agency or individual to be in total command to act decisively and leaving coordination to degenerate into a bureaucratic ritual. It was a case where every agency or individual had all the material to defend itself, but collectively little to defend the nation. The system was designed to fail as those with knowledge had no legal empowerment or fire power, while those with fire power were not in the knowledge loop and those with legal empowerment were tactically deficient and resource constrained.

On top of this, there was multiplicity of agencies even in each category without standardized operating procedures, governing rules and doctrines, training and equipment, and commonly shared objectives and priorities. This had to be corrected divergence substituted by convergence, turf wars replaced by synergy and concerted action taking over confusion. And, for this, they thought a unified national agency was the answer.

However, the envisaged NIA does not bring us anywhere closer to this objective. On the contrary, it adds one more standalone platform with no structural integration or operational unification. As a post-event investigation agency, at its best, it might marginally increase conviction rates or get enhanced punishment to few jihadis who, working at suicidal level of motivation, may only find it amusing.

Had this agency existed before Mumbai carnage, none of the shortcomings that came to light would have been minimized. It would not have ensured improved intelligence integration or action oriented dissemination, better pre-emptive or preventive response, etc. Rather than ending the turf war there would have been one more player playing it. They might be interrogating Ajmal Kasab little better but the real masterminds would have still remained beyond their reach and jurisdiction. Legal actions are important but, at the end of the day, war against terrorism would neither be won nor lost in the courts of law.

What India needed was a counter terrorism outfit that converges all-source intelligence collection and its dissemination, real time and decisive physical response to meet the threat both in defensive and offensive-defense modes and efficient investigations to punish the wrong doers. And, all this under a common umbrella with unambiguous responsibility, authority and accountability.

While the intelligence function should have aimed at collection, integration of all-source inputs and their refinement to operational grade intelligence, the physical action component should have focused on terrorist specific tactics, field craft, equipment and skills for speed, surprise and dominance.

Investigators as part of the composite Team, should have been selected for their special skills and attitude including knowledge of terrorist groups, modus operandi, collaborative linkages, channels of procuring funds and weapons, etc. Most importantly, highly knowledgeable and skilled interrogation teams should have been constituted.

To be effective, the new outfit should develop a secure E-network connecting the apex agency to all district headquarters and police stations. It should be linked to the agency's data mining centre where terrorist information from police station to the highest in the agency is inputed according to availability and retrieved according to needs; with appropriate security measures, firewalls and filters. The agency should have state of the art, technical infrastructure to collect technical and cyber intelligence, break the codes, analyze terrorist documents, carry out technical surveillance and jam terrorist communications during physical engagements.

Specialized counter terrorist force, like the NSG, should be brought under the control of the agency for undertaking intelligence driven operations and remaining in readiness with constantly rehearsed exercises for physical actions. They should be constantly updated of emerging trends, techniques, weapons, modus operandi targets etc. Commandos are not robots and their mental tuning is necessary for optimal results. The personnel carrying out intelligence, physical and investigation functions should carry out joint exercises and train themselves together to achieve total synergy.

The ideal arrangement would be to have a director general, counter terrorism who is ex-officio special director of the Intelligence Bureau with all counter-terrorist work, multi agency centre and joint task force on intelligence centralized under his control.

Being part of IB, the outfit will overnight acquire communication linkage, intelligence reach, logistic and technical support, connectivity with local police and administration not only in every district but remotest border areas. This will bring the whole country under a unified counter terrorist grid with no extra cost or time involved. No comprehensive counter terrorist data centre can be built to the exclusion of intelligence inputs and due to various sensitivities involved, no intelligence agency can transfer its entire data to a non-intelligence agency.

If the director general of Counter Terrorism is made part of IB, he can have total access to the intelligence data, will also be able to leverage vast technical capabilities of national intelligence agencies both for intelligence and to keep the counter terrorist force at its technical best. The director general of the new agency should, however, enjoy total autonomy and should be the only person empowered under laws to undertake counter terrorist actions.

To enable him to control, train, equip and motivate men for special counter terrorist actions, the NSG should be brought under his command. This will enable the NSG to be associated on a day-to-day basis with all the developments on the terrorist front and help upgrade their tactics and field craft in tune with the emerging demands. The DG should also be empowered to maintain liaison with friendly security and counter terrorist agencies, as when handled by those who know little about terrorism, the loss in content and time is unaffordable. They are also not able to seek right amplifications, raise the level of dialogue from generic to specific and fine tune the action plans by distinguishing between immediate and important.

This will also help the DG to keep abreast of latest techniques, technologies, equipment and weapons that have proved effective against the terrorists and take initiatives to keep his armed wing best trained and equipped. Fourth generation warfare needs people who can change fast, think fast and act fast in this battle, it's not the bravest but the smartest that takes the trophy.

None of the measures suggested above encroach on powers of the states any more than the NIA Act does. It also does not require any amendments to existing laws and can be achieved within executive powers of the union government. With what is happening in Pakistan, Afghanistan and within our own country we may be in for much greater shocks than Mumbai and we are not prepared for it. We think the latest was the last but the worst is probably yet to come. Today there is mood for change in the nation but it may have a short shelf life. The consensus on response to terrorism is an opportunity to be seized.

(The author is former head of IB)

Abject surrender at Sharm-el-Sheikh

2009-09-06T00:16:00.000-07:00

Abject surrender at Sharm-el-Sheikh

Ajit Doval
First Published : 01 Sep 2009 11:09:00 PM IST
The New Indian Express
Link:http://www.expressbuzz.com/edition/story.aspx?Title=Abject+surrender+at+Sharm-el-Sheikh&artid=NEfbSO|X/fM=&SectionID=XVSZ2Fy6Gzo=&MainSectionID=XVSZ2Fy6Gzo=&SEO=Manmohan+Singh,+Sharm-el-Sheikh,+Lashkar-e-Toiba,&SectionName=m3GntEw72ik=

Whatever the mode of engagement — war or diplomacy — nations interact to maximise their national interest. In adverse conditions, like defeat in war, they work to minimise their losses. The icing of ideology, morality, justice, global and human interest is often just trappings added to lend legitimacy and acceptability to what they mostly lack. The degree of success in furthering one’s national interests is determined by a nation’s comprehensive state power and the will and vision of its leadership to exercise it.
Notwithstanding its decisive edge in terms of state power, India has failed to further its interests vis-à-vis Pakistan. Without any legal or political locus standi it has allowed Pakistan to become a stakeholder in Kashmir. Despite being guilty of violating norms of international behaviour Pakistan has gone unpunished though its sponsorship of terrorism has led to thousands of deaths. Worse, it has constricted India’s options and forced it to the negotiating table in a position of weakness. Sharm-el-Sheikh is where Pakistan got away unscathed after the Mumbai carnage and inveigled India to the negotiating table.
On April 15, talking to the Editors’ Guild, Prime Minister Manmohan Singh pronounced that, “There won’t be any resumption of bilateral talks till Islamabad stops allowing terrorists to use its territory against India”. On July 16, he signed a joint statement with his Pakistani counterpart at Sharm-el-Sheikh agreeing that “India was ready to discuss all issues with Pakistan, including all outstanding issues” (read Kashmir) and lowering the focus on terrorism by stating that the “real challenge is development and poverty” (and not terrorism?). Only two inferences can be drawn from these apparently contradictory positions. First, Pakistan did something momentous between April 15 and July 16 that convinced India that Pakistani territory was no more being used for terrorism and that anti-India activities and consequently terrorism had ceased to be the central issue.
Drawing the right lessons
The Prime Minister’s assertion during the Chief Ministers conference on August 17 that, “Cross-border terrorism remains the most pervasive threat and there is credible information of ongoing plans of terrorist groups in Pakistan to carry out fresh attacks”, makes it obvious that this is far from correct. The other inference would be uncharitable, impinging upon his credibility and consistency. Prime ministers have, understandably, to work in the best interests of their countries even if that is at the cost of their personal image. The question, therefore, is not whether the Prime Minister has been credible and consistent, but whether he has been able to pursue the country’s Pakistan policy in its best interests. It is also important to examine whether we, as a nation, have drawn the right lessons and internalised them in formulating our national security and strategic doctrines. Countries that fail are destined to be punished by history.
The following are a few of the negatives of the Sharm-el-Sheikh communiqué in the context of India’s national interests:
The first point is that it put a lid over India’s pronouncements following 26/11 that, ‘all options were open’. In the wake of the groundswell of global condemnation Pakistan was seriously unnerved by India’s assertions. Apprehensions soared high. It was at this time that they took steps against Lashkar-e-Toiba leaders while making desperate pleas for restarting the stalled dialogue.
But the pressure was terminated at Sharm el-Sheikh. The joint statement mentioned that, “Both Prime Ministers recognised that dialogue is the only way forward”. The formulation that the prime ministers “considered the entire gamut of bilateral relations with a view to chartering the way forward in India-Pakistan relations” and agreed that the foreign secretaries “should meet as often as necessary and report to the two foreign ministers” who would meet on the sidelines of the forthcoming UN General Assembly, meant the stalled talks were restarted without any of India’s concerns being addressed. It is intriguing that on June 16, the Prime Minister told President Asif Ali Zardari in the Russian city of Yekaterinburg of his “limited mandate”, only to discuss how Islamabad can rein in terror. His later clarifications carried little conviction against the written words of the communiqué, particularly in the wake of statements that subsequently emanated from Pakistan. It sent the message that no matter how hard it was hit, today or tomorrow, India had no options but to talk and the brave words were meant only for a domestic constituency.
Respectable once again
Secondly, Pakistan’s intelligence agencies were let off the hook. The Prime Minister, addressing the Chief Ministers conference on Jan 6, had said that, “On the basis of investigations, there is enough evidence to show that, given the sophistication and military precision of the attack, it must have had the support of some official agencies in Pakistan.” On July 17, the Prime Minister made a U-turn, saying India does not accuse the current regime of “active involvement” in terror. In reply to a question, he asserted that, “There is a history to it. But it is certainly true that I am not accusing the present Pakistani government of active involvement”. Pakistan thus could once again demand to be treated as a respectable and responsible state. Its argument that even if some Pakistani nationals belonging to a terrorist outfit were involved, as a country it could not be held accountable, gained credence. The fact that Lashkar-e-Toiba is a creation and protégé of Pakistani intelligence got lost in the din.
Again, by bringing the two on a common pedestal on the terrorist front India has lost its diplomatic edge. By stating that “Both leaders agreed that terrorism is the main threat to both countries” and affirming, “Their resolve to fight terrorism and to cooperate with each other to this end,” Manmohan Singh allowed India to be equated with Pakistan. The reality is that while India for over two decades has been a victim of terrorism exported by Pakistan, leading to over 80,000 deaths, Pakistan is the victim of a self-inflicted injury caused by a jihadi agenda as an instrument of state policy to deal with India.
Fourthly, the formulation that Pakistan would “do everything in its powers” to “bring the perpetrators of the Mumbai attacks to justice” was the minimalist position with which India was surprisingly satisfied. There was no call to dismantle the infrastructure of terror, stop infiltration, return Indian nationals wanted in serious crimes from sanctuaries in Pakistan, large-scale smuggling of weapons, explosives, counterfeit currency from Pakistan, etc. There is no indication that India even raised these concerns. The formulation that “Prime Minister Gilani assured that Pakistan will do everything in its powers in this regard (Mumbai attacks)” sounds like a reluctant ritualistic formality rather than a commitment to action that India should have extracted or refused to have a joint statement at all.
One blunder after another
In the overall context of the bilateral relationship and the fact that the meeting was on the sidelines of an international conference, a joint statement was hardly needed. It must be on Pakistan’s insistence that, to deflect the focus from terrorism, “Both leaders agreed that the real challenge is development and the elimination of poverty”. It was advantage Pakistan as it wanted to marginalise terrorism.
Then, the reference to violence in “Balochistan” and “Other areas” in the context of terrorism is a historic blunder. It lends legitimacy to Pakistan’s unfounded accusations of India sponsoring terrorism in a neighbouring country. The reference to “other areas” gives Pakistan space to blame India for any terrorist action in its territory. India’s acceptance of a discourse substantially weakens its position. In future, whenever Pakistan is confronted with evidence of its terrorist activities, sabotage and subversion in Kashmir, it will counter with fabricated evidence on Balochistan. It will also use it to denigrate India through a malicious propaganda war internationally. The instrument will further be used to pressure India in Afghanistan and enlist Western support by extending the argument of Pakistan’s security as a precondition to fight the ‘West’s War’ against al-Qaeda and Taliban. That Pakistan is going to use this newfound weapon was obvious when in his first press conference after Sharm-el-Sheikh Prime Minister Gilani said that “The joint statement signed by me and Prime Minister Manmohan Singh underlines our concerns over India’s interference in Balochistan and other areas.” Manmohan Singh’s rejoinder that “If you have any evidence, we are willing to look at it because we are an open book; we are doing nothing. Therefore we are not afraid of discussing these issues”, has little meaning in this context. This is what Pakistan also can turn around and say probably with greater vigour, rejecting all evidence, to claim innocence.
National interest overlooked
Acceptance of the position that “Terrorism should not be linked to the composite dialogue process and these should not be bracketed”, militates against India’s interests. It implies that while Pakistan may continue to bleed India, India should continue with the talks and refrain from counter measures;
Non-mention of Kashmir to be acclaimed as an achievement is misleading. As Satish Chandra, former deputy National Security Advisor aptly puts it, “It is puerile to contend, as some have, that the ‘K’ word does not figure in the statement, as the phrase “outstanding issues” is shorthand for the same and forms part of the composite dialogue process”.
Why does Pakistan so desperately want to talk? It is aware that there are very few areas where the two countries could really have any meaningful partnership. It is Kashmir, which is central in Pakistan’s strategic and security calculus, that it wants to tackle through a two-pronged policy of use of covert action on one hand and dialogue on the other.
On Kashmir, India is a status quoist state. It has, wrongly, stopped pressing its claim over Pakistan-Occupied Kashmir. Having illegally occupied one-third of the state, Pakistan estimates that through terrorism, subversion in Kashmir, international machinations and now nuclear blackmail, it can extract concessions on Kashmir. Talks keep the issue open bilaterally, reinforce its character as an unresolved international dispute, retard India’s progress — which threatens to widen the gap between the state powers of the two countries — and commits Indian troops, enabling Pakistan to maintain effective parity in force levels at minimal cost. As a weaker power it cannot achieve these objectives militarily, so it resorts to low-cost covert action, ie, terrorism, sabotage, subversion. However reprehensible, Pakistan’s policy objectives and strategy are clear and it cannot be accused of being muddle headed.
But why does it want to hold talks? It is to minimise the attendant cost of hitting a powerful adversary and using instrumentalities which in today’s world invite international reprobation. It needs to be emphasised that covert action comes with a price tag, albeit with a difference — act now pay later. The cost is determined by the aggrieved party’s capacity and will to punish the delinquent and create international pressure that is unaffordable for the delinquent. Pakistan has perfected the art of synchronising and calibrating both aspects of covert action, leveraging variables on both fronts to its advantage. In the first, it recruits, trains, motivates, arms and uses terrorist groups to inflict maximum losses through acts of depredation. In the second, it manages the fallout by disclaiming its role, making loud pronouncements to its commitment to fight terror, projecting itself as a prime victim, highlighting the dangers of conflict between two nuclear states and using the dependence of its Western allies in the fight against terror to restrain India and demand resumption of dialogue. More importantly, it projects Kashmir as the core factor in the birth and proliferation of Islamic terror in Pakistan that now threatens the world. It wants the matter tackled in a way that de-emotionalises potential terrorists in the interest of global peace and safety. Talks are considered a means, for which it wants the support of the international community — which in effect implies pressuring India.
To India, through terrorist depredations it conveys the hard message of the cost of retaining Kashmir. It follows the principle that force against the adversary must be decisive to generate desired results but when it comes to the costs, it advances the principle that all contentious issues can only be resolved through peaceful methods and force provides no answer. So talks and preparations for the next attack go on concurrently. Musharraf’s assertion in his autography that “I would like to state emphatically that whatever movement has taken place so far in the direction of finding a solution to Kashmir is due considerably to the Kargil conflict” is indicative of this mindset. Despite military failure, Pakistani strategists saw Kargil not as a debacle but a success story vis-à-vis its policy objective.
Pakistan’s dangerous doctrine
Pakistan also feels that its nuclear possessions hedge it against the world allowing it to fall apart, whatever its follies. Both subtly and blatantly it works on a dangerous doctrine that the consequences of a failed nuclear Pakistan with an army of Islamic radicals would be unaffordable to the world as a whole. It estimates that it can exploit its unique setting to force the world not only to keep it going politically and economically but even provide it with strategic space vis-à-vis India and Afghanistan. Even the terrorists are concurrently seen as both liability and asset. Pakistan works on the premise that success in short time-frames is what is important. It’s the immediate that matters. Even the long-term framework is only the cumulative total of short-term actions and responses.
The West’s fear forces it to focus on the short term, foregoing the long-term strategic sites. It remains content with what little Pakistan delivers, at whatever cost. Even undermining India’s legitimate security concerns is an affordable cost as the personal ‘stakes are high’. This suits Pakistan but singles out and isolates India. It underlines the need for India to evolve an independent strategy to protect its sovereign interests.
Thus, there is a pattern and design in Pakistan’s strategy of strike-talk-strike. But when India allows itself to be sucked into this vicious spiral it defies reasoning. Following Kargil, Musharraf was asked by Gulf News, on June 15, 2003, if it could happen again. His reply: “We don’t trust India… Bilateral talks started only because of Kargil. Another Kargil would depend on how the peace talks proceed.”
When Pakistan struck Mumbai on July 11, 2006, killing more than 200 persons and injuring nearly 800 in seven serial blasts, an anguished Prime Minister asserted that “We are certain the terror modules are instigated, inspired and supported by elements across the border.” And what did Pakistan achieve? Within two months, at Havana India certified that Pakistan was not a terrorist-sponsoring state but a victim state. A “composite dialogue” was initiated, and ISI given a clean chit by asserting that “We must draw distinction between terrorist elements in Pakistan and the government of Pakistan”. No wonder it was hailed as a major success by Pakistan’s establishment, the dividend of July 11, 2006. Some day, Sharm-el-Sheikh will be acclaimed as a trophy of 26/11 by Pakistan.
Assumptions confirmed
If it had been serious about the peace process Pakistan would have unilaterally rolled back its terrorist infrastructure, handed over the Indian criminals provided sanctuary in Pakistan and stopped trans-border infiltration. Till that happens talks and diplomatic engagements will have to follow differently calibrated and nuanced formulations to change Pakistan’s India view. General Aziz Khan, former chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, addressing an army function in Rawalkot on June 24, 2003 had said “Pakistan not only knows how to tackle India but has leaders with the guts.” Sharm-el-Sheikh reinforces their belief in such assumptions.
The writer is a former director of the IB.

Ajit Doval, ex-IB chief on intelligence failure

2009-08-30T05:32:00.000-07:00

Interview with Shri Ajit Doval on IBN channel on Sept. 15, 2008- in Evening at 6 PM

Ajit Doval, ex-IB chief on intelligence failure
Sept. 15, 2008, IBN channel

Anand: Good Evening Mr. Ajit! The Delhi blasts have once again proved beyond doubt that terrorists are miles ahead of the IB when it comes to planning and execution. What’s also becoming clear is that increasingly they are getting the erudite & tech savvy lot to join their bastions to disrupt the peace in this country by choosing locations at will and with an intention to cause maximum harm. These are ominous signs that we need to nip the evil in the bud or be prepared to witness bloodshed in front of our eyes. No doubt, society at large has a role to play. The simple tenet 'Know thy neighbor' needs to be practised to be aware of one's surroundings. As someone who has been part of the counter-terrorism and counter-intelligence operations, where do you think the lacunae lie and how can we prevent such mindless acts of terror from becoming a routine affair?
Ajit Doval: Firstly, let me assure you that India's intelligence capabilities are not as low as rated by you. Of course, any major blast is a failure and accountability must be fixed. But more important is the intelligence agencies initiating pre-emptive actions to degrade the capabilities of subversive and terrorist organisations. In a large country with democratic freedom 24 x 7 security cannot be ensured and some desperate persons, if they have got the training equipment and motivation to cause explosions, they can't always be prevented. But what is more important is that they are neutralised before they acquire and position these capabilities to bleed the nation. I think covert offensive operations duly empowered and legalised by the state will help a lot provided the nation can muster political will for that.
Shridhar:After major blasts in Bangalore, Ahmedabad, Jaipur; Now in Delhi. It is really a shame on Indian intelligence. Are you still waiting for the same to happen in all other Indian cities? Better to implement POTA, to nab terrorism. What do you say about this, sir....!
Ajit Doval: I think in today's conditions even POTA is not sufficient. We need to go for laws tougher than that with the provision that any misuse will also be a punishable offence within the Act.
Chandan Sharma: Does India need to become more aggressive when dealing with issues related to Pakistan and do we need an organization like CIA which are not only meant for intelligence gathering but which can eliminate prospective threats within and outside the country through unofficial means.
Ajit Doval: I think we need to bring all central intelligence agencies under one umbrella to ensure seamless integration in their operations, assessments and response. We also need to take a re-look about how to deal with Pakistan from an intelligence perspective. Indian intelligence overall needs to show greater aggressiveness in its approach towards safeguarding vital national interests.
Chenna Padmati: Dear Ajit Doval Sir, though we are seeing the bomb blasts occurring in USA, UK and India, but the frequency at which these are occurring in India is very high. After the London blasts the UK police have thwarted all other attempts by terrorists. What are the reasons in India for having so many Blasts? I would like to know how Indian intelligence differs from US and UK. Please give your answer in detail.
Ajit Doval: I think the first difference is the mere size of the problem that is faced by them and by us. They do not have 15,000 kms of land border of which nearly 9,000 is with Pakistan and Bangladesh which account for infiltration of terrorists, smuggling of arms and explosives and the terrorists finding easy sanctuaries across the borders. Pakistan has been waging a proxy war against India and hence the terrorist and subversive groups have received major support from Pakistan to bleed India which is not the case with the UK. Unfortunately, in India the fight against terror has been politicised and there is no national political consensus on the issue which exists in most of the Western countries. India has also not been able to bring in tough anti-terror laws like the UK and other Western countries despite the fact that it has been the world's largest victim of terrorism.
Rohit Kundra: Hello Mr Doval, You obviously have a very healthy and wise experience in Regards to Intelligence, can you tell the Failures of RAW,IB can be attributed to Red Tape , bureaucracy which I am very sure is one of the causes of our failure to prevent any incident. Look at Israel, probably 1/10 size of India, and 100 times better Intelligence Operations compared to our own, better than the US I would assume, Do we need Government Interference at all, since Govt. is anyways hopeless and hapless in most cases.
Ajit Doval: Red tape is definitely a big stumbling block in a country's performance in various areas of governance. Security and intelligence are no exceptions. I think there is an urgent need for de-bureaucratising India's intelligence agencies both form outside and within.
SRIRAM: Does it demotivate you, as a person fighting terror that SIMI was once banned only to be allowed to function once the Govt. changed and so did the affiliations and vote bank?
Ajit Doval: I think the overall approach towards radical extremist groups including SIMI has been rather soft. The Govt. should have been more firm in dealing with SIMI.
Abhishek: As a common citizen, how can we contribute to improve the situation?
Ajit Doval: Maintaining a high degree of alert and informing the police if anything suspicious comes to your notice.
Nagarajan: Don't you think it's impossible for the intelligence agencies to locate the various spots in a particular city where the terrorist group are planning to strike unless the network is smashed beforehand. It's therefore important to strengthen ground level policing at crowded who become police informer for intelligence agencies.
Ajit Doval: It is not impossible for the intelligence agencies to strike at their hideouts but they can do it only with the full involvement of police authorities. Intelligence operatives do not have powers of the law to strike on their own, arrest, seize, or raid terrorist premises. These powers are only with the police.
Malay Ray: Why can't we have tougher laws to punish all close relatives of terrorists? It is understandable that some innocent people will suffer; but aren't the people suffering from these explosions innocent too? That's one way to build social and emotional pressure on terrorists.
Ajit Doval: The basic jurisprudence of our criminal law is opposed to the idea of sharing responsibility for criminal actions by those who are not co-conspirators or part of a criminal act. Unless we can prove that the family members had connived, no action can be taken against them. I don't think that in today's world, it will be possible to make laws holding innocent persons, even if they are family members, accountable for the acts of a particular terrorist.
Aditya Sanghi:Hi, When we got to know about operation BAD, the next target was to be Delhi, isn’t it a total failure of our intelligence that even after getting the code word, we were not able to avoid these blasts? It brings up a big question mark on the competence level of the intelligence if they are at all keeping pace with technology. Such attacks can never be avoided by police, it needs to be owned by the intelligence. Thanks, Aditya Sanghi Informatica Business Solutions
Ajit Doval: Intelligence working is not confined only to intelligence agencies. The local police has to know their area, the movement and activities of people operating there and ground level sources of information at police station level. Once the intelligence about likely terrorist strikes in Delhi were known, the organisation which is likely to strike, identity of some of its operators etc had been obtained particularly after detailed interrogations of arrested SIMI activists. The police apparatus should have been more vigilant and pro-active.
RK: Sir, I don't blame the Intelligence Agencies. Don't do feel that without strong anti-terror laws, its too much to ask from Intelligence Agencies?
Ajit Doval: I totally agree that intelligence by itself is not the complete answer to terrorist threat. Even if one knows many things but is unable to take any action for want of suitable laws and other empowerments, the problem can't be tackled. India needs very strong anti-terror laws to make use of the knowledge available about the terrorists and their over ground support base.
Nitin Mjh: Hello Sir...I wish to know how was terrorism countered and curbed in Punjab and can't we adopt similar kind of strategies and policies to curb this Islamic terror as well?? Thanks Nitin.
Ajit Doval: I think there are a lot of lessons to be learnt from Punjab as also successes in north-eastern states like Mizoram. At the same time, it is important to understand that all conflicts have their own special characteristics and one model cannot be automatically supplanted in another theatre. Actually, we can learn more from our Kashmir experience in dealing with radical Islamist extremist threat.
ANIL SHETTY: After 9/11 - attack on USA. There is no attack on USA more than 7 years. If they can maintain their security, Why we cannot maintain at least 50% of them.
Ajit Doval: All security systems operate in a certain environment and setting. Our internal and external environment as also availability of resources are quite different than what is obtaining in the US. They have taken a doctrinal decision to take the war from where terror threat emanates. That is in their defensive-offence mode. So the theatre of conflict is say in Afghanistan, Pakistan, Iraq or other countries. For various reasons, we are operating in a defensive mode. There is a need to have a re-look at overall strategy to tackle terrorism.
Armoredfish: What do the intelligence agencies normally do? That has to be told to the public now. It is time. It is mostly political intelligence for the ruling party. We do not have any covert agency like the MI6 or the U.K or elsewhere. What is your take on this?
Ajit Doval: Intelligence agencies provide knowledge component at policy formulation, policy execution and operational levels. We do have an elaborate intelligence network covering all the areas of internal and external intelligence. The Indian intelligence agencies are as covert but at the same time accountable to the government as MI-5 & MI-6. However, their activities can't be disclosed to the public and large number of misgivings about their poor performance are because of ignorance about their role and activities. There are large number of successes to their creidt of intelligence agencies which unfortunately can't be shared with teh public. Nevertheless, there is need for considerable improvement.
Vivek: Good Evening Mr. Doval, Is our security apparatus so weak that these attacks just can't be stopped or it merely shows the lack of political will on the part of current government to deal with it.
Ajit Doval: Security apparatus is not weak but obviously in recent years has not been able to cope with the challenges faced by it. There is an urgent need to strengthen and reorgnaise it. Political will is of course the most important component of response mechanism. It detremines the response, capability, in various other allied areas, including efficiency of police forces. Of late, we find poor political will in fighting terrorism.
Aditya Sanghi: Hi, Me as a lay man gets a feeling that there isn’t any coordination between states which is one of the major reasons for the failure of intelligence. What one state says seems to be ignored by the other state or centre. How true is this? Is there a scope for improvement and if yes then what are the top three things that come to your mind to improve this? Thanks and regards, Aditya Sanghi Informatica Business Solutions
Ajit Doval: It is not true that there is no coordination amongst the states though there is nothing so good which cannot be improved. The problem lies at times in legal; formalities which have to be completed before action or info provided by one state to the other is complied with. For example, Gujarat Police could not arrest Abu Basheer from Azamgarh though they had info about his activities. UP Police also could not hand over Basheer after arresting him till he was produced in the court of law and orders obtained. In this interim, lots of useful clues were lost and many conspirators got alerted and fled. In some of the states there is no sensitivity to terrorism and their police forces do not take follow-up action as fast as possible. However, gradually more and more states are coming forward to extend their cooperation.
aathrey:Do you think there is a need for special central Intelligence agency with quick hassle free communication from the top to bottom and vice-versa and from one corner to the other with no politician poking their nose.
Ajit Doval: As far as intelligence agencies are concerned they do have fast and dependable channels of communication. However, what is needed is a nationwide security communication grid which can integrate communication between intelligence agencies, police forces, paramilitarty organsiations and defence forces where they are involved in internal security duties. Such a grid should also be connected to national data bank on terrorists so that any information regarding the terrorists, their plans, movements which are known in one part of the country are automatically transmitted and accessed by other agencies.
Vinay: Our intelligence seems to lag in terms of technology and I.T. Also some hidden traffic cameras would have been helpful. Does our intelligence department spend enough money to upgrade itself from time to time?
Ajit Doval: Technology is an important component of modern day intelligence. All Indian agencies do have high tech capabilities besides having a separate organization known as National Technical Facilities organization which is dedicated to development of new tech and integration. Some highly eminent scientists are involved in tech development for intelligence services. As far as hidden cameras are concerned, it is a good preventive and detective measure that can be used for policing purposes. It is being used in some areas. However, it does not come within the domain of intelligence technical gadgetry.

‘Indian Mujahideen is Pak’s local outsourcing of terror’

2009-08-30T05:13:00.000-07:00

‘Indian Mujahideen is Pak’s local outsourcing of terror’
Date: Sept 21, 2008
Mailtoday,
Mail Today spoke to the country’s three most renowned security experts – former BSF director-general Prakash singh, former IB director Ajit Doval and retired D-G of the NSG and former Delhi Police Commissioner Ved Marwah – to get a closer insight into what Indian Mujahideen is all about:

Is IM an email ID or is it really the new name for terror in India?
AJIT DOVAL: IM is a case of local outsourcing of terror done by Pakistan. In SIMI, Pakistan’s terror outfits found a perfect ally in terms of ideology, age-group and reach across the country.
VED MARWAH: Don’t discount the Pakistan hand in IM. Make no mistake – IM could be a radical local outfit but it is a part of a global jehadi network.
PRAKASH SINGH: IM seems for real, but it can’t be mistaken for a completely indigenous outfit as it wanted everyone to believe through its emails.

But all 13 names of IM cadre given out by the Delhi Police today belong to Azamgarh in UP and are all educated youth…
AJIT DOVAL: It is a cleverly thought-out strategy to militarise some young Indian Muslims and polarize the Indian Muslim population.
VED MARWAH: These are local networks which have been raised by groups like LeT and ISI in Pakistan. The local cells are activated when a terror strike is executed in India.
PRAKASH SINGH: The ‘mastermind’ is using the expanding SIMI network in India to rope in the new generation of educated. IM has apparently sourced its educated and tech-savvy cadre from its parent body, the SIMI.

So then, who is the ‘mastermind’? Abu Bashar or Abdul Subhan Qureshi alias Tauqeer, the Osama of India?
AJIT DOVAL: In such a terror act, the actual mastermind may very well be a person who is not actually executing the terror strike or is not even making the bombs. He could be a person doing the main planning and strategizing.
VED MARWAH: We can say only about the mastermind of a certain serial blast. There can be links between various blasts but the real planner could be sitting far away in Karachi, Dubai or Kabul.
PRAKASH SINGH: It is not proper on part of the police to quickly say that they have killed the mastermind of Indian Mujahideen as Delhi Police did just hours after the encounter. The police made two arrests and these persons should be first interrogated properly to know the complete contours of the crime.

But what has prompted this local element-driven terror in India? Are Gujarat riots, which finds mention in each email sent by the IM, to blame for it?
AJIT DOVAL: I would say that SIMI started organizing itself in a big way and its underground cadre became active after POTA was lifted in December 2004. Regarding Gujarat, I would say that such riot-hit areas could have been targeted by the SIMI as a catchments’ area for new recruits.
VED MARWAH: What we need to nip this terrorism in its bud is to stop the unfortunate policy of going soft on terror where even cabinet ministers are backing SIMI. Centre-state co-operation on terror has broken down in the tenure of this government.
PRAKASH SINGH: The Gujarat riots did lead to a new evolution of terrorism in the country. But these terrorists cannot use that as a pretext to kill innocents.
(As told to Aman Sharma)

Bleeding from within

2009-08-25T06:48:00.000-07:00

Bleeding from within
*Ajit Doval
25 Aug 2009
Source: New Indian Express
URL:
http://www.expressbuzz.com/edition/story.aspx?Title=Bleeding+from+within&artid=Z60JJ2NrD4c=&SectionID=XVSZ2Fy6Gzo=&MainSectionID=XVSZ2Fy6Gzo=&SEO=UPA,+LWE,+MHA,+naxalism,+Syed+Moinullah+Shah,+Lash&SectionName=m3GntEw72ik=

The country’s internal security environment, which suffered steady deterioration during UPA’s earlier five-year rule, continues to remain a cause of serious concern. Now that the government is no more fettered by pulls and pressures of coalition partners, which its apologists claimed prevented it from decisive actions in the past, it is regrettable that the situation is showing no signs of abatement. I would like to point out some of the disturbing trends which indicate callous apathy of the government to attend to this vital aspect of governance thereby not only endangering the safety and security of the aam aadmi but also seriously undermining the national interests. These are illustrative and not an exhaustive list of serious acts of commission and omission by the government.

Left Wing Extremism
* Fast spatial growth of the problem. When the UPA government took over there were estimated 76 districts in nine states (MHA Annual Report 2004-05) of the country affected by LWE. Today, as per a study carried out by Centre for Land and Air Warfare Studies, corroborated by many other experts on the subject the number ranges from 203 to 252 districts in 18 states. Practically 35 districts are getting sucked into the vortex of LWE every year despite the prime minister proclaiming on November 4, 2004 that naxalism constitutes the biggest threat facing the country. The pathetic response to a security threat that at the highest level is assessed as the biggest national threat raises serious doubts, both of the capabilities and intentions of the government.

* As per the figures released by the database of International Institute of Strategic Studies giving details of each incident of Left Wing Extremism, the total fatalities for the five-year period from 1999 to 2003 stood at 1,550. As against this the figures for the five-year period from 2004 to 2008 stand at 3,177, depicting an alarming increase of 100 per cent. The current year gives no signs of comfort. In seven months of the current year 475 people including 255 civilians have lost their lives. (Figures given by Mail Today — July 13, 2009). Similarly, the number of Naxalite incidents is also consistently showing an upward trend. In seven months of the current year 1,130 incidents have been reported as against 1,591 in entire 2008. (Figures given by Mail Today — July 13, 2009).

* Other cause of serious concern is the high rate of killing of police personnel. From 2004 to 2008, 877 brave policemen were martyred. While last year 231 police personnel were killed, in seven months of this year the number had touched the figure of 230. The police personnel need better protection against land mines and IED’s as also frequent ambushes. They need better body protection equipment, weapons, communication and transport facilities.

* The strength of armed guerrillas has swelled from less than 7,000 in early 2004 to somewhere around 13,500. Left extremists, today, have many more and much sophisticated weapons; some of them suspected to be from external sources. They raise funds nearly to the tune of Rs 1,200 crore a year and accretion in their financial strength is directly in proportion to funds released for development of Naxal affected areas. One lesson of insurgencies world over is that pumping funds without required infrastructure, accountability and administrative apparatus to ensure its fruitful absorption only enriches the insurgents. The extremists have acquired tactical skills, terrain knowledge and intelligence capabilities, that too in inaccessible rural and forest hinterland, that the security agencies are finding it difficult to cope with.

JAMMU & KASHMIR

The recent reports indicating large-scale infiltration of terrorists and weapons from Pakistan is a matter of serious concern. The army on April 25, 2009, paraded before the media, a Pakistani terrorist named Syed Moinullah Shah, who disclosed that he was member of a group of 120 people, who entered Kashmir earlier that month. The display of weapons recovered on his disclosures was mind boggling, both in quantity and their lethality. In the last few months there have been every day reports of fierce and long encounters between the security forces and the militants indicating presence of a new genre of terrorists — better armed, trained and networked. This exposes persistent claims of the government of sharp improvement in security situation in J&K. Even the army chief has indicated backing to these terrorists of the Pakistanis, and recently told the NDTV that ‘The camps, which were there on the other side, are still existing. There is definite support for infiltration from the other side. The kind of equipment with which these militants have been caught — whether in terms of weapons or communication equipment — indicate the tremendous supports given to them by the other side’. Quoting official sources Asian Age (April 24, 2009), reported that, ‘Available inputs confirm that 1,000 terrorists will be sent from 26 different terror camps located in several areas of Pakistan’. The report quoting an official further added, ‘Lashkar has at least 30 terror camps located in Muzaffarabad and Kotli. There are confirmed reports that at least 550 Lashkar militants are being prepared by their handlers for carrying out terror activities in India. They will also be sent to India by June end’. All these developments are indicative of a fast deteriorating security scenario with grave threats to India’s sovereignty and integrity.

It is surprising that the joint communiqué signed by the PM with his Pakistani counterpart makes no mention of continuing support to terrorists by Pakistan, the presence of camps there, continuous infiltration of terrorists from across the border but instead Pakistan’s concern on Balochistan has been added.

TERRORISM

Terrorism continues to be the most serious threat confronting the nation; most of it. While it has a profound external component, efforts have also been made within the country to subvert some misguided youth. The government instead of dealing with the problem firmly and by building national capacities to contain and counter them is pursuing illusive diplomacy to deal with it.

In September 2006, the government claimed a major break-through in Havana when it declared that Pakistan was a terrorist victim and not a terrorist sponsoring state. In a statement the government said; ‘The fact is, terrorism is a threat to Pakistan and it has been a threat to India. We need to have a collective mechanism to deal with it’. Surprisingly, it came just after Mumbai blasts of July 11, 2006 in which 201 persons were killed and 714 injured in seven serial blasts. After the blasts the prime minister had said, “We are certain that the terror modules responsible for the Mumbai blasts are instigated, inspired and supported by the elements across the border”. And what was the consequence of this capitulation. From that date till Mumbai carnage of November 26, 2008, 18 major incidents of terrorist attacks took place in the country.

Pakistan let loose reign of terror in which 602 persons were killed and 1,649 were injured in a span of two years. And, what is the lesson we have learnt from this? We tamely signed a joint communiqué with Pakistan resuming the dialogue process in which instead of articulating our concerns as an aggrieved party we agreed that comprehensive dialogue would be de-linked from terrorism. Pakistan’s policy is very clear to coerce India into submission through bleeding it continuously, this was best articulated by Musharraf who during the SAARC summit in Nepal in January 2002 said that the Kashmir issue ‘was linked to Indian terrorism and cannot be separated’.

Despite repeated assurances by the government and claims of major diplomatic victory, Pakistan has taken no tangible and verifiable steps to stop its terrorist offensive against India and bring to book the culprits of 26/11 Mumbai blasts. It is not only that the appeal for detention of Hafiz Saeed has been withdrawn but no accomplices and associates of the 10 Pakistani terrorists who attacked Mumbai have been arrested or proceeded against. As the investigations have revealed the planning and preparations of Mumbai attacks took over one year in which Kasab and his associates were recruited, imparted training, provided weapon, communication lines were established, intelligence was collected, safe houses in Pakistan were established, their journey to Mumbai through sea was planned and various logistic arrangements were tied up. Most of it happened on Pakistani soil. It is not only the senior leaders of Lashkar-e-Toiba like Hafiz Saeed, Zakiur Rehman Lakhvi and Zarar Shah who were involved but also tens of others were active accomplices in this plan. Pakistan has taken no action against them. It is only hoodwinking the international opinion by pertaining to be keen to take action. But, what is most regrettable is that India lends credence and legitimacy to Pakistani claim by not only resuming talks but also agreeing to have intelligence cooperation between the two countries.

We would like the government to take immediate steps if it wants to make its electoral promise of zero-level tolerance to terrorism a reality rather than a mere electioneering slogan:

* Strengthen its intelligence apparatus, particularly at the operational level to pre-empt, prevent and punish the terrorists

* Accord early approval to various long pending state legislations against organised crimes

* Strengthen border security with higher technological support to control terrorist infiltration

* To restore the confidence of the people in the rule of law, execute the punishment accorded to Afzal Guru, the convict in Parliament attack case

* Establish special courts for speedy disposal of terrorism cases

* To strengthen counter-terrorist laws including bringing about changes in the evidence and criminal procedure laws to effectively deal with terrorist and their supporters

* Pursuing a two-pronged strategy in dealing with the neighbouring countries — generally promote good and friendly bilateral relations with all neighbours for mutual benefit and adopt a firm and unambiguous policy towards those meddling with India’s internal security and take effective measures to neutralise infrastructure/capability located therein, which is currently utilised by terrorists to unleash terror attacks in India.

* Set up national data bank of terrorist organisations and terrorists with nationwide e-connectivity

* Launch a major programme to assist state governments in the modernisation, up-gradation and restructuring of state police forces

NATIONAL IDENTITY CARD

On April 17, 2000 the Government of India appointed a Group of Ministers (GoM) chaired by the home minister with defence minister, external affairs minister and finance minister as its members to review the entire gamut of national security and recommend ways and means to revamp it in an integrated manner. The GoM submitted its report in February 2001, which was later accepted in its entirety by the Government of India in April 2001.

In its report, acknowledging that ‘illegal migration has assumed serious proportions’ the GoM recommended ‘there should be compulsory registration of citizens and non-citizens living in India. All citizens should be issued multi purpose identity cards and non-citizens should be issued identity cards of different colour and design. This should be introduced initially in the border districts and then extended to the hinterland progressively’.

The Government of India accepted the recommendation. Accordingly, the Citizenship Act 1955 was amended in December, 2003 to provide for compulsory registration of all citizens and issuance of national identity cards. A detailed system after series of inter-departmental deliberations and consultations were worked out for linking of the full details and entries from the national to state, district and sub-district levels. After soliciting the help of some IT experts a highly sophisticated software programme was designed. Through an elaborate and near automated system it was designed to provide unique national identity number to each Indian citizen above the age of sixteen and link it to birth and death records, passport details, record of property holdings, driving licence, income tax return, foreign travel records through emigration bureau, criminal records, educational institutions attended etc. It also envisaged biometric recognition details besides fingerprints. Responsibilities were delineated and the state governments approached for their role and support in making the plan a success.

When the change of government took place in April 2004 the scheme was at the takeoff stage. The funds had been allocated and a detailed action plan had been operationalised. Pilot projects had been launched in some border areas and necessary improvements brought about on the basis of experience gained.

It is quite confusing now the government has come with the new idea of unique identity cards trying to reinvent the wheel. While there was an allocation of Rs 44 crore for the MNIC in 2008-09, it has been slashed to Rs 10 lakh in 2009. On the other hand the government has allocated Rs 120 crore for unique identity cards. It is also intriguing why the subject has been shifted from the ministry of home affairs to Planning Commission. I would like to emphasis that issuing of this card was not so much a developmental need as the security need. It is meant to differentiate bona fide Indian citizens from illegal immigrants and foreign terrorists. The government needs to clarify whether the basic purpose for which national identity cards are to be issued has undergone a conceptual change. It also needs to be clarified what is the status of the earlier scheme which the government for the last five years has been claiming was being assiduously pursued.

COMMUNITY POLICING

The participation of citizens is essential for maintenance of internal security for a country as vast and diverse as ours. There are a large number of highly nationalists and contentious citizens who would like to extend their support in not only maintaining peace and order in the civil society but also play a supportive role in combating terrorism, insurgencies, extremism and other forms of threats to the nation. The government should initiate steps to leverage the civil society in maintenance of internal security. It needs to devise innovative methods of involving the community in exercising vigil for the security of neighbourhood on self-help basis and for constructive inter-action with Thana police. Plans for consultation with the community — for instilling a general sense of security and improving the public perception of the police force also needs to be introduced.

Ajit Doval

* The author is a former chief of the Intelligence Bureau

Move to the offensive mode: Doval

2008-11-08T01:38:00.000-08:00

Move to the offensive mode: Doval
Sept 27, 2008
An Interview by Harinder Baweja
Source: Tehelka Magazine, Vol 5, Issue 38,

Whoever thinks faster will win, former IB chief AK Doval tells HARINDER BAWEJA

As the former director of the Intelligence Bureau, what do you think the state needs to do to counter terror?

The state does not have the political will by which it can convert its intrinsic state power into real power. That can happen if the politicians are prepared to take the right decisions in the national interest, unmindful of the political consequences to their own self and their party. When there is a conflict between the interest of a party or an individual and the interest of the state, the latter should prevail.

Is there a failure in collecting cutting edge intelligence?

We require pro-active intelligence to degrade their [terrorists’] capability and degrade their resources. We are chasing them, but they are ahead of us. You require a paradigm shift in the intelligence approach. We have to get from the defensive mode to the offensive mode. Every hour, new ideas need to be generated. It is essentially a game of outsmarting and outwitting. Whoever can think faster and do the unexpected will win the game.

From past experience we know that POTA and TADA did not succeed.

It is totally incorrect. Neither TADA failed, nor POTA failed. First we must know what is the purpose of legislation. Legislation is the demonstration of national will through politically elected representatives on a particular issue. Through POTA you conveyed to the terrorists groups and their mentors that India will respond to acts of terror with all the force at its command.
It also works as a deterrant not only to the terrorists but their overground supporters. Legislation is not about how many people have been sent to jail. It also works as a motivator for the law enforcing agencies.

Conviction under TADA was 1 percent.

Anti-terrorist laws are not for conviction only. When POTA was in force, only onetwentieth of the number died as compared to when POTA was removed. Within six months of removal of POTA, SIMI struck on July 5, 2005 at Ayodhya. The trail of their terrorist depravations from that day has remained unabated.

But SIMI activists are being acquitted by the courts for lack of evidence.

Convictions and acquittals depend on the evidence that is produced in the court and not on the guilt of the individual. The courts are not there to find the truth but to examine the evidence . In terrorist cases, the evidence is difficult to find, particularly if the yardstick of common crimes is applied to them.

But there is something called the criminal justice system.

Yes, a criminal justice system is important. However, the Mallimath Committee that examined the criminal administration system of India unequivocally felt that the country’s criminal justice system was totally inadequate for meeting terrorist threats.
They recommended far reaching changes which, unfortunately, the government has shelved. Terrorism is a form of war, and its jurispudence has to be different from those applicable with respect to ordinary crime.

How can this serious threat be met?

The solution lies in various concentric circles — at the levels of policy formulation, implementation, technical, operational and legal. We also need policies that will minimise the sense of alienation among various sections of society. We also need to minimise collateral damages. There is a need for bringing convergence in intelligence activity and at least bringing all central intelligence agencies under one umbrella, as has been done in the US.

URL: http://www.tehelka.com/story_main40.asp?filename=Ne270908moveto_the.asp

Expert advice to cops: Innovate

2008-11-08T01:37:00.000-08:00

Expert advice to cops: Innovate
Date: Sep 15, 2008
Source: The Times Of India

Every time serial bomb blasts take place, the absence of real time intelligence is lamented. And the Delhi blasts on Saturday were no exception.
But former spymasters and top strategic analysts believe the battle between terrorists and intelligence officers is a cat-and-mouse game where the side with better innovative skills stays one step ahead of the other.
If intelligence officers are not able to surprise terrorists, then terrorists will surprise the nation, says ex-IB boss Ajit Kumar Doval. The ability to carry out a surprise strike — for terrorists, it could be a bomb blast; for intelligence officials, it could be a preventive swoop — depends on the team's ability to generate new ideas. New ideas help find ways to create new tactics to combat and thwart the adversary.
Which is why, says former Intelligence Bureau director Doval, there's nothing like a time-tested formula for either terrorists to carry out their devious plans or for intelligence officials to stop them. The sheer ingeniousness of the plan enabled terrorists to hoodwink the US intelligence apparatus and carry out the 9/11 strikes. Says Doval, "Time-tested wisdom is an anti-doctrine in successful intelligence operations. You require constant refinement of tactics on the ground. A successful tactic can be used only once. It's a use-and-throw technology."
Ironically, the same holds true for terrorists too. For instance, once a terrorist knows that intelligence officials indulge in telephone tapping, he is unlikely to divulge classified information during a call; on the contrary, he will only talk what he wants the other side to know.
URL: http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/Cities/Delhi/Expert_advice_to_cops_Innovate/articleshow/3483237.cms

Armed Conflicts and Peace Processes in South Asia

2008-11-08T01:35:00.000-08:00

Armed Conflicts and Peace Processes in South Asia
Nov 30, 2006
Speaker: Ajit Kumar Doval
Source: Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies

The left wing problem should not be seen statistically. It is seen as a serious problem because it tends to spread as of today, even if incidents take place sporadically. The important aspect is the number of people involved in the attacks or incidents of violence. In such cases, response option becomes difficult and is limited. Such helplessness of response brings violent changes. In future, this is likely to increase as more and more people are being mobilized.
We should get out of our propensity to look all the problems in a single readymade framework and deal with this problem independently and in alienation. There are vested interests which want to preserve the conditions. This way, the problem becomes extremely difficult. The chapter, falls short of tracing out a comprehensive history/background of left movement. Various crucial stages have been found missing from the historical background. The dynamics within the ideology have also to be taken into account to understanding the problem. In different areas, different dynamics are prevailing.
Impact of patterns of violence that takes place need to be studied. It would have been worthwhile, if this would have been taken into account in the chapter. There is a problem with the identification of the groups, which could have been as ideologues, armed groups etc. A deep study of how the money is generated, where does it go and how is it disbursed, who all are involved is needed.
The chapter on Nepal was a good though events have fundamentally changed since when it was written. It provides a wonderful background as to how it developed from the beginning till the last decade. Factors that influenced it have been covered. Last one year had been eventful. Recommendations for genuine and transparent democracy are agreeable. Recent visit and remarks by Prachanda that Indian Maoists are ideologically mislead is significant.

URL: http://www.ipcs.org/Pak_seminars2.jsp?action=showView&kValue=2175

Chinese envoy’s remark unwarranted: Doval

2008-11-08T01:34:00.000-08:00

Chinese envoy’s remark unwarranted: Doval
An Interview by Rajeev Sharma
Nov 19, 2006
Source: The Sunday Tribune

Mr Ajit Kumar Doval, the former Chief of Intelligence Bureau, Government of India, is an internationally renowned expert on strategic affairs. He is known for his out-of-box thinking, unconventional wisdom and pragmatic views.
Mr Doval speaks to The Sunday Tribune exclusively on the eve of Chinese President Hu Jintao’s visit to India beginning tomorrow.
Excerpts:
Q: The Chinese Ambassador to India, Mr Sun Yuxin, has said the whole of Arunachal Pradesh belonged to China. What could be his motive behind this comment?
A: The remarks made by the Chinese Ambassador were bad in form and content. A subjective interpretation of facts, history and obligations under international law does not alter the realities. There is a bilateral mechanism in place where the border question is being addressed and such assertions do not help the process.
More important, it was the timing, stridency and the fact that the remark was made without any apparent provocation is disquieting. Obviously, it was a deliberate assertion and not an off the cuff remark. Its impact on President Hu Jintao’s visit could also not have been lost sight of. It may well be an attempt to put India on the defensive when addressing various bilateral issues.
Q: How do you see Mr Hu’s visit to India? Will it be a successful, substantive, forward-looking visit? Or is it just a stopover for Mr Hu who undertakes a far more important and sensitive visit to Pakistan from November 23?
A: It is a very important visit. India and China are poised to be two major players in the emerging global scenario and have much in common, both in strengths and problems. Together they have world’s one-third population, are fastest growing economies and share many problems of growth and development. Most important, they are neighbours with a long common border and it is in the interest of both the countries not to grow as strategic adversaries.
President Hu’s visit is an important visit and underrating it will be a mistake. Linking it to his visit to Pakistan may not be the right approach. With a long-term perspective, we need to formulate an independent China policy and firm sure footed moves at this stage will help in evolving that policy.
Q: Can India trust China considering Beijing’s close ties with its all-weather ally Pakistan? Is India’s China policy faulty? Should India reverse its stand on two crucial issues of Tibet and Taiwan? What will be the pros and cons if New Delhi were to do that?
A: The question of trust and distrust is not the issue. Identifying our best national interests and developing a convergence to achieve them is the issue. Let us not underestimate our own strengths. India is as important to China as China is to India in pursuing their respective long-term national interest. A conflict relationship is not in the interest of either country. How do we develop that commonality of interests, fully protecting our strategic, security, political and economic interests, is the challenge.
India does not have to speak from a position of weakness or strength but reasonableness and rationality. China would do well to develop greater sensitivity and understanding of India’s genuine concerns.
Q: Is it correct that the Chinese have re-started arming the Indian Northeast insurgents, reversing their own decades-old policy?
A: I don’t have any information about the Chinese arming the Northeastern insurgent group. I do not know what is the basis of your information. On the face of it, it looks highly unlikely to me.
Q: How do you see the trade route with China through Nathu La in Sikkim? Will it ultimately work as the Chinese mainland-Lhasa railway is now poised to expand to the Indian borders? What are the military and strategic implications of this railway line for India?
A: Opening of Nathu La for trade was an important move forward. Its trade potential, at least at this juncture, may not be very high but its symbolic import cannot be underestimated. It does have some security implications, but I am sure the agencies concerned would have taken appropriate countermeasures. Whether the experiment will prove to be fruitful or not will depend on overall evolution of relations between the two great neighbours.
Lhasa being connected to the mainland by a railway line has definite military and strategic implications for India. The railway infrastructure has been built which is capable of enhancing combat capability of China and transporting hardware for military offensive. India has to factor it in its higher defence planning and match the capabilities.
Q: How do you see the role of Yughen Thinley Dorjee, the Chinese-recognised 17th Karmapa working among the Tibetan Diaspora both within Tibet and outside, especially in India?
A: On the face of it, the whole sequence of his coming to India, establishing himself, developing contacts and linkages, gives an impression that there is more to the whole episode than what meets the eye.
I definitely feel that it is a sensitive matter and needs to be addressed from a higher plane of knowledge. Of course, if he is under the spell of some hostile influences, internal or external, it can be detrimental to India and we need to maintain a high degree of vigil.

URL: http://www.tribuneindia.com/2006/20061119/edit.htm#3

Old men and their Official secrets

2008-11-08T01:33:00.000-08:00

Old men and their Official secrets
3 Sep 2006
Source: The Times Of India

When a man lies to his wife about where he is going, he is not always headed to his lover's nest. Sometimes, it is just a state secret.
For decades, the lives of such men who walk down the forbidden alleys of intelligence or the nuclear programme are bound by a written code of silence. Then one day they retire. And state secrets become distant memories. Even their memories are guarded by the Official Secrets Act.
Fobbing off the wife is a tact that former Intelligence Bureau director Ajit Kumar Doval learnt during his exciting life. His wife, Anu, unknowingly, played host to a band of armed men at their home in Aizwal. For two years.
He told her that they were part of an operation. But they were, in fact, army commanders of the legendary Laldenga's Mizo National Front, which was involved in the Mizo insurgency.
"They were all heavily armed but I had given my word that they would be safe. My wife cooked pork for them even though she was not used to cooking pork," says 61-year-old Doval, chuckling. His wife came to know of their identity many years later and felt miffed.
Besides hosting the Mizo army commanders and helping the government in Mizoram, Doval's 33 years of service took him to inaccessible areas of India's north-east.
He was inside the Golden Temple in 1989 during Operation Black Thunder when security forces were charging in to flush out terrorists from there. He also helped plan the 1992 Punjab state elections.
An interesting aspect of his career was the six years he spent in Pakistan. That country's Intelligence always shadowed him. One day, Doval decided to visit the dargah in a local market at Lahore. The attraction was a qawaali programme.
"I decided to go incognito and dressed up as a middle-class Muslim gentleman. Later, when I was enjoying the qawaali, one Pakistani Intelligence officer came to me very quietly and whispered into my ear that my fake beard was dangling. It was so embarrassing. I quickly left."
With his two sons having flown away to the West, Doval now leads a quiet life in Delhi with his wife. He has no plans to write a book, unlike his colleague and former joint director of CBI, Maloy Krishna Dhar, who broke traditions by writing a book Open Secrets, which he called "the first open confession of intelligence operative".
URL: http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/articleshow/msid-1951335,prtpage-1.cms

Pak must destroy terror infrastructure: Doval

2008-11-08T01:32:00.000-08:00

Pak must destroy terror infrastructure: Doval
An Interview by Rajeev Sharma
August 6, 2006
Source: The Sunday Tribune

A quintessential “operations” man and the Bhishma Pitamah of the Indian intelligence brass, Ajit Kumar Doval (IPS 1968 batch, Kerala cadre), is viewed as a national asset. A former Chief of the Intelligence Bureau (IB), former Prime Minister Indira Gandhi conferred on him the Kirti Chakra.
Mr Doyal spent years in Pakistan and is credited with breathtaking acts of espionage during his stay there. Incidentally, he was the Centre’s chief negotiator with hijackers of Indian Airlines IC 814 in Kandahar. In an interview to The Sunday Tribune, he maintains that Pakistan must dismantle its terrorist infrastructure at any cost.
Excerpts:
Q: What should India do to make Pakistan dismantle the terrorism infrastructure?
A: Pakistan will have to do it and it is bound by international obligations including the UN resolutions 1373, 1455, etc. and bilateral commitments. India has to create compulsions for Pakistan to do it. It has to be forced to realise that this perceived low-cost option to achieve politico-strategic objectives is too costly. It involves putting a stop to recruitment and training, financing and equipping, communication facilities and demolishing collaborative networks of terrorist with gunrunners, underworld, currency counterfeiters, hawala operators, etc. It would also involve ISI dismantling its networks in Bangladesh, Nepal, Middle East etc created to assist terrorists.
Q: Is India justified in postponing the Foreign Secretary level talks with Pakistan following the Mumbai serial blasts? Can the composite dialogue process with Pakistan and terrorism go side by side?
A: Yes. The dialogue process cannot succeed as long as Pakistan’s mindset is routed in what President Musharraf reportedly said on July 15, 2003 to Gulf News that “we don’t trust the Indian Government. Before Kargil, Kashmir was a dead issue” and “another Kargil taking place depends on how the peace talks proceed.” If blood and terror or the threat of it, implicit or explicit, is the only argument that Pakistan has to bring to the negotiating table, the talks have no prospects.
Q: What prevents India from using satellite imagery and other modern devices to nail down Pakistan’s lies?
A: Jurisprudence of covert actions, as also its response, is not governed by the laws of evidence. Evidence, or lack of it, is only an argument used by the players to lend legitimacy to what they want to do or refrain from doing in their perceived self-interest. We do use high technology intelligence capability wherever needed. But satellite imageries can only show you some physical objects on the ground but it cannot connect it with the terrorists.
We have much better evidence in the form of hundreds of Pakistanis and their associates arrested who have given graphic details of how they were recruited, trained, motivated, tasked and enabled to undertake terrorist actions. We have loads of terrorist documents and diaries to prove Pak involvement. Sharing of evidence like Dawood Ibrahim or Salahuddin’s Pakistani passports and identity cards, etc. may be good evidence in a court but not in the game of intelligence. The adversaries insist on evidence not for taking action, but to plug the gaps and bring about correctives.
Q: War with Pakistan will have much less casualties than the number of people who have lost their lives or limbs due to Pakistan’s proxy war. Is this view cynical?
A: I find this view cynical to the extent that we are not living in the medieval age where wars were waged to kill people. Wars are fought to achieve well defined political or military objectives. Loss of lives is just a collateral damage. Pakistan’s nuclear status will not have a decisive bearing on India. However, like many other components, nuclear factor will also be an element that will have to be factored in.
Q: What does Pakistan get out of this proxy war strategy which is out of sync with modern times?
A: Pakistani strategists are fully aware that terrorists cannot dismember or weaken India. It, however, looks at the proxy war as a low-cost and sustainable offence which can bleed India, against whom it harbours a compulsive hostility. It also feels that it commits a large body of Indian troops to internal security duties thereby narrowing the gap of force-level disparities between the two countries. Pakistan also assesses that it may lead to communal polarisation in India increasing its leverage amongst Indian Muslims. In the aftermath of the Afghan war, it also felt that so many trained jehadis and loose terrorist weapons floating around could be a source of serious internal instability and could best be directed towards India. Retarding India’s economic progress was also an objective.
Pakistan has been proved wrong on all counts. India’s military preparedness is as high as ever, Indian Muslims hate Pakistan today more than ever before and India’s economic progress is for the world to see. Ironically, Pakistan today is much more internally unstable today because of the jehadi factor.
Q: Is General Musharraf in total control of Pakistan? Is he no longer capable of reining in terrorist outfits?
A: General Musharraf is in total control of Pakistan like any other army ruler in the past. However, the people’s hearts and minds may not be with him. Nevertheless, he and his army are capable of reining in terrorist outfits, given the will.
Q: Will the Indo-US nuclear deal adversely impact India’s strategic programme?
A: It was a positive move. But the devil lies in the detail. The form it is taking now leaves much to be desired. The fine print is not conducive to our long term national interests.
URL: http://www.tribuneindia.com/2006/20060806/edit.htm#1

The IB chief who dined with militants

2008-11-08T01:31:00.000-08:00

The IB chief who dined with militants
15 Jul 2004
Source: Times of India

A daredevil operations man who spent three decades chasing, terrorising and educating terrorists is now India's Intelligence Bureau chief.
Unlike his predecessors, who have largely been faceless officers with just grey hairs of wisdom and a bit of luck in winning the crucial political nod, Ajit Kumar Doval, brings with him action, dynamism and adventure that has kept him in the news for years.
The office of the Intelligence Bureau chief demands seniority, which all his predecessors had. Doval has that too. But he has more to offer. He is starkly different in his approach as his track record shows.
An operations man, Doval has spent more than three decades in the rough and tumble of India's fight against terrorism.
He was posted in the northeast at the height of militancy. Among the numerous tales surrounding Doval, one tells of the few days he spent with a senior militant in his hide-out, without the latter realising that his companion was a top cop.
It was during the height of Punjab terrorism that Doval, a 1968 batch Kerala cadre IPS officer, actually proved his mettle. In fact, he went on to become India's first civilian to win the military bravery honour Kirti Chakra.
Doval, say his peers, has shown an uncanny ability to seize the moment and act, on several occasions putting his life at risk.
Once, in pursuit of a hardcore Punjab terrorist, Doval got a tip-off that his quarry was planning to flee the area.
Doval had to act before the reinforcement arrived. The not-so-tall IPS officer jumped on the terrorist and held on to the tall, well-built Sikh for quite a while before the back-up arrived.
"He is unconventional, courageous and sharp," says one of his contemporaries.
On another instance, Doval had asked a few of his colleagues to meet at a particular point for the day's work, mostly surveillance.
Minutes after the juniors arrived, Doval showed up as a rickshaw-puller, and asked his juniors to hop on to the rickshaw.
It is his hands-on approach that endears him to his juniors. When his appointment as IB chief was announced last week, the entire IB office erupted in celebrations, including those who were in the running for the post.
"I am sure he would bring back a lot of professionalism. He definitely has a vision for the agency," says a former IB officer.
When IC-814 was hijacked in December 1999, Doval was the obvious choice to go to Kandahar, Afghanistan to negotiate.
Doval's training as a professional negotiator helped, as did his ability to speak Pashtu and Urdu. At the end of his Kandahar negotiations, Doval was featured on the front page of a Pakistani magazine and was a prominent media figure across the border.
But the then government was in a hurry. Doval and other officials had to talk to Jaish militants without any proper brief, without much time, and with not much space to manouevre.
Decisions had already been taken in Delhi and on the last day of 1999, External Affairs Minister Jaswant Singh landed at Kandahar with three dreaded terrorists, who are now kingpins of terrorism in Kashmir.
Doval continues to do what he is best at: watching, chasing and studying terrorists, and warning and informing the government about the nation's security situation.
The Kashmir Challenge
For the past few years, Doval has been a crucial advisor to the government on Kashmir and Pakistan matters. His judgement has been on target on
Kashmir and Pakistan, says a senior bureaucrat who has interacted with Doval on several occasions.
Now as the Kashmir situation once again threatens to get out of hand, Doval is in the thick of action. It would require much courage and imagination to keep Kashmir on track and to get the doves among Hurriyat Conference to come back to the negotiations table. This will involve some political manoevring as well.
URL: http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/India/The_IB_chief_who_dined_with_militants_/articleshow/msid-778332,curpg-5.cms

India’s new generation intelligence agencies – Sharp, Smart and Operational – Bond and Swartzenegar types take control

2008-11-08T01:28:00.000-08:00

India’s new generation intelligence agencies – Sharp, Smart and Operational – Bond and Swartzenegar types take control
July 14, 2004
Source: www.indiadaily.com

India’s intelligence agencies are taking different look. The agencies are led by sharp, smart and street fast operational heroes who bring real world experiences on the table. These are new generation Bond and Swartzenegar types who can terrorize the terrorists and make them run for cover!
A daredevil operations man who spent three decades chasing, terrorizing and educating terrorists is now India's Intelligence Bureau chief. Unlike his predecessors, who have largely been faceless officers with just grey hairs of wisdom and a bit of luck in winning the crucial political nod, Ajit Kumar Doval, brings with him action, dynamism and adventure that has kept him in the news for years. The office of the Intelligence Bureau Chief demands seniority, which all his predecessors had. Doval has that too. But he has more to offer. He is starkly different in his approach as his track record shows. An operations man, Doval has spent more than three decades in the rough and tumble of India's fight against terrorism. He was posted in the northeast at the height of militancy. Among the numerous tales surrounding Doval, one tells of the few days he spent with a senior militant in his hideout, without the latter realising that his companion was a top cop. It was during the height of Punjab terrorism that Doval, a 1968 batch Kerala cadre IPS officer, actually proved his mettle. In fact, he went on to become India''s first civilian to win the military bravery honour Kirti Chakra. Doval, say his peers, has shown an uncanny ability to seize the moment and act, on several occasions putting his life at risk. Once, in pursuit of a hardcore Punjab terrorist, Doval got a tip-off that his quarry was planning to flee the area. Doval had to act before the reinforcement arrived. The not-so-tall IPS officer jumped on the terrorist and held on to the tall, well-built Sikh for quite a while before the back up arrived. "He is unconventional, courageous and sharp," says one of his contemporaries.
URL:http://www.indiadaily.com/editorial/07-14b-04.asp

Ways to defeat ourselves

2008-11-05T01:47:00.001-08:00

Ways to defeat ourselves
Ajit Doval
Jun 01, 2006
Source: Indian Express

On the face of it the two have no correlation. Fourth Generation Warfare (4GW), which has kept strategic thinkers engrossed for the last decade and a half, is about the what, why, where and how of future conflicts and possible responses. The reservation issue is an expression of anger and frustration in some of India’s bright youth against what they perceive as denial of justice and equality.
Before I explain the connection, let me explain what generation warfare is all about. Following the treaty of Westphalia in 1648 when fire arms began to dominate the battlefield, the concept of nation states started concretising and the state established monopoly on war, the first generation of modern warfare started. It involved massed manpower concentration of armies outnumbering the enemy. It lasted till machine guns and indirect fire made such tactics suicidal. The second generation warfare was based on massed fire power with heavy reliance on artillery; the tactics involving outdoing the adversary in fire power, speed and movement. The third generation warfare was based on manoeuvre and high technology exemplified by the Blitzkrieg of World War II. Later, strategic weapon systems made big wars un-winnable. Conventional wars became cost ineffective. There was no guarantee the state with superior weapons/ armies would necessarily emerge victorious (US in Vietnam, USSR in Afghanistan) and unpredictable post-war consequences could turn victories into net national disadvantage (Afghanistan and Iraq).
This takes us to 4GW, warfare in which civil society becomes the critical element of war. Societal factors within a state will influence forces both within and without — who will launch the war, against whom, how and when. Societies and governments which lose their legitimacy and credibility will be the most vulnerable. If an adversary has to destabilise and bleed a nation to achieve its strategic, political or economic ends, a fractured society will provide a ready ground to exploit the faultlines. It costs much less, can be sustained for longer and, with a few exceptions, even those who become tools of external machination are ignorant of that.
And then, there is a more serious danger within. Fragmentation of society unleashes forces which can destabilise the state, retard its economic growth, undermine the rule of law and lead to violence. How many of us are brave enough to concede that what beleaguered Punjab, J&K, Northeast and now left-wing extremist areas was to some extent a consequence of divisive politics providing openings to our external adversaries? We can ignore history’s lessons only at our peril. A fragmented society loses its national will, which is key. After all, in battles military might is used to subdue the will of a nation to enable the victor to dictate its terms of peace. Divisive politics, in the blind pursuit of power, at times ignores the impact of actions on the will of the nation. When that happens a country becomes a soft ground for launching a 4GW by asymmetric adversaries.
The guru of 4GW, William S. Lind, observed: “If nation states are going to survive they (people in power) must earn and keep the trust of the governed.” He told the American Council of Foreign Relations: “The heart of 4GW is a crisis of legitimacy of the state.” How true to the Indian model when he added, “The establishment is no longer made up of ‘policy types’. Most of its members are placemen. Their expertise is in becoming and then remaining members of the establishment. Their reality is covert politics and not the competence or expertise.” When 4GW visits them their response would be to “close the shutters on the windows of Versailles”.
India is an old civilisation but a new nation state. In the package of its rich national heritage it was also bequeathed many faultlines, prejudices and undesirable social practices. To build a strong, vibrant India, in which members of all communities could grow to their potential excellence we needed a social revolution that resisted the temptation to use these fissures to acquire and sustain power. After Independence many far-reaching laws were enacted to bring about socio-economic transformation — drastic changes in Hindu Civil Law, making untouchability a crime, abolition of zamindari, etc. They were all accepted with near national consensus. It is because the leaders of that time were genuinely interested in bringing about social transformation to build a strong Indian society — all enabled and empowered.
Why is it that the present initiative of the Government has such a divisive impact? It is essentially because no one is convinced, including the likely beneficiaries, that it has been done with bonafide intentions to bring about social justice. They feel it is meant to subserve the power interests of few, callously undermining its disastrous impact on society, its stability and security. It is the error of intentions which is at the root of the problem followed by a failure to anticipate its long-term consequences.
From a security point of view the reservation issue, particularly the way it has been handled, militates against India’s interest. It is not only about admission of some students to elite institutions. It impacts the mindset of the people belonging to different communities — rival sections of society considering their interests as inversely related. It is significant that the medicos and others spearheading the agitation personally have nothing to gain. Their admissions are not at stake. It is bad when it starts psychologically affecting our people in fields and factories, courts and police stations, cantonments and sports fields, classrooms and marketplaces. It may appear to be a harmless passing phenomenon but history testifies to the fact that social acrimonies have a cascading effect and it takes tremendous time and effort to bring about correctives.
The reservation issue is only the latest manifestation of a larger malaise: the politics of dividing the electorate — and society — on as many issues as possible till one’s own tiny segment becomes the biggest. It is the strategy of pygmies. It has to be substituted by the strategy of consolidation and integration of as many segments and interests groups as possible till one acquires the critical mass that gives legitimacy to rule. There is no dearth of issues on which, cutting across caste, communal and other divisive lines, Indian society can be consolidated and led. But that will involve vision, competence, commitment and honesty of purpose.
The writer was director, Intelligence Bureau akdoval@yahoo.com
http://www.indianexpress.com/news/ways-to-defeat-ourselves/5564/1

Red star over India

2008-11-05T01:43:00.000-08:00

Red star over India
Ajit Doval
Apr 14, 2006
Source: Indian Express

Does Left Extremism really pose a threat to India’s security or is it something the media hyped up? After all, they do not question India’s territorial integrity and apparently are not working as proxies of powers hostile to India. They, at best, want a regime change, albeit through violence, which many others would also vote for. They raise issues of hunger and poverty. These and other nuances notwithstanding, the straight answer to the question is: Left Extremism poses a very real threat which has to be fought with total resolve. Any obfuscation would lead to increased costs and prolonged agony. Naxalites use violence to achieve their political objectives and target innocent lives and thus fully meet the definition of terrorism. Diluting India’s principled position that the “core issue” argument does not justify Terror would have serious implications. But let us examine why is it really a high potential threat.

First, they seek to bring about change through violence and annihilation of arbitrarily identified class enemies. In-built is destruction of all that free India stands for. If hypothetically, the “revolution” succeeds and the new dispensation becomes tyrannical, oppressive and corrupt, which with the exercise of absolute power it’s bound to, how does one get rid of it? Backed by the might of a totally politicised state apparatus, it would be unchangeable except through civil war or foreign intervention. Fortunately this is a remote threat.

Second, Naxalites feel no ideological compunction in aligning with and supporting forces adversarial to India’s security interests. In the name of supporting nationalist minorities, they support secessionists in Kashmir, insurgents in Northeast, LTTE in Sri Lanka and CPN (Maoist) in Nepal. Charu Majumdar, their role model, opposed India in the Bangladesh war. Support for the 1962 Chinese aggression is an old story. So much for their ideology of supporting people’s movements against oppressive regimes. Similarly, in the name of class war, in Bihar and Jharkhand, they indulge in the worst form of caste violence. They have a self-serving definition of “have nots” and exercise ruthless violence against the landless and tribals who do not support them. The massacre of Salwa Judum tribals illustrates this. Over 90 per cent of civilian victims of their violence are poor. Under the veneer of revolutionary ideology lies a ruthless ambition for absolute power.

Third, the “revolution” continues to gather strength, engulf new areas, militarise itself and make large areas of the country non-governable. Naxalites stun to submission the poor and the deprived and the state is unable to provide protection or even undertake schemes for their socio-economic uplift due to a vitiated security environment. Naxalites have a vested interest in perpetuating poverty to conserve and expand their constituency. Their area of dominance runs into thousands of sq km, one Punjab getting added to it every two years. This will erode India’s state power, retard its growth, prevent social and economic uplift of the poor and downtrodden and make the political process hostage to the politics of violence. This is the real danger.

Taking the trends of the last five years, we can build a model of the security scenario for the year 2010. Over 260 districts, nearly half of India, would be Naxal affected where the government’s writ hardly runs. If we add to this the insurgencies in the Northeast, militancy in J&K and the scourge of Islamic terrorism, India’s overall internal security landscape presents a frightening picture. The strength of left-wing armed cadres would soar from the existing 7,500 to over 16,000, with backup support of thousands of “revolutionary” militia. Their arsenal may be in the range of 12,000 to 15,000 sophisticated weapons. Jan adalats where spot justice is dispensed, extending to beheadings, may increase from the present three per week to one a day. Collection of taxes estimated to be in the range of Rs 17 crore per month may soar to over Rs 40 crore. This money power in economically backward and inaccessible tribal areas can cause havoc.

In this scenario, visualise Indian security forces thinly deployed in the countryside facing murderous crowds in the thousands, many equipped with automatic weapons. The force, in self-defence, will either over-react leading to unacceptable civilian casualties or will be disarmed and possibly lynched. It is noteworthy that despite a sizeable army and paramilitary presence, domination of the Kashmir Valley and six worst affected districts of Punjab proved difficult.

We should doctrinally accept it as a problem of terrorism and deal with it as such. On Thursday the PM recommended enhanced inter-state cooperation. He should call an all party meeting and build a consensus against providing any space to Naxalites for electoral gains or political appeasement. Proactively invoking Article 355 of the Constitution, legislation should be enacted empowering the Centre to suo motu deploy Central forces in badly affected areas. State governments may be informed that provisions of Articles 365/352 could be invoked in the eventuality of breakdown of constitutional machinery if they fail to control the problem.

The number of policemen available for per one lakh population in all the Naxal-affected states is amongst the lowest and much below the national average of 123 — Bihar 56, Chhattisgarh 92, Jharkhand 74, Orissa 92. At least 150 policemen per one lakh population must be made available. More important is qualitative upscaling of manpower. Operational capabilities of state intelligence, right up to the police station level, must be built for undertaking tactical operations. Concerted efforts to choke Naxals’ sources of finance and channels of procuring weapons also deserves high priority.

A concerted effort should be made to access the affected population to disabuse them of misleading propaganda. The media, think-tanks and NGOs operating in these region could be enlisted. These are only some illustrative policy ideas which need to be converted into a comprehensive action plan.

The writer was director, Intelligence Bureau.akdoval@yahoo.com http://www.indianexpress.com/news/red-star-over-india/2438/1

'A deterrent law can really contain terror'

2008-10-29T04:01:00.000-07:00

'A deterrent law can really contain terror'
Q&A: Ajit Kumar Doval, former Director, Intelligence Bureau, speaks to Asha Khosa about the lapses in the country's intelligence setup.
October 5, 2008
Source: Business Standard

Are we, as a country, under siege from home-bred as well as global terrorists?

India faces a serious threat to its internal security, if not a siege. Even so, the state’s power to counter terrorists and subversives is much more than the combined strength of all terrorist groups. We have a well-defined law and order apparatus and above all, the requisite political will to fight this challenge. But the situation might change anytime and India may face threats of much higher degree in future. For this, we do not seem to be ready. There’s an urgent need to put our house in order.

Is our government moving in the right direction in fighting terrorists?

Our system was never meant to handle the current level and quality of terrorist threats. Our laws, structures of governance, infrastructure, governmental functioning and the pace of decision-making etc are all meant for an earlier time. So, this needs to change drastically.
First of all, we need a strict anti-terror law, which can be a deterrent to the terrorists and also enable the security forces to tackle crimes related to the inflow of funds from abroad, the overground support to the terrorists, and also the corruption in political institutions.
There is a divergent opinion on the need to have a strong law.
Unfortunately, the debate on anti-terror law is motivated by political considerations. The real question is: Is POTA (Prevention of Terrorism Act) desirable? POTA was in force from September 2001 till December 2004, and the graph of terrorist-related violence was the lowest in this period. After POTA was scrapped, we saw a five-time rise in such incidents. With POTA gone, terrorists took just six months to reorganise themselves and they started striking in the hinterland from June 2005 onwards. A deterrent law really helps contain terrorists. Ask an average terrorist, and he would tell you that a strong law makes his work more difficult.

There are apprehensions that a harsh anti-terror law would be misused by the police and security forces...

We need to enable our police to deal with terrorists. A law is required so that the police do not have to work under pressure to produce results. If a policeman has no right to detain suspects for a reasonably long period, he would resort to torture to find out whatever he can in a short time. POTA or a POTA-like law can be reworked to ensure it’s not misused. A good law would always give the benefit of the doubt to the police in case they have made bonafide mistakes.
Looking at what is happening today, there is no future for us if we keep maligning the security forces and police who go after the terrorists. This is like giving them the gun but not giving the right to use it.

Giving sweeping powers to the police to detain people appears a scary proposition...

Giving powers to the police does not mean that they would wield them indiscriminately. It only gives them the confidence of moving scientifically and not being prosecuted if they make a bonafide mistake. For example, during anti-militancy operations in Kashmir, the security forces could use gunships. We never used them because we realised it would cause huge collateral damage. Imagine a village where a few terrorists are entrenched. Security men fight them with hand-held weapons the whole night and sometimes for days on end. There is the option to bombard the village but, barring the Kargil invasion, we never used gunships.

If POTA or a POTA-type law is so good, why do you think the government is not agreeing to it?

If it is for political considerations, I must say it is suicidal. The debate on the anti-terror law should be held in view of protecting our national interests and not the political interests of one or the other party.

There is a feeling that Indian Muslims are being pushed to the wall and an anti-terror law would accentuate their feeling of being wronged.

Firstly, there is a dire need to de-link Islam from terrorism. Terrorists must be treated as individuals and not representatives of one religious or ethnic community. Look at Pakistan, how it is tackling militancy. They have Muslims as terrorists, and also as the victims of police and militants’ action. But is anyone making it an Islamic issue?
However, it’s also true that since 1989, anti-India forces have used local Muslims for subversive activities and it’s only natural that the community, at any given time, would feel the heat. It happened to Sikhs in the past. On its part, the state should try to insulate Muslims from this, and the community must come forward to ostracise those who have even the remotest connection with anti-national acts. Unfortunately, it does not help when a university, instead of rusticating terror suspects, gets into providing them legal support. Such actions mount the heat on Muslims.
I believe common Muslims too want a strong anti-terror law. It would protect them from being coerced into giving shelter to terrorists or becoming their overground supporters.

With our growing economy, what new challenges should India be prepared to tackle in future?

The ISI (Inter-Services Intelligence of Pakistan) has been showing us what’s in store for us if we do not act now. The ISI is pumping counterfeit currency into our country in huge amounts. Look at what happened in Parliament on July 22 during the vote of confidence. Money was paid to some members to influence such a crucial decision as India becoming a nuclear power. What happens if a particular country pays Rs 50,000 crore to an MP to subvert a decision of crucial national importance in Parliament. A provision to look into this kind of corruption should be part of the anti-terror law.

Is there need for a federal investigating agency in India in view of the terrorist threats?

I find this entire debate on an FBI-type agency as mere talk of hardware even before the ideas on threat perception have been identified. We seem to be working on formulas and theories on the basis of mere slogans. This debate is topsy-turvy.

How would you compare our handling of terror in various parts of the country?

Mizoram was the first state where militancy was eliminated with the help of the local community. Insurgency is a games of wits where both the insurgents and the government wait for the other side to make mistakes and quickly cash in. For example, in Punjab we botched up Operation Bluestar, but we did not lose a day in exposing the militants’ misdeeds by launching Operation Black Thunder. This was the single-most important decision that changed the situation in Punjab. Recently, in Kashmir, the militants got the better of us when they encashed the Amarnath agitation in Jammu to beef up their support base.

http://www.business-standard.com/india/storypage.php?autono=336364

Need for Discovering New Paradigms to Fight Terrorism

2008-10-16T02:33:00.000-07:00

Need for Discovering New Paradigms to Fight Terrorism
*Ajit Doval, K.C.
October 2008

Source: Eternal India: A New Perspective Monthly, Vol.1, Number 1

High threats make security problems serious; not knowing how to deal with them make them dangerous. Terrorism is one such problem. Nations of the world, affected states, law makers and enforcers, all alike, are still groping in darkness for right solutions and at an ever increasing cost. For want of policies that can deliver, strategies that can subdue the threats and tactical response which could be executed, credibility-deficit statements or politically motivated stereotypes are masqueraded as response. There is no scientific study or analysis to sustain those sweeping generalizations. Over a period of time the establishment itself starts believing its own bluffs in the absence of anything better to substitute them.

For a scientific enquiry, access to data which is relevant, reliable and comprehensive on one hand and its objective painstaking analysis on the other is necessary. Studies of contemporary terrorism lack both, leaving answers to key questions required for policy formulation or execution unanswered. A researcher has no direct access to information about the terrorists, their organizations, sources of finances, procurement and distribution of terrorist hardware like weapons and explosives, their internal communications or relationships of the militant groups with the state and non-state entities supporting or opposing them. The data that would be required to analyze their psycho-sociological profile, emotive and material elements influencing their individual and group behaviour, content and style of leadership and unique mode of command, control and coordination are still more distant. Even the limited information available, if scientifically analyzed could provide answers to some critical questions. But this remains buried in classified files of security agencies, who have little time or talent to use it for a painstaking scientific enquiry. For justifiable reasons of security the data cannot be made public. Consequently most of what passes off as source material, if its origin is traced, will be found emanating from one or the other interested party, interested in projecting a particular point of view to subserve their perceived advantage. The literature or websites of the terrorists, books authored by sympathetic ideologues, tapes and press releases of terrorist leaders, their threats, claims and justifications for terrorist actions have its use but is contaminated material for research. Moreover, they do not answer the vital questions that a researcher need to seek. Equally incomplete and unreliable are the assertions of the governments regarding the terrorists, their organizations, sources of support and sustenance, morale and motivation, strengths, capabilities and intentions. Besides emanating from bona-fide knowledge gaps, these infirmities are consequented by understandable, higher considerations of national interest and public good. Governments do not run their business for the comfort of researchers and hence cannot be found fault with their ‘perception management approach’, except when they produce results, contrary to what was intended, or the governments become victims of their own propaganda. Both often happen.

Most of the writings and researches on terrorism have tended to focus on causes and history of terrorist uprisings, their political dimensions and ideologies, organizational and structural architect, incident analysis – either in statistical or case study mode, etc. Prescriptive responses are suggested based on these findings – the two having sub- optimal direct relationship. Nevertheless, these studies have substantially contributed in de-mystifying terrorism and help policy formulations, particularly in the western countries, where independent research and governance have developed an institutionalized linkage.

For responding to terrorism there is needed an approach which differentiates between tackling terrorist movements and the terrorist groups. Terrorist movements are essentially political or ideological beliefs which its adherents believe are attainable through instrumentality of violence. Only few among them are practicing terrorists. Terrorist groups on the other hand are well organized, trained, equipped, controlled and commanded formations who can operationalise the idea of violence and convert it into ground reality. Terrorism manifests its coercive power through terrorist groups. The rise and fall of terrorist movements and the groups may not be co-terminus but terrorist movements cannot survive for long in the absence of terrorist groups. And even when they do, they do not constitute a grave threat. Fighting terrorism is just like talking about fighting poverty or illiteracy- more a political gimmick than an action plan. At empirical level, it is the terrorist groups- their leaders, activists, supporters, infrastructure, weapons, funds and infrastructure which have to be degraded to defeat terrorism. The first shortcoming of our approach is undue focus on fighting terrorism rather than the terrorists, which deflects the discourse from practical action to theoretical domain. You can never fight let alone defeat an enemy that you cannot define in tangible terms. If problem identified is itself abstract, the solutions suggested cannot be otherwise.

Terrorists Lifespan

Terrorist groups are not endless entities as they sometime appear to be. They have a life cycle which includes their birth, ascendancy, peak and decline; eventually leading to their demise. When at their zenith, these groups appear to be endless but when they eventually wither away one only wonders how could they demonstrate the resilience for so long before meeting their logical end. Audrey Kurth Cronin, a noted authority on terrorism observed that “Studies of groups that use terrorism, across regions, cultures and historical areas, reveal that terrorism is by no means a promising vocation. Over and over, these case studies point to how difficult it is to maintain the momentum of a campaign. By any objective measure, the average lifespan of a group that relies on terrorist attacks is short.”

U.S based Memorial Institute for the Prevention of Terrorism (MIPT) examined about 521 terrorist groups around the world to study their lifespan. They found that the lifespan of 243 (46.6%) of them worked out to be below 10 years while 104 (19.96%) survived from 10 to 20 years and 119 (22.84%) for 20 to 30 years. Only 3.646% endured beyond 50 years. Nearly 90% of them thus consumed themselves within 30 years, the average lifespan of a terrorist group working out to be 5 to 10 years. For governments it may be a long game of patience but seen in historical perspective it offers hope for success. What is more important is that it is only in minuscule of cases where terrorist groups become extinct after achieving their political goals. Serious research is required to identify the factors that hasten the demise or prolong life span of terrorist groups. Both, horizontally, across regions, and vertically, across time, there is a commonality in the group behaviour of terrorist outfits and largely identical factors contribute to their decline and demise. There is a weak relationship between the causes of their birth and those of their death. The reasons for which violence is initiated, within two to three years undergo a metamorphis and new causes for their survival or death start replacing the old. Initial goals start getting eclipsed by subsequent external and internal pressures. The studies bring out that governments often inadvertently play a contributory role which delays the termination. Indecisiveness, weak initial actions, appeasement and opening the political door without convincingly subduing them are just few in the long list.

Unfortunately, once a terrorist group disappears from the conflict arena, very little attention is paid to analyze the course of its life span and the causes that led to its demise. For the governments and their security bureaucracies, once these groups become inactive an amnesia sets in that prevents the states from learning from their own experiences. This leads to unique tendency of the states to commit the same mistakes again and again hoping that next time the results would be different. For intensive study of extinct terrorist groups, which can provide useful basis of formulating counter strategies, it could even be easier for the governments to make the old interrogation reports, terrorist documents, their internal communications and other official materials available to selected researchers under controlled conditions. Interestingly, all new terrorist groups very closely study the history, methodology, tactics, organizational structure, reasons of failures etc. of their predecessors to ensure that they don’t repeat the earlier mistakes. Aware that state responses are more ‘precedent’ driven stereotypes and hence predictable they are able to innovate methods to maintain secrecy and deny intelligence to the enemy, bring about tactical improvements, camouflage their movements, take care in recruitment, carefully select targets, introduce elements of surprise in their operations, modus operandi, communications etc. As a matter of strategy, terrorist groups invariably leverage their strength through faulty or inadequate actions of the state. When the governments acquiesce to it, either by default or design, the war against terrorist groups becomes prolonged and costly. There are vast lessons to profit from historical experiences as to how terrorist groups gained strength not by their superior organization, resources, infrastructure or greater supporter base but acts of commission and omission of the states – both at strategic and tactical levels.

Common Features

A study of terrorist groups that met their end, both in India and abroad, brings out some interesting features of commonality. Firstly, neutralization of top leaders and activists proved to be one of the major contributory factors in their demise. At strategic level, their neutralization led to ideological dilution and confusion, demoralization in the ranks, doubts about movement’s ability to deliver promised goals and loss of invincibility image. At tactical levels, it leads to struggle for leadership, disruption of established sources of funding and weapon procurement, interruption of inter- group and intra- group communications and abandonment of plans in the pipe line. Further, the questioning of top leaders often provides strategic and tactical inputs, which if pursued diligently and imaginatively, substantially weaken the movements. Inherent in their interrogations is the answer to group specific actions that can lead to their destruction. At times, they agree to become active, join the government’s counter terrorist effort and wherever it happens their contribution is substantial.

Illustratively, CPI(M-L), which, during 1969 to 1972, perpetrated wide spread naxalite violence, with Charu’s death on 28th July, 1972 lost its revolutionary steam and became faction driven. By 1974, the movement got splintered into many small groups due to fight for leadership. Leaders with limited local influence like Nagi Reddy and Pulla Reddy in Andhra Pradesh, Mahadev Mukherjee and Sharma in West Bengal and Bihar etc. emerged as weak centres of the movement. Large cadres, disillusioned and demoralized, left the organization and in many parts like Kerala, Punjab, U.P, Tamilnadu, the leaderless groups became defunct. In 1974, Subrato Dutta again brought pro-Mao, pro-Charu and anti-Lin Piao factions of the CPI(M-L) together rechristening them as CPI(ML-Liberation), but following Subrato Dutta’s killing in 1975 the group could not pursue its agenda of violence any more and had to embark on “Rectification Movement”, distancing itself from politics of violence.

Similarly, in Punjab, the neutralization of top terrorist leaders like Harjinder Singh Jinda, main killer of united KCF, Gurbachan Singh Manochahal, Chief of BTKF, Labh Singh, Chief of KCF etc. fragmented Punjab militancy and led to splintering of the movement and inter group clashes for supremacy to control funds and Gurudwaras. However, Babbar Khalsa was the only group which remained intact for quite some time as its leaders like Sukhdev Singh Dasuwal, Wadhawa Singh and Mahal Singh remained out of the net. However, within six months of its chief Sukhdev Singh Dasuwal getting neutralized the organization lost much of its sting. Similarly, in Kashmir, dozen of terrorist out-fits ceased to exist following neutralization of their top leaders. The termination of Ikhwan-ul-Muslimeen following the killing of Hilal Beg, Muslim Mujahideen after arrest of Hyder Salim Zarger, Muslim Jaanbaz Force with arrest of Babbar Badr, Alah Tiger with arrest of Air Marshal Noor Khan etc. are illustrative. When in 1996, some of the senior commanders of terrorist groups like Kukka Parry, Majid Osman, Liaquat, Javed Shah etc. had a change of heart and decided to fight on the side of India, the Kashmiri component of the movement got heavily degraded and Pakistan had to bring in foreign jihadis under the banner of Lashkar-e-Taiba and Harkat-ul-Ansar. These reformed terrorists played a major role in kick starting the long stalled electoral process in 1996.

Experience Abroad

The experience abroad also reinforces the fact that decapitation of top leadership gives a major blow to terrorist organizations. The examples of Shining Path in Peru, Aum Shinrikyo in Japan and the Real IRA in Northern Ireland are illustrative. The arrest of Abimael Guzman, charismatic leader of the Shining Path, on 12th September,1992, led to its decapitation and within a year the violence levels fell down by 50%. Today the group exists only in name. The Real IRA’s activities declined sharply after the British government arrested Michael (Mickey) McKevitt on 26 May,2000. From prison, McKevitt declared that further armed resistance was futile and that was the end of Real IRA. Shoko Asahara, cult leader of the Japanese Aum Shinrikyo, was arrested in 1995 and sentenced to death in a trial that ended in 2004. Asahara’s arrest was a devastating blow to the group, which was essentially built around the personality of Shinrikyo . His exit was followed by factional disputes which combined with decisive police action practically heralded its end.

Thinking the unthinkable

The other hypothesis which deserves to be researched is that wherever conventional and predictable options have been exercised by the state, the lifespan of the terrorist groups has tended to get elongated. When terrorist groups plan and operate they make a careful estimate of the counter-action that will follow. When the state out-smarts them by not doing what they expect and doing what they don’t, they are caught totally off guard. Unlike the governments, their resilience and capacity to absorb unexpected shocks is too low while capacity to absorb expected shocks is very high. They can absorb shocks of their degradation in terms of their cadres, equipment or infrastructure, which they anticipate and hence are prepared for. In May 1998, during operation Black Thunder, the militants were expecting and were prepared for an attack by the security forces after they shot at then DIG, CRPF S.S. Virk. A repeat of Blue Star of 1984 would have only been disastrous. But unexpected killing of Panthic Committee Chief inside the Golden Temple due to suspected inter group fight triggered suspicions and infighting that influenced events thereafter. The subsequent deft handling cashing on mistakes of the militants and assault through the media in which liquor bottles, implements of torture, shameful evidence of immoral activities inside the holy temple and surrender of hundreds of terrorists, all of which people could see on their TVs, led to mass-revulsion and anger. It overnight polarized the Sikh masses against the militants. The sight of scores of dreaded names amongst terrorists meekly surrendering to the security forces with their raised hands demolished their contrived image of invincibility and valour. The use of ‘Cat System’ of keeping some arrested militants duly camouflaged at vantage points led to arrest of many hard to identify terrorists in Punjab, Kashmir, North East etc. However, with surprise element over after some time - thanks to media- results started petering out. Time tested methods in invisible warfare are the worst methods. A method that has proved useful must be discarded and substituted by new one as fast as possible. It requires leadership at various levels to think the unthinkable and develop capacities to execute it.

Audry Kronin’s research of terrorist movements that failed brings out another interesting point. He, with evidence, blows a popularly held myth that the best way to end terrorism is for states to engage in politics designed to win the sympathy of the populations from which terrorist groups emerge. This kind of “hearts and mind” approach, he feels, “does not work” even though these methods may be “desirable for many other reasons”. He asserts that groups regularly self destruct by range of mistakes they commit and weaknesses which creep in. Over a period of time, operational errors, burn out factor, internecine splintering, doctrinal infighting, targeting errors or a backlash in the constituent populations start sapping the energy of the movement within. The heart and mind approach at times reverses it. Instead of sending signals that can be mistaken for weakness- a life elixir for dying terrorist groups- governments can take measures to indirectly catalyze the process of their making strategic and tactical mistakes. He concludes that in ending terrorism, government’s “top priority should not be to win people’s heart and minds, but rather to amplify the natural tendency of the violent groups to lose them”. Unfortunately, quite often the governments do just the opposite. Inviting ULFA for talks every time it was under pressure only helped it to convince the people of their viability and strength giving it a new lease of life. To cite an example at tactical level, when Mir Waiz was killed by Hizbul Mujahideen terrorists in Kashmir on 21 May, 1990, there was unprecedented anger against Pakistan. A huge funeral procession shouting anti-Pakistan and anti-terrorist slogans was on the streets. Overreacting to some commotion in the crowd, a panicky CRPF officer ordered firing and the whole scenario in the Valley changed. The funeral procession suddenly became slogan- shouting anti-India demonstration. The serious mistake of selecting a wrong target by Hizbul- Mujahideen could not be cashed in and instead just the opposite was done. The terrorists groups for their survival look forward to mistakes by the governments which they exploit to the hilt while the governments in real time are not even able to see the opportunities which come their way.

Che Guvera the doyen of guerilla warfare in Latin America had propounded a doctrine that the efforts of the terrorists should be aimed at grounding enemy forces to static formations. Higher the security personnel on static duties lesser the bleeding of the guerillas. Terrorist groups, world over, have internalized this doctrine. We should have conducted research to determine how could it be undone. The visible heavy deployment of the troops, including army, builds pressure on the terrorist groups is a myth that all in the government, including senior police officers and policy makers, believe to be true. It at best makes few targets inaccessible to them but still leaves plenty for a free hit. All personnel on protecting the VIPs , installations, bridges and culverts, airports and power houses and own formations of security forces deplete most of the man power which in offensive mode could create serious pressure on the terrorists. In India over 75 to 80% forces, which includes army, is either on self-protection mode or protecting the likely targets. Wherever planners have been able to reduce this number to the minimum, degradation of terrorist groups has been very high and fast.

Devil lies in Detail

To conclude, terrorism has to be fought by emaciating and decapacitating terrorist groups which in turn involves degrading their leadership, image, resources and infrastructure. Most of the battle has to be fought and won at tactical level and perfecting the tactics to out-smart the terrorists should in itself constitute a major component of the strategy. Devil lies in the detail and a strategy without tactics is only a noise before the defeat. The other part of the strategy should be to employ policies that bring to surface the illegitimacy of the movements and erode their credibility, both in terms of objectives pursued and means adopted. Illustratively, holding of regular elections, after 1996, in Kashmir has been one single step that proved to be a serious setback to the separatist- terrorist movement.

This approach requires a deep understanding of historical, political and social context in which the war on terror has to be fought. Formulating doctrines that can deliver will require in-depth research, based on authentic data which is relevant for answering critical questions. The civil society response, which is vital for fighting terrorism, in different socio-political and cultural settings also varies widely. Intensive situational and area specific research is hence necessary for contextual insight.

*The author is a former Director of Intelligence Bureau.

Only unsettled issue is continued occupation

2008-09-12T03:13:00.001-07:00

Only unsettled issue is continued occupation
Ajit Doval
August 28, 2008
Source: MAIL TODAY ePaper
URL: http://www.mailtoday.in/2882008/epaperhome.aspx
The enemies, both within and without, use bullets and bombs, not to kill people. They are collateral damages. The real objective is to subdue the enemy by breaking its will and dictating its terms of peace.
National will is the most vital ingredient of state power that erodes when leadership is weak and systems lose their strength. The chosen weapon to break the national will is psychological warfare or psywar; often employed by the adversaries to demoralise and confuse the enemy. Its aim is to manipulate the minds of the decision- makers and the people at large who could pressurise them to make them think and behave in a manner that will serve the attackers interests.
In the last few days, there have been some voices in the country questioning the wisdom and expediency of retaining Kashmir. The state, these people say, has bled the country so much in the last six decades. These people unwittingly play into the hands of enemies of the nation and give them a signal that national resolve is crumbling. Such an impression is not only totally incorrect and far from truth, but provokes our enemies to actually intensify their onslaught. Such suggestions are responsible for emboldening the forces of sabotage and subversion, giving adversaries the hope that with little more of a push, the ball will be in the goal. They also create confusion in the minds of people and erode singular conviction of people in the unity and integrity of the nation.
Like metals, states have a melting point. The state building process involves raising this melting point to a level where it is impervious to the heat generated by our enemies within or without. The enemy tries to get to know this metaphorical melting point as well as design its strategy to generate the heat required to reach it. If India wilts under the pressure of terrorists, insurgents, criminal mafia or violent demonstrations funded from abroad, it only indicates how low its meltdown point is. A nation aspiring to be a major player in global power dynamics can ill- afford to be a victim of such a psyche. Once a precedent is formed, all hostile groups will, supported by enemies within and outside, start competing with each other to reach that point at the earliest. This will create total anarchy in the country besides taking a huge toll in terms of lives of people.
Creation of a wrong discourse, by design or default, is the first step towards decline, which over time has a tendency to gather its own momentum.
These ill- conceived discourses start making space for themselves not by their superior reasoning and better understanding of history and strategy, but by an appeal to “ sexy” slogans. Such slogans do immense damage in all settings but are suicidal in democratic polities. It leads to people taking partisan positions without understanding the grave implications. This casts a heavy responsibility on the intelligentsia who have easy access to the media.
It is a pity that sweeping statements and prescriptive judgements are being dished out by some commentators who presume they can authoritatively talk on subjects they know little about.
Kashmir is an integral part of India, not only as per the unanimous resolution of the Indian Parliament and Constitution, but by it being an indestructible part of Indias civilisational identity. It also symbolises the fundamentals on which modern Indias state idea rests.
The only unsettled issue on Kashmir is continued occupation of parts of the state by Pakistan.
Anyone who deviates from this position holds in contempt not only Parliament but also its Constitution.
(The author is former IB director)
http://www.mailtoday.in/2882008/epaperhome.aspx

Religious Terrorism: Civilisational Context and Contemporary Manifestations

2008-09-10T23:13:00.000-07:00

Religious Terrorism: Civilisational Context and Contemporary Manifestations
A.K. Doval

Source: As published in Civilisational Harmony: Global Conflicts and Indian Vision, Chapter 8, pp 196-241, Global Foundation for Civilisational Harmony (India), January, 2008

Transcending time and space, religions have influenced civilisations-in cultural, social, material and spiritual arenas- more profoundly than any other single factor. Tangible achievements of man’s possessive and creative impulses, struggle for self-preservation, pursuit of mundane happiness or supra mundane bliss, all bear its imprint. Religion has been both a dominant cause and effect of rise and fall of civilisations, influencing the conduct of war and peace, social intercourse, political and economic life, cultural motif and individual and group ethics.
‘Terror has no religion’ is a common refrain, particularly of political interest groups. Franco Frattini, the European Union’s Commissioner for Justice, banned the use of term ‘Islamic terrorism’ in 2006. He averred, “You can not use the term Islamic terrorism. People who commit suicide attacks or criminal activities on behalf of religion, Islamic religion or other religion, they abuse the name of religion”1. If this assumption is valid, religious terrorism is a misnomer and arguably deserves no place in any civilisational or religious discourse. However, if it is only a tactical positioning to evade hard realities it can cause immense harm. Dishonest diagnosis leading to a faulty treatment is unforgivable, particularly if it is deliberate. The assumption hence needs to be examined objectively in the light of hard realities on the ground, credible historical evidence, theological interpretation and religious doctrines of warfare in different religions. Taking the reality what we wish and not as it exists is an escapism that comes with unaffordable price tag. Some well-intentioned politicians, social scientists and intellectuals advance the formulation that it is a public interest myth floated to isolate the terrorists-which unfortunately it isn’t. Moderates among the coreligionists find in it an escape route from accepting their responsibility of confronting the wrong doers, lest they incur their wrath. The historical experience, unexceptionally, underlines the fact that escapism in the face of a danger, that is real and eminent, though may have apparent short-term tactical gains, but involves a heavy strategic cost that future generations have to pay.
While examining validity of the proposition, it may, however, be underlined that religion in terrorist context has to be understood more in its empirical form- the way it is practiced and its consequences felt, rather than theological sense, as intended by its founders. As Bertrand Russell puts it “Religion is primarily a social phenomenon. Churches may owe their origin to teachers with strong individual convictions but these teachers have seldom had much influence upon the communities in which they flourished. The teaching of Christ, as it appears in the gospels has had extraordinarily little to do with the ethics of Christians. The most important thing about Christianity, from a social and historical, point of view, is not Christ but the Church.”2
Religious Terrorism - Reality Or A Myth?
Religious terrorism is real as it is inspired by and carried out in the name of religion. Faith, in psychological sense, is a subjective phenomenon and its reality lies in what the believer thinks to be true and not what the truth is. Faith is a powerful motivator of human behavior influencing, in varying degrees, his perceptions, reasoning, response, actions and consequence estimates. Since a terrorist derives his motivation from his religious beliefs, religious terrorism is a reality. The interpretations of the governments fighting it, the victims, the courts of law etc. matter little as they do not affect their self- view or the world-view. However, as religion in its social form has an institutionalised structure, the only entity which can declare their acts as irreligious is the church to which they owe allegiance. As long as that approval exits, the acts can be illegal, inhuman, unreasonable or even psychopathic but they certainly are not irreligious. Faith has its own dialectics and jurisprudence from which a terrorist draws legitimacy for his actions. Wherever and whenever the source of this legitimacy emanates from religion, and is not declared as an act of an apostate by institutional mechanism of the religion, it is religious terrorism. Illustratively, to a question whether Eric Robert Rudolf, bomber of Atlanta Olympic in 1966, belonging to Army of God, was a religious terrorist or not, Michael Barkun, Professor of Political science at Syracuse University and a consultant to the FBI on Christian extremist groups held the view that, “Rudolf can legitimately be called a Christian terrorist”.3 Ku Klux Klan, with an unmistakable protestant identity, for nearly hundred years carried out acts of terror in the name of religion to achieve certain political objectives, but was always accepted as a Christian terrorist group. Significantly, the end came not as much by the efforts of the FBI and the police as by the initiatives of the Christian Church leaders to oppose the violent cult. Martin Luther King Jr., who spearheaded the Civil Rights Movement, was a Baptist minister. He insisted on ‘personal responsibility in fostering peace’.4 The formulation that terrorism has no religion precludes the responsibility of religious leaders and religion’s institutional mechanism to share responsibility. It makes the problem an exclusive responsibility of the coercive instruments of the state. This leads to violence being countered by higher violence generating a spiral effect, which may not serve the long term interests of the society best. Such myths advanced by politically correct, unreasonably optimistic or willfully ignorant, hence, do not appear to be sustainable.
As long as the Jehadis believe their actions to be as per the injunctions of Islam and the Islamic clergy does not frontally challenge and prove them wrong, Jehadi terrorism will deserve to be treated and tackled as religious terrorism. The response of the Islamic clergy against top terrorist killers has not been a fraction as severe as against Salman Rushdies, Taslima Nasreen and their likes who were excommunicated from Islam and fatwas were issued for their extermination. No such fatwa has been issued against any terrorist. The response of non- commitment that ‘Terror has no Religion’ only gives religious space to the terrorists, they so desperately need for their existence.
Secondly, the predominant motivation of religious extremists is to serve the political cause of their religion and not their spiritual salvation. The religion provides that psychic motivation to kill, or be killed, without any compunction. Devoid of this, no ordinary human being of prudence will undertake the suicide missions and cause concomitant pain and suffering to the innocents to please the ‘True God’. To understand the psychological phenomenon what is important is not the view of those who suffer but the self-view of those who carry out depredations in the name of religion. Daily Mail of London in its issue of 2nd July, 2007 brought out an interesting revelations by Hassan Butt, who till recently was a member of Al Qaeda affiliated Al-Muhajiroun in London. Butt observed, “We used to laugh in celebration whenever people on TV proclaimed that the sole cause for Islamic acts of terror like 9/11, the Madrid bombings and 7/7 was Western foreign policy”.5 He added, “Though many British extremists are angered by the deaths of fellow Muslims across the world, what drove me and many others to plot acts of terror within Britain and abroad was a sense that we were fighting for the creation of a revolutionary worldwide Islamic state that would dispense Islamic justice”.5 Providing an insight into terrorists religious dispensation of the terrorist mind he averred that, “The foundation of extremist reasoning rests upon a model of the world in which you are either a believer or an infidel… The Islamic jurists have set down rules of interaction between Dar ul Islam (the land of Islam) Dar ul Kufr (the land of unbelievers) to cover almost every matter of trade, peace and war. What radicals and extremists do is to take these two-steps further. Their first step is to argue that, since there is no pure Islamic state, the whole world is Dar ul Kufr. This reclassification of the globe.allows any Muslim to destroy the sanctity of the five rights that every human is granted under Islam: life, wealth, land, mind and belief. In Dar ul Harb, (land of war) anything goes, including the treachery and cowardice of attacking civilians.”5
It is interesting that even the secular modern states, who proclaim that terrorists have no religion, provide those services and facilities as per their claimed religion either in jail or if killed in action. Those very coreligionists who declare that ‘terror has no religion’, rally around to protest against alleged religious persecution if they find any of the religious facilities wanting. Except the terrorists who take an honest position of being religious fighters (Mujahedeens), the inherent dichotomy in the position of others is indefensible. If the world is facing religious terrorism let it be faced as such and solutions found taking the reality as it exists and not as it is wished to be.
Do Religious Traditions Provide Space To Justify Terrorism?
No religion justifies terrorism, in terms of the ingredients associated with it in moral context, is correct in a subjective framework. There is plenty in each religion which can be quoted against cruelty, killing of or inflicting injury on the innocents, causing wanton destruction etc. The problem arises when drawing from the same or equally authentic and impeccable sources, the opposite can also be justified. Contestants take subjective positions, deliberately or otherwise, which are in consonance with their self interests, predispositions or psychological fixations and then find religious justifications to rationalise their actions. This begs an objective examination of how much space different religions provide, if any, in support of violence which is inhumanly cruel, can be directed against the innocents, and target people for having a faith and belief system in variance of their own. It is no definition of modern day terrorism; actually there exists none-despite all the noise about its being the gravest threat faced by the modern civilized world and collective global effort to combat it. The underlying problem in finding an acceptable definition has been more political than intellectual; each involved entity wanting to fine-cut a definition which sub serves its interests, immediate or potential. Without getting into the semantics, it would be worthwhile examining if religions do provide any space where such indiscriminate and inhuman violence can be justified. If such violence can be justifiable there is every possibility of terrorists exploiting it to validate their actions.
Wars and violence in the name of religion is an established historical reality and thus part of religious history of most of the religions. If we consider use of ‘illegal violence’ as a binding ingredient of terrorism, probably some of the most inhuman atrocities committed will not qualify to be treated as terrorist acts since they were not in violation of the laws of their times and lands where they were perpetrated. However, in the evolutionary process of civilisations, while some religions transformed themselves with the changing needs of the society few were relatively slow to change. If in the moral jurisprudence, legality is taken as procedural and not substantive part of terrorism probably most of the religious traditions could be found guilty of indulging in religious terrorism in one form the other.
All religious traditions have a concept of just war to be waged in pursuit of what is believed to be true, not by reason but by faith, when ordained by institutionalized religious apparatus. Radicals position themselves as upholders of social and political ethics and, from their point of view; it is not that religion has become political but politics which has become irreligious that needs catharsis.
Just war concept was not only exclusive to expansionist and proselytizing faiths but more so in respect of non-proselytizing pacifist religions. What, however, distinguished the two were the ends for which just wars could be waged (Jus ad bellum) and the means that could be employed (Jus in bell). A comparative study of the means and ends of the just war becomes essential to understand the ideological underpinnings of the modern day religious terrorists since the terrorists try to draw their inspirations and legitimacy from these religious sources. The subjectivity aspect of terrorist phenomenon also needs to be factored in. All terrorist groups at ideological plane condemn terrorism and emphasize strong disapproval of their religion against it. They concurrently, characterize acts of adversaries as terrorist acts, retaliation against which, they feel, is not only permitted but ordained by their religion as a sacred duty. A terrorist considers his acts to be part of a just war. He perceives himself to be a religious warrior engaged in a just war against the enemies of his ‘True God’ and his ‘True Religion’.
A study of the role and place of terror in religion has two distinct aspects. One, the space, if any, that the religion in ideological domain provides to justify terror and two religious histories, which are cited as religious precedents, particularly when associated with the lives of Prophets and other holy men.
In Judeo-Christian tradition, waging of war to achieve religious and political objectives through a just war is approved. In Christianity, a just war, however, must be (a) exercised as a last resort when other peaceful means have been exhausted, (b) it can be declared only on the approval of legitimate authority, (c) ultimate goal of just war is to promote the cause of religion and (d) use of violence should be proportionate. In practice, these rules have, however, been often violated. As observed by, Christopher Tyerman in ‘God’s War: A New History of the Crusades’ and supported by many other authoritative sources on the subject, “Like many religions, Christianity has seen historic periods where some of the faithful and their leaders have resorted to terrorism, such as incidents during the Crusades, the Spanish Inquisition and the Reformation. In recent periods, examples of Christian terrorism are overwhelmingly tied to individuals and small groups”.6 Martin Luther, founder of the Protestant Reformation in Christianity said, “It is both Christian and an act of love to kill the enemy without hesitation, to plunder burn and injure him by any method until he is conquered”.7 As far as historical precedents are concerned, mony examples can be quoted of use of violence against the innocents, faith killings, inhuman cruelties etc.
Islam, essentially being a warrior religion and its early ascendancy being significantly attributable to political and military actions, had more strident and specific rules of engagements against religious adversaries. Unlike Christianity, where very little can be attributed to Christ in use of violence against the opponents or defining the rules and ethics of war, prophet Mohammad himself a military commander laid considerable emphasis on this issue as per the setting of his times. Besides Quran, many of the rules are contained in the Hadith, sayings attributed to Prophet Mohammad that postdate Quran. Some of the major doctrines of warfare include:
(a) Exhorting the Muslims to fight in the name of Allah but not to exceed the limits i.e. disproportionate use of force was not approved.Quran said, “Fight in the way of Allah with those who fight with you, and do not exceed the limits” (2.190).
(b) Revenge killing was approved. Referring to non conformist opponents, it was said that “Kill them wherever you find them, and drive them out from whence they drove you out, and persecution be severer than slaughter” (2.191).
(c) No mercy was recommended towards non-believers as they were considered obstacles in Allah’s way. It was ordained “when you meet in battle those who disbelieve, then smite their necks until when you have overcome them”.
While in the Judeo-Christian-Islamic traditions violence was approved to achieve, mutually intertwined, politico- religious objectives, in Eastern religious traditions it was justified only to uphold Dharma (the eternal laws sustaining the creation of Supreme reality) and not to provide political support to the religion or the reverse. Torked Brekke elucidating this fundamental difference of approach, in his highly scholastic ‘Ethics of War in Asian Civilisation –A Comparative Perspective’, observed that “Classical Islam gives criteria for just war which are similar to those found in the Christian tradition, Hinduism on the other hand has been seen as completely alien in its theoretical treatment of war and warfare. Hinduism comes out radically different from the Judeo-Christian-Islamic family of religions”.8 Elaborating, he adds, “Killing for mundane goals was always forbidden according to the dominant ethical tradition of Hinduism”.8 Prof. Francis X. Coolney of Harvard University corroborates the same view in his study of wars in comparative religions. In his research paper, Coolney brings three basic elements of Hindu warfare viz. (a) “killing for mundane goals is always forbidden”, (b) “intending harm is always condemned”, and “no war by base motives and energized by malice towards the others”9 is justified.
Hindu missionaries did not accompany or were followed by marching armies. As early as the 4th Century BC Megasthense, a Greek Ambassador to an Indian court, in his diary observed, “Whereas among other nations it (destruction) is used, in the contests of war, to ravage the soil and thus to reduce it to an uncultivable waste, among the Indians, on the contrary, by whom husbandmen are regarded as a clan that is sacred and inviolable. The tillers of the soil, even when battle is raging, are undisturbed by any sense of danger. The combatants on either side in waging the conflict make carnage of each other, but allow those engaged in husbandry to remain quite unmolested. Besides, they never revenge enemy’s land with fire nor cut down its trees”.10 The treatment of war and conflicts in Hindu theology thus precluded possibility of religious justification for any indiscriminate violence or terror against religious or other adversaries. This is duly reflected in India’s record-one of the most ancient civilisations that rarely went for conquests or carried its sword to advance its political or religious interests.
Even when some practitioners of state craft, particularly Kautilya, in the wake of foreign aggressions in 300BC, came out with new state craft doctrines advocating means which were not in consonance with Dharma to protect sovereign interests of the state, he failed to get religious approval for the same. Rejected by the Hindu theologians, he failed to make any worthwhile dent on aggregate Hindu psyche. Kadimbini Bhatt a noted Hindu saint and scholar of Sixth century AD lambasted Kautilya for his unethical formulations and declared his teachings to be blasphemous.
This largely explains why oriental religions, like Hinduism, Buddhism, Jainism etc., even when at their zenith, with no major religions to compete, did not opt for political conquests or holy wars to expand their empires or propagate their religions.
The postulates which bolster intolerance or provide scope for violent actions on religious grounds thereby giving ideological justifications to terrorism can be summed up as under;
(a) The concept of chosen people – People belonging to a particular faith believing themselves to be divinely privileged to the exclusion of others.
(b) The concept of True and False gods - The belief that only the ‘God’ worshipped by oneself and the co- religionists is true while the ‘Gods’ worshipped by others are false. It is religious and a service to the true God to destroy the false gods and their worshippers.
(c) Concept of martyrdom – The belief that the world is coming to an end and the martyrs, who die fighting for the religion, will be rewarded for their sacrifices in the world or the life hereafter. It creates a desire for deviant martyrdom, a keenness to die for killing others, making people psychologically dangerous for the society;
(d) Revelations are divine, infallible and unchangeable- Even suggesting or talking about any change on ordained matters is blasphemous. The concept of Ijitihad (Process of making a legal decision by independent interpretation) was highly restricted and confined to areas of Islamic law, social relationships, economic practices etc. and not in respect of religious postulates like Jehad (religious war), Kufr(non believing), Shahadat (martyrdom etc.) as they derive their authority from Quran. In any case, even the doctrine of Ijitihad imperative had fallen in disuse after eleventh century. As Toynbe asserted, when cultures limit variability and diversity, they lose their capacity to adapt to changing circumstances;12
(e) Bond of religious solidarity subsuming all other bonds of human relationships- the religious identity subsumes all other identities and, irrespective of merits, one was duty bound to stand by his coreligionist in any conflict with followers of other religions. Higher the stranglehold hold of these elements on any religion greater has been its inflexibility, fanaticism and propensity for violence.
Historically, different religions had different traditions of response to; (a) Challenges confronted - physical and ideological; and (b) Dynamics of change-political, economic, social, technological etc. These two paradigms to a large extent are intertwined and the response in one area has conditioned the other. Modernity emphasized individualism, political and economic competition, and moral benchmarks dictated by self interest. Colonial imperialism was a manifestation of this phenomenon so was defining new jurisprudence formulated to regulate the world order, including rules of war and peace, trade and commerce, international relations and human rights. Christian West, the dominant player, crafted these rules which sub served their interests. This constituted a challenge to others- either to change or to confront. Those unwilling to comply constituted challenge to the West. Religions which displayed greater flexibility and propensity to change and were able to integrate new variables depicted faster progress while the confrontationists were able to preserve their pristine fundamentals more zealously. Religions which, responded to challenges by adopting orthodoxy also developed a seize mentality while others suffered weakening of religious institutions and their hold over the community.
As Muslims were the dominant power of the pre- industrial era, they faced the challenge most acutely. Looking backwards, they responded trying to find solutions in their past and relying on their fundamentals. Islamic societies for reasons religious, historical and internal power dynamics found it difficult to opt for change to modernity. There was a tendency to turn its gaze “to the glorious past”. It was considered to be the only way to the glorious future – both before and after the death. As observed by Lauren Langman and Douglas Morris of Loyola University in their research paper, “In the face of various assaults or challenges to Islam, from the sacking of Baghdad by the Mongols to the Inquisition and expulsion from Spain, and more recently the decline of the Ottoman Empire in the 19th Century, Islamic societies and leaders repeatedly embraced more conservative positions… When the central scholarly community of Baghdad was destroyed by the Mongol invasion, a centre of liberal, diverse learning was lost. This happened again in the Iberian Peninsula…Progressive alternatives to Islam orthodoxy were lost. This resulted in retrenchment and cultural conservatism.”11 The fact that Islam as a religious movement, right from its inception, heavily emphasized its military dimension and its founder had to militarily subdue his adversaries to establish the supremacy of his divine revelations contributed in shaping Islam’s response to challenge. Because of asymmetry of power in the new dispensation, terrorism became the new mode of Islamic warfare to cope with the challenge.
In pursuit of its political and economic ambitions, West provided the causation and to defend itself, the hard line Muslims, defying geographical boundaries, responded by getting radicalized and opting for Jehad. It set in motion a vicious cycle of stimulant- response relationship each feeding on and aggravating the other. With availability of technology, money, and state support by some Islamic states, the phenomenon assumed dangerous proportions.
Religious terrorism, a genetic mutation of fanatic radicalism, has acquired a very special import in contemporary world as it threatens the individuals, civil societies nation states and modern civilisational values equally seriously. Following the post September 11, 2001, strikes, in last six years, the US estimates of fatalities due to international terrorism have been placed at 18,154, while those of domestic terrorism at 32,112.11 Though the norms adopted for compiling these statistics are questioned by some experts who feel that menace of terrorism faced by non-developed countries is not adequately reflected in these estimates, basic points of colossal loss of human lives by terrorism is undisputed. Religious terrorism accounted for bulk of terrorist incidents of violence and well over 60% of persons killed, making it the biggest killer in the present day world.
Islamic terrorism takes the major share of religious terrorism in terms of human lives lost and geographical area covered- extending to Americas, Europe, Middle East, North Africa, South Asia, Central Asian Republics, Russia, South East Asia and Australia.
Though the current high intensity and vast expanse of Islamic terrorism is relatively new, symptoms of radicalisation started becoming apparent immediately following the fall of Ottoman Empire. If terrorism is not taken merely as gory details of terrorist depredations or back grounders of terrorist outfits and their leaders, but more importantly, a war of ideas which threatens modern civilisation and way of life, it becomes necessary to have a closer look at evolution of these ideas and the factors that shaped them.
Conflict Of Islamic Radicalism And Secular Humanism-Evolution And Causes
Islam within five hundred years of its birth held sway over Middle East, Caucuses, North Africa and parts of Europe, South Asia and South East Asia. By the end of twentieth century, its size had substantially shrunk, its military and political power degraded, and Muslims left far behind in their social, economic and economic progress. Rather than take responsibility for the fall and find the causes within, which militated against their faith system, they tried to find them outside. Muslims suspected a global conspiracy against them and a serious threat to their faith from western ideas and interpretations of democracy, secularism, socialism, rule of law etc. It was perceived that West in its ruthless pursuit of a political and economic agenda, was out to destroy Islam and hit at its fundamentals. After the First World War when the Western powers carved out of the Ottoman Empire small non-Muslims states under the Sykes-Picot Agreement, their fears got further strengthened. Radical secularisation of Turkey under Kamal Ataturk, who was inspired by rationalist and secular ideas of Zia Gokalp and the abolition of Caliphate were widely resented dubbing Attaturk as a Western stooge. The emergence of Bahai faith at the end of the nineteenth century was suspected to be a part of conspiracy to undermine Islam.
This started a debate within Islam; Why the Fall and what was The Remedy? The modernists attributed this decline to inability of Islam to keep pace with changing setting and environment and pleaded for fundamental changes to modernize the Islamic society. The radicals differed. They attributed departure from the original path, as shown by the Prophet and Shari’a, as the root cause and demanded going back to the fundamentals of ‘glorious past’ to achieve the ‘glorious future’. Both fundamentalists and terrorists today draw sustenance from the thought that modern society is rotting, and the cause of rot is drift from the only true God and religion which Muslims were ordained to establish-Nizam-e-Mustafa (the sovereignty of God). In their view, “The only lasting sustainable solution lies in turning to the word of God in its purest form – the Quran and Sunna. Muslims must turn to the original core texts and interpret them in a way that makes them relevant to the needs of today”.12 As Islam historically when threatened, has tended to embrace orthodoxies laying emphasis on Jehad-fight to defend the faith, expectedly, fundamentalists opted for this route.
Moderate thinkers, such as Sir Syed Ahmad Khan, felt that Islam’s problems were consequented by superstitious beliefs and unscientific practices which had crept in the medieval times. They wanted Islam to adopt western-style scientific education, relate social progress to the betterment of the common man and acquire scientific temper. The medieval Islamic jurisprudence (fiqh) was considered to be unfit to meet new requirements of the society and the individuals. They also advocated disconnect between worldly and spiritual matters wanting the religion to confine itself to religious matters.
They faced stiff resistance from the conservative Islamic clergy. Western educated moderates were dubbed as puppets in the hands of western powers- who failed to exert enough to assert themselves and opted for the policy of calculated non-confrontation leaving free space to the Islamic conservatives in religious matters. Well established in the fields of politics, trade, education, high skill professions etc., they developed a vested interest in avoiding confrontation with the Ulema’s (Scholars of Islam-usually including the clergy) whose rancor threatened to weaken their standing in the Community.
Muslim Brotherhood, A fundamentalist organisation, inspired by the teachings of Ibn-Taymiyya, an eighteenth century ideological successor to Mohammad Ibn Abu Al-Wahhab, was formed in Egypt in 1928. Some Muslims, owing allegiance to Muslim Brotherhood, spearheaded a violent campaign against the British opposing their presence in Egypt in violation of 1936 Anglo-Egyptian Treaty. The Movement waned and waxed and gradually lost its momentum but was soon replaced by its more strident successors. In early fifties, Sayyid Qutub emerged as the group’s principle ideologue who propagated that the decline of Islamic world “could be reversed” only if a small group of real Muslims emulated the ways of the Prophet Muhammad and worked to “replace the existing governments in Muslim lands with Islamic ones”.15
Qutub’s ideology brought about radical redefinition of Islamic postulates in modern context. He advocated establishment of a true Islamic society based on Quran and Shari’a in which every Muslim was required to submit only to the will of Allah and not to the man or the laws made by him. He proclaimed that the way to bring about this transformation was only through Jehad. He announced Jehad was “Islam’s tool to exercise it divinely – ordered right to step forward and establish political authority on earth. Islam had the right to attack and destroy all obstacles in the form of institutions and traditions if it was required to release mankind from their pernicious influence and to engage in Jehad for this purpose”.14 Qutub characterized secularisation of law, philosophy of socialism, liberalism and modernisations as un-Islamic and tools of oppression. He justified Jehad against them. Qutub’s ideology had a seminal affect on Islamic extremist thought. Though he was tried and executed in 1966, his followers made him a martyr and he became an inspirational icon for later day radicals and terrorists. Every Islamic terrorist movement today swears by Qutub’s ideology. No credible school of Islamic theologians in last half a century has come forward to seriously contest his formulations.
At the political front, following the Second World War, nationalist struggle for independence began in many parts of the world including Muslim societies. However, while in non-Muslim societies, it remained a secular political initiative, in newly independent Muslim states, like Pakistan, Egypt, Algeria etc, it got intertwined with religious identity of the people and the mullah. Even moderate Islamic political leaders considered it tactically expedient to play the religious card, unmindful of its long term consequences. This led to religion becoming central to the polity of these countries, providing space to the radicals to expand their influence. The moderate political leaders, though in private, were contemptuously critical of their teachings, publicly never wanted to be seen on wrong side of the Ulema’s. They also provided financial and other state support to these institutions who started producing a new breed of radicals and potential foot soldiers for Jehad.. All this gave legitimacy and dedicated support base to the radicals which had long term political and security implications. s
The economic interests of West in the Middle East, particularly after the oil boom, made them not only to overlook but even strengthen unpopular, non-democratic regimes whom they could manipulate with ease to sub serve their economic interests. Most of these regimes for their survival at home were dependent on the conservative Islamic clergy and used them to counter the moderates and pro-democratic elements by dubbing them as un-Islamic. In the dichotomy that ensued, while the secular West was busy through theocratic dictatorial regimes manipulating its foreign and economic policies internally the conservative radical forces, opposed to democracy, secularism and pluralism were getting strengthened. The people in power while subservient to the West when outside the country were critical of them at home to curry favour with the conservatives. Emergence of religious institutions and madrassas at large scale, was another supporting factor in rise of radicalism.
The creation of Israel, without adequately addressing the Palestinian question and adjusting the refugees, proved to be the biggest contributory factor in growth of Islamic radicalism. It caused wide spread alienation among the Muslims throughout the world.
The Soviets finding Palestine issue strategically advantageous to extend its influence and add to West’s discomfiture, developed linkages with Palestinian hard line groups opting for resolution of conflict through violence. It selectively equipped and trained them to bleed the West. This provided Islamic extremist access to modern weapons, tactics, and expertise to engage regular professional forces in unconventional warfare, an expertise for which all had to pay a heavy price later.
Lastly, US response to the marching Soviet troops in Afghanistan in 1979; was a critical development in the evolution of modern Islamic terrorism. Mobilising Muslim youth from all over the world in the name of Jehad, equipping, training and logistically supporting them to fight the Soviets had four important adverse consequences;
(a) It brought about a physical interface and unity among scattered radicals at global level, later developing into a global net working and the consequent menace of international terrorism;
(b) The trained and religiously motivated Jehadis on return to their homelands after the Afghan war created modules of terror in their native countries;
(c) It validated the radical doctrine that Jehad, which was blessed by ‘Allah’, could subdue the mightiest. Victory of Jehad not only vanquishing a super power but eventually leading to its dismemberment and freeing of Islamic Central Asia came as a great moral booster to the Jehadis;
(d) Pakistan, a highly unstable Islamic state with nuclear capabilities, saw in Jehadis a potent force which could be effectively leveraged for asymmetric warfare and achieving its politico-military objectives. It patronized the new soldiers of Islam using it with a politico-military agenda in Kashmir, Afghanistan, Central Asia etc. The spill over effect was soon to be felt all over the world including the West.
Salafi Terrorism-The Eminent Threat
Most of the Islamic terrorism that the world is experiencing today- in the West, Arab countries, South Asia or South East Asia- is the Salafi variety of Jehad. Salafism represents a Sunni Islamic School of thought that is credited to an eighteenth century ideologue of Saudi Arabia named Muhammad Ibn Abd-al-Wahhab. It was later refined and perfected by Scholars of al-Azhar University in Egypt, notable among them being Muhammad Abduh Jamal-al-Din-al-Afghani and Rashid Rida. Salafis insist on reverting to the conduct followed by pious ancestors (Salaf) of the early period of Islam. They believe Islam was perfect and flawless during the days of Prophet Muhammad but undesirable innovations and impurities crept over the period of time. They all had to be identified and discarded. The School is thus opposed to any change and innovations and highly inflexible and orthodox in its approach.
Though its original home was Middle East and it largely remained confined there for many decades. Of late, its spatial growth in Sunni dominated areas all around the world has been notable. For rootless immigrants and disaffected second-generation youth in Europe, the attraction of the authentic Salafism as a way to differentiate from others-as it is seen to be pure and stripped of the local superstitions, conferring a status of moral superiority.21 One of the main political objectives of the Salafis is establishment of Islamic caliphate which could establish the sovereignty of Allah. The concept of caliphate is totally rejected by the Shias-Shia ideologues have their own interpretations of ideal Islamic world order, which create a different variety of radicalism and poses a different genre of conflicts with its own implications. The present day threat predominantly emanates from Sunni-extremism. Sunnis constitute over 80% of the world Muslim population, have widely dispersed global spread and exclusively contribute to the Salafi ranks, who believe in Islamic universality, allowing no local diversions.
Sunni revivalists of the caliphate idea include Hizb-ut-Tahir, a major radical Pan Islamic outfit which has its presence in over 45 countries. In Central Asia they stand for establishment of an Islamic state from Black sea to Xinziang in China. Similarly, an idea of a united Islamic state in South East Asia comprising of Indonesia, Malaysia, Southern Thailand, Parts of Philippines and other adjoining areas is envisaged. Similar vision is harbored for South Asian countries and many other parts of the world. All these new gains, through Jehad, integrated with Islamic world are envisaged to be part of the Islamic caliphate. It may be mentioned that during prophet Mohammad’s time, Arabia had no state and the Quran does not speak of any Islamic state as such. The notion of caliphate is of much later origin and came into existence only after the death of Prophet Mohammed. Salafis stretch the concept of Islamic Umma to mean a united Islamic Sovereign political entity rather than unity of Islamic people that it meant. Political consolidation, they consider is necessary for enforcing the divine laws of Quran the examples of Prophet (Shria), Islamic laws (fiqh) etc. Their conflict with notions of modernity likes democracy, Secularism, equality before law, human rights etc, is fundamental and irreconcilable. They consider that egalitarianism of Islam provides sufficient space to meet all human needs – both physical and spiritual.
The spread of Salafi philosophy has given a quantum jump to Islamic radicalism and concomitant terrorism. It has provided a new breed of radicals and foot soldiers for Jehad with a fire power and geographical expanse never known to any religion, including Islam, in history. The role of ideology in Salafi-Jehadi terror is multi-functional and intertwined to social and political processes. For a Salafi Jehadi the strategic objective is not only creating liberated Shari’a zones but perpetration of Jehad itself and attainment of martyrdom. The ideology both expresses and reinforces a culture of self martyrdom as a strategic good in itself giving rise to phenomenon like suicide terrorism. Salafis consider themselves as Al Taifa-al Mansoura (the victorious group) who alone would be saved at the end of time. They are critical of moderate Salafis who only believe in it ideologically but are unwilling to participate in Jehad, and label them as Margi’eb (prevaricators). This fraternity reaches its apogee in combat and revolves around the common pursuit of martyrdom.16 The promise of brotherhood and its associated group is essential component of the recruitment process, especially for Jehadis in the West.17 In its most extreme form, Salafi “parallelism” can be found in the concept of ‘takfiri’, separation from all elements of society outside their cells. In this concept exclusion both of Muslims and non-Muslims is legitimate and not apostate. This permits the targeting of everyone outside the group, Muslims and non-Muslims for violence.18 The Salafi terrorist ideology creates an obligation for physical Jehad as Bin Laden wrote “the most important religious duty –after belief itself- is to ward off and fight the enemy. Jehad is obligatory now for the Islamic nation, which is in a state of sin unless it gives its sons to maintain Jehad.19
Spatial Growth And Expanse
The above dialectic of Islamic terrorism renders a geographical theatre analysis meaningless. For them, the whole world is a single entity where Nizam-e-Mustafa (the Sovereignty of Allah) has to be established. Briefly, a geographical analysis has to be understood factoring in the following constraining factors:
(a) At ideological plane, the Jehadis consider the areas, where the sovereignty of Allah does not exist as Dar-ul-Harb. Here wars have to be fought to convert or kill to establish Islam. In the Islamic regimes, wars have to be fought to enforce the laws laid down by Quran, Shari’a, etc. This practically extends their arch of action to the entire world.
(b) Emergence of International Islamic Front for Jehad under the over-arching leadership of Osama Bin Laden and his Al Qaeda has brought in ideological unity and global networking among Islamic extremist of various hues. The call of global Jehad cutting across nationalities, ethnicity, language culture etc., renders boundaries of nation states meaning- less. It has converted Al Qaeda from a terrorist outfit to an Islamic movement with no formal structure and centralized control but as a global motivator for terror and violence;
(c) Modern technology and revolution in informatics has enabled the terrorists to communicate with ease, facilitate flow of funds to each other, access common sources of terrorist hardware and draw upon human resources from a wide catchments area. In this scenario, state specific threat assessment or response strategy has become difficult. Geographic boundaries are part of the problem and not solution;
(d) Even where institutionalised linkages do not exist, perception of common enemy and ideological commonality reinforces group psychology which binds them in a common bond to think globally even when acting locally. There are various nuanced inter-linkages which are difficult to define but dangerous to ignore. There are very few experts today who can claim full knowledge of all the groups operating, their inter relationship and areas of cooperation. A terrorist of any area is a potential threat to any other part of the world.
Despite these limitations, as different regions have their own peculiarities, their own set of functional terrorist groups, have differing response systems etc, a geographical analysis becomes necessary.
Middle East
Middle East is not only the birth place of Islam but also of modern Islamic radicalism from where it spread its tentacles to new areas and mutated to take the form of global terrorism. This later engulfed new areas and graduated to full blown terrorism with global security implications. The festering Palestine issue has been central to Muslim religious leadership, intellectuals, politicians and laymen, cutting across national, sectarian, ethnic and denominational identities. Many militant groups from Palestine and other Middle Eastern Islamic countries targeted Israel to carve out the state of Palestine, which was deemed by them to be their legitimate struggle, and continue to do so.
After the conclusion of US backed peace plan it was expected that the peace will ensue and violence will abate. However, with road blocks surfacing in the peace plan, these hopes have been belied and violence has again escalated. The terrorist groups which currently are in the forefront of militant action include Hamas (Islamic Resistance Movement), Palestinian Islamic Jehad, Al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigades and Hezbollah. Their targets include government facilities, Israelis security forces and the civilians.
Hamas, Palestine’s major Muslim fundamentalist movement and terrorist outfit, has been primarily active in Gaza Strip and West Bank, where its armed wing has been striking. Besides, the armed wing, it has an extensive social service network which assists it in recruitment, intelligence gathering, and providing over-ground support to the armed cadres. Its social service network runs, mosques, health care clinics, orphanages, sports clubs etc. Its declared charter endorses armed struggle to establish supremacy of Islam, destruction of Israel, and establishment of an Islamic State on the West Bank and Gaza Strip. During last five years Hamas has been increasingly resorting to suicide attacks, targeting Israelis civilians and military establishments, leading to sharp escalation in casualties and damage to properties. It is well organised, financially strong and by its armed actions has been able to create wide spread fear-psychosis in the civil population. Though Hamas’s official membership is unknown, the intelligence agencies place the figure of their armed wing, over ground activists and active supporters in tens of thousands.
Palestinian Islamic Jehad (PIJ), like Hamas, is committed to the creation of an Islamic Palestinian State and the destruction of Israel. It is strongly anti-West, holding it responsible for the present plight of Palestinians and persecution of Muslims. Though small, it is better knit and organised; enabling it to undertake some meticulously planned terrorist operations inflicting high casualties. Since 2002, it has upped its ante of violence, particularly against Israeli civilian targets like city buses, shopping malls and cafeterias.
Al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigade is active mainly in West Bank and is affiliated to Al-Fateh, which claims to be a secular Palestinian nationalist movement but maintains links with armed Islamic organisations. The political objective of the group is to drive away the Israeli Army and Jewish settlers from West Bank, Gaza Strip and Jerusalem through an armed struggle and to establish an independent a Palestinian State.
Hezbollah, a Shia terrorist group with quarter of a century long history of terrorist actions, mainly operates from its bases in Lebanon and enjoys full support of Iran. Led by Lebanese based Sheikh Hassan Nasrallah, and Imad Fayez Mugniyah, who in terrorist circles is considered a legendary terrorist commander and operator are prime targets of Israel and the West. Mugniyah, variously reported as Hezbollah’s operational chief, security chief, chief of international operations and commander of Islamic Resistance (Hezbollah’s armed wing), has master minded series of highly sophisticated and daring terrorist operation in Middle East and much beyond- bombing in Buenos Aires, Argentina, bombing of US embassy in Lebanon killing sixty three people, attack on US marine and French paratroopers in Beirut leaving 141 dead, being illustrative. Palestine cause is a passion with Mugniyah and recently he agreed to assist Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jehad to recruit foreign nationals’ capable of infiltrating into Israel. Despite being a Shia, in Sunni terrorist circles he is highly admired by all; Osama himself being his great fan. Mugniyah’s meeting with Osama Bin Laden in mid- nineties is on record and it is known that Osama sought his help in building up Al Qaeda’s international strike capabilities. Mugniyah agreed to train and provide expertise to Al Qaeda Mujahedeens in handling of explosives and planning secret operations in exchange for money. His extremely close links to Iranian establishment are well known, who besides financing provide the group with logistic assistance like use of government air crafts to its leaders for visiting Lebanon.
Fateh-al Islam, a Sunni Islamists group with activists from Palestine, Lebanon, and Syria, of late, has come to notice for undertaking terrorist operations, particularly in Lebanon. The organisation stands for organizing the Palestinian Refugees community in-line with Shari’a Law and building resistance against Israel. The outfit first surfaced in November, 2006 when it split from Fateh Al-Intifada, a Syria backed Palestinian group. It is strongly suspected of its secret links with Syrian Intelligence. The group gained provenance in May, 2007 when it got engaged in series of clashes with the Lebanese Security Forces. The organisation is reported to be linked with Al Qaeda and had been working in tandem with the outfit of slain Jordanian born terrorist leader Abu Musab Zarqawi. Palestine Liberation Front and Asbat Al Ansar, are other two active terrorist outfits, the later primarily operating in Lebanon demanding strict enforcement of Islamic laws.
Following, American intervention leading to ouster of Saddam Hussain, Iraq has emerged as the bloodiest battle field of conflict between hegemonic power ambition and religion- inspired violent retaliation. Initially, it was estimated to remain a political power struggle between pro and anti Saddam forces with manageable religious overtones. But like many other assumptions, this too was to be proved wrong. Religious fury has now dominated the engagement, both anti US and among rival sectarian Muslims groups, relegating the political players to the margin. Iraqi civil society which hardly has the tradition of religious orthodoxy, has presently been totally eclipsed by the warring religious and tribal sentiments with political, economic, nationalist, and social issues taking a back seat.
Like most of the developments on terrorist front, both in this region and beyond, Al Qaeda’s resurrection has been the most disquieting feature. In Iraq too, after some initial hesitations, it entrenched itself quite deeply and decisively despite some inherent disadvantages like a large Shia population, Al Qaeda being under heavy pressure in Afghanistan and serious beating its terrorist infrastructure received following Sept 11, 2001 strikes. It maneuvered the situation to its advantage by forging alliances with high potential local groups, even where it had substantial differences with them on ideological issues or strategic objectives. In this marriage of convenience, all were right allies as long as they treated US and its allies as their enemies and were prepared to declare Jehad against them. Attracted by Osama’s larger than life image and the crafty alliances that he forged, many groups rallied under Al Qaeda’s banner and soon occupied center stage position. The declared political objective of Al Qaeda in Iraq is to topple the US supported “Un-Islamic Shiite puppet regime” and restore Sunni domination. But more importantly, its strategic objective is to bleed, punish, and discredit US and hopes that West’s engagement in Iraq will swell the ranks of Jehadis and enhance their standing in the Islamic world. It feels that inflicting unaffordable losses on America will make its claim of sole super power look ridiculous to the doubting Muslims giving rise to a new phase of Muslims resistance to the West. They also assess tactical setbacks to US, if sustained, will generate mutual dissensions among their allies, create domestic compulsions at home for them, and lead to reduction of pressure on the Jehadis in different theaters of the world. In Iraq, all perceived supporters of US-politicians, security personnel, suspected spies and government functionaries besides members of rival religious sects are on their radar, leaving very few out of the danger zone. Al Qaeda was responsible for the attack on Golden Mosque in Samarra, a sacred Shiite shrine, which triggered off most vicious Sunni-Shia clashes.
The outfit has large number of non-Iraqi volunteers from Algeria, Yemen, Syria and Saudi Arabia engaged in Jehad under Al Qaeda banner. Structurally, they are not under a unified command nor the tactical operations are coordinated. The terrorist actions, decentralized and localized, are out sourced to local Islamic outfits, tribal outlaws having their private armies, sectarian and religious leaders controlling various Mosques, and the criminal elements. The indulgence of Al Qaeda in complex local level Iraqi politics has also a down side as it has earned them many enemies and Zarkawi’s death is attributed to the local rivalries leading to his betrayal.
Tanzim Qaedat Al-Jehad Fi-Bilad is an important terrorist network active in Iraq. Floated by Zarkawi and closely linked to Al Qaeda, the organisations works in tandem with other local groups like, ‘Islamic State of Iraq’, an umbrella group of Sunni insurgent outfits formed in 2006. ‘Islamic Army of Iraq’, a Sunni-led group with over 15,000 activists has been responsible for large number of attacks against US forces.
The ‘1920 Revolution Brigade’, named after 1920 uprising against British colonial occupation of Iraq is another terrorist outfit sharing military objective of driving out foreign forces from Iraq and establishing an Islamic state. It specializes in use of Improvised Explosive Devices and has been responsible for a large number of roadside explosions as also mortar and rocket attacks in West of Baghdad. The group maintains close liaison with ‘Association of Muslim Scholars in Iraq’, a grouping of Sunni scholars who are opposed to West’s intervention in Iraq. ‘Ansar Al-Suna’, a Sunni Salafi group, active in Central Iraq and ‘Ansar Al Islam’, active in North-East Iraq, also deserve a special mention for series of violent actions executed by them in the recent past. Most of these groups though maintain close ties with Al Qaeda, retain their decisional autonomy and ideological stance..
In addition to the groups’ active in Israel, Lebanon, Syria, and now Iraq, there are many other local Islamic outfits having their cells in other parts of Middle East. Al Qaeda has its modules and sympathizers in many of the Arab countries, particularly Saudi Arabia and Yemen. The organisation is opposed to the present Saudi Royalty and wants total withdrawal of US troops from there. Middle East also is an important source of financing for Al Qaeda, though after post Sept. 2001, with the tightening of control on terrorist financing through multilateral international effort, there is discernible drop. It is now mostly being routed through Pakistanis settled abroad, who regularly remit funds to Pakistan from where they find their way to North Western tribal area and Afghanistan.
Egypt has not only been a premier seat of Islamic learning but also a hub center of providing ideological leadership to the Islamic world. Salafi Islam and its doctrines were evolved in Al-Azhar University of Cairo in late nineteenth century, which today form the basis of Salafi terrorism. The first reaction to termination of caliphate was felt in Egypt with the formation of Islamic Brotherhood in 1928, which can be considered as first among the modern radical organisations. Though over the years, Islamic Brotherhood has undergone lot of transformation and has fallen from grace among the hard line terrorists for its alleged soft stance, it played a vital role in the early years in nurturing Islamic radicalism and influencing the minds of those who were to provide radical leadership in years to come. Terrorist groups, however, were not able to develop deep routes in Egypt because of strong counter-terrorism policy pursued by different Egyptian governments, right from the time of President Naseer. Groups like Gamaa Al Islamia, which stands for over-throwing Egyptian government and establishment of an Islamic rule, and ‘Egyptian Islamic Jehad’ another Sunni militant group continue to have their presence and influence in the country. Some groups aligned to Al Qaeda are also active and there hands in some recent terrorist cases is suspected.
Of late some other parts of North Africa are also getting sucked into the vortex of Islamic extremism. Most notable among these is Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat (GSPC). This Algeria based Sunni group has renamed itself as Al-Qaeda and owned up responsibility for series of terrorist actions after Al Zawahiri second–in-command of Al Qaeda declared the group’s allegiance to it on Sept. 11, 2006. The group, till recently, only seen to be a domestic insurgency group wanting to throw out the Military regime in Algeria has now graduated to a full fledged Salafi terrorist group, recently announcing its decision to send Mujahedeens to fight Americans in Iraq. In a January 2007 speech, Abu Musab Abdel Wadoud, Al Qaeda trained commander of the organisation announced objectives of the organisation to fight in Palestine, Iraq, Somalia and Chechnya.
South Asia
In the evolution of Islamic radicalism and terrorism South Asian countries of Afghanistan, Pakistan and Bangladesh have a special import, both academic and empirical. The first two where the virus proliferated most abundantly and the third where it hit most lethally. Largest number of Muslims have fought and died in the name of Jehad from this region in the last quarter of a century and over two hundred Islamic extremist groups and Jehadi organisations of various hues and sizes still claim their existence, of which about a dozen deserve to be taken very seriously. Islamic terrorists who struck in different parts of the world in last one decade have had some link or the other with the region. However, while the first three have overwhelmingly contributed to the Jehadi ranks and their depredations, Indian Muslims, who are numerically largest, have by and large remained out of it. Though India, with over 40,000 civilians killed, is world’s biggest victim of Islamic terrorism, ironically, majority of those killed were Muslims falling prey to the bullets of their coreligionists from across the border. All the three states where Islamic radicals received state or civil society support are politically unstable, burdened with no or weak democracies, trapped in slow economic and social growth and seen as near failing states. More importantly, though theocratic Muslim states, they themselves are facing a virulent form of sectarian terrorism.
History and geography have conspired to make this region the single largest contributor to the growth of Islamic terrorism as also its major victim. To flush out the Soviets, Islamic zealots were brought from all parts of the Islamic world to Pakistan and Afghanistan forging a unity among those who shared northing in common but willingness to die for a cause they considered Islamic. This convergence, enabled by western powers, not only made a superpower to retreat and eventually fall apart but made Islamists aware of the potential of Jehad and force multiplication effect of networking. Its aftermath saw ascendancy of Taliban – recruited, trained, weaponized and militarily backed up by Pakistan an ally of the west. More sinisterly, Taliban, under Pak patronage, converted Afghanistan into a breeding ground for Islamic terrorists with training bases and infrastructural support to extremists from Turkey to Indonesia, Chechnya to China and Europe to Africa. It became the home of Al Qaeda and gave Islamists a geographical space to pursue their global agenda with impunity.
Counter terrorist military action against Taliban following post September 11, 2001events did shake it. There was, however, a strategic flaw in response pruning was mistaken for uprooting. Clandestine support from across the borders, failure to neutralize the top icons, Karzai’s handicapped governance, shift in West’s focus from Afghanistan to Iraq and duality of the frontline ally enabled Taliban and Al Qaeda to reclaim the lost ground. Today, Afghanistan is fast relapsing to its past. Al Qaeda has found new sanctuaries in lawless tribal areas of North West Pakistan and Baluchistan. Taliban influence has substantially increased in these areas where Pakistan Army is increasingly on the defensive. Heavy military casualties forced them to strike a dubious deal with Taliban’s in September, 2006 which enabled them to consolidate their position. The sanctuaries in Pakistan and lack of control on the borders enabled Taliban leaders to cross over to safe areas in Pakistan whenever under pressure from the NATO troops. Within Afghanistan the terrorist scenario has worsened and there is considerable increase in their striking capabilities. The incidents of attack on the government troops and the civilians have substantially increased. .
Following Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan, many factors influenced Pakistan’s strategy and response towards Islamic terrorists. First, having discovered their strength and potential, it decided to hold and nurture them as integral, albeit deniable, instruments of its state apparatus. A subservient Taliban regime was installed in Afghanistan which besides achieving strategic depth against India was envisaged to work as Pakistan’s backyard for dirty tricks. The agenda included installing Taliban prototypes in the Central Asian Republics, reaching out to radical Islamic forces globally and leveraging them to Pakistan’s advantage in the politics of Islamic world. The second policy objective was to settle scores with India on Kashmir and avenge the humiliation of 1971. Pakistan decided to use the Jihadi forces at its command against its asymmetric adversary hoping to succeed where its earlier military adventures had failed. The Jehadis, the huge left over arsenal and the infrastructure to recruit, indoctrinate, train, equip and infiltrate the terrorists, was positioned to launch a covert offensive against India. The West, instead of coming to India’s help or force Pakistan to rollback the apparatus, underplayed India’s concerns. The fire looked too far and distant than it actually was. The prophetic warning to US Congress by the then Indian Prime Minister Vajpayee in October 2000 that ‘Distance and geography provide no nation immunity against international terrorism’ met with characteristic indifference. Pakistan soon became a nursery not only for terrorists who trained their guns on India but those who targeted the West, Arab world, Far-East and other Afro-Asian countries. Keen to extend its influence in unstable Islamic Central Asian Countries, Pakistan used Taliban to strengthen radicals hoping to establish Taliban type regimes there. Radiational effect of terrorism thus started advancing in all directions—India being worst hit due to Pakistan’s hostility and geographical proximity.
The other important factor that shaped events in Pakistan was September 11 attacks in US which overnight changed global perception of the threat. Pakistan could no longer support the Taliban and Al Qaeda as before. It made a tactical withdrawal and decided to cooperate with the West to the extent it was necessary to protect Pakistan’s strategic interests. In a dangerously calibrated response, it made queer deals and counter-deals with both the sides. September 5, 2006 agreement with the radicals in North-Waziristan, marketed to both sides as something done to favour them is illustrative. While Taliban used the dichotomy to their advantage, West lost valuable time and is still trying to decipher Pakistani intentions.
The third factor has been inexorable growth of sectarian violence within Pakistan among rival Islamic groups. Intertwined in a complex relationship of mutual collaborations and hostility, Pak intelligence had used them selectively but is now finding it difficult to live with its contradictions. For different reasons, different groups have turned against Musharraf though still receive some patronage on the quite down the line. Attempts on the life of President Musharraf, however, have led to head on collision and brought to the fore their threat to internal security.
Pakistan’s policy of ‘different strokes for different folks’ bracketing the terrorists in three broad categories viz., those targeting the West, those responsible for domestic violence and those hitting at India has created a confusion that Pakistan is finding difficult to cope with. The problem stands compounded because of convergence of anti-establishment elements under re-emerging Taliban and resurgent Al Qaeda. Classifying terrorists under different labels is proving to be both strategic and tactical mistake. Pakistan continues to be soft on the groups operating against India. Their top leaders live and move around in Pakistan freely, travel on Pakistani passports and run businesses with impunity. Though ISI controlled training camps, and other terrorist facilities have not been rolled back, greater discretion is exercised to achieve higher deniability.
The situation in Bangladesh has fast deteriorated after September 11, 2001, than is normally understood. When Pakistan and Afghanistan came under pressure, a good number of terrorists, reportedly with Pak intelligence support, found Bangladesh as safe haven. Using Islamic card for political gains, the Bangladeshi society stands highly radicalized—local groups working on the franchise of Pak-Afghan terrorist outfits including Al Qaeda. The collective strength of terrorist groups like Harkat-ul-Jehadi Islami, Harkat-ul Ansar, and Okaye Jote etc. now is estimated in several thousands. While India is the principal target, the anti-US and anti-West outbursts are too shrill to be ignored. The proximity to arm bazaars of Pacific Rim countries has enabled them to procure sophisticated weapons and explosives. Illustratively, on April 2, 2004 at Chittagong port, 1,790 rifles, 150 rocket launchers, 2,700 grenades, one million rounds of ammunition etc. were seized while being loaded in ten trucks. The brother of then ruling Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP) leader owned the two trawlers who brought the consignment from Malaysia. The weapons, it is reliably learnt, had India as their destination.
South East Asia And China
After early 90’s South East Asia has emerged as another hub of contemporary phase of international Islamic terrorism. Jemiah Islamiyah, (JI) which came into existence in late seventies, as a non descript Islamist group has spread its tentacles in many area adopting a stridently militant posture. It aims at establishing a Pan-Islamic State consisting of Indonesia, Malaysia, Southern Phillipine and Southern Thailand. The group which has its cells in almost all these countries, and traces its routes to ‘Darul Islam’, a violent radical movement that sprang up in late forties at the end of Dutch colonial regime in Indonesia. Though in its early years it did not subscribe to violence but after 1990s it has shown marked proclivities towards violence. These are attributable to its interface with Al Qaeda and other Afghanistan-Pakistan based radical Sunni Islamic groups during and after Afghan war. Its important leaders include Nurjaman Riduan Ismuddin (also known as Hambali), Hambali aften described as Osama bin Laden of South East Asia was arrested in Thailand in August 2003. Noordin and Azhari Hussain, a British-educated engineer and explosive expert, and Mohammad Noordin, a former Accountant, both Malaysian born members of JI, were responsible for attacks on Marriott Hotel and Australian Embassy in Jakarta in August, 2003 and September 2004 respectively. Besides, Abu Bakar Bashir, an Indonesian of Yemeni descent is the group’s ideologue leader who actively associates himself with the outfits operational plans. He joined ‘Darul Islam’ in the 1970s and was imprisoned in Indonesia. He later fled to Malaysia where he recruited Mujahideens to fight the Soviets in Afghanistan. In 1998, following stepping down of President Suharto, he returned to Indonesia to run a Muslim seminari in a Muslim majority island of Java. He denies his involvement in any terrorist activity though his involvement in the October 2002 Bali bombing is strongly suspected. He was the head of JI’s reginal shura, and has close links with Al Qaeda leaders.
The group is outlawed in Singapore and Malaysia, while Phillipines Security Establishment has been maintaining a close vigil over it activities Response of Indonesian government has been relatively soft, at least in early years, as a view is shared by some influential persons in the government that precipitated action against JI may well its support base and lead to strengthening of radical forces. There has, however initially been hardening of attitude following the Bali bombings in October, 2002.
In Philippines Abu- Sayyaf, An off shoot of ‘Moro National Liberation Front’ which initially spearheaded a Muslim separatist movement in philipines, is an Islamist militant organisation operating from Southern Philippines. Its avowed objective is to carve out a separate Islamic state for the country’s Muslim minority. Abdurajak Janjalani, who fought under ‘International Islamic Brigade’ in Afghanistan during Soviet occupation, was its founding leader. Crucial financing to form the organisation was provided by one Muhammad Jamal Khalifa, a Saudi businessman following the death of Abddurajak in 1998, his brother Khadaffy Janjalani led the organisation till 2006 when he was killed. With the killing of Abu Sulaiman the successor in January, 2007 the organisation practically became headless as it does not have a committed second rung leadership. The second rung leaders are more of criminals than ideologically motivated Jehadis. Organisations links with its Middle Eastern donors have also got adversely affected. Recently, Radullam Sahiron, an old man with one arm severed and no operational experience was made the chief in January, 2007. The organisation is presently weak but its recovery can not be ruled out. It is also likely to continue with its criminal activities like extortions, kidnapping for ransom etc.
Activities of the organisation have included bomb blasts, assassinations, kidnappings and extortions. One of the major terrorist incidents perpetrated by the group was kidnapping of twenty people, including three Americans, in May, 2001 at a tourist centre. Abu Sayyaf beheaded one of the American captors and held the other two Americans as hostage in an island in Southern Phillipines. In June, 2002, in a rescue operation two of the hostages were killed and one American missionary Gracia Burnham was rescued.
Of late, Southern Thailand has emerged another active area where Islamic insurgents have been attacking Buddhists, including monks, in large numbers. Though in earlier years the movement did not show change in global activities for violence, with the Islamic mind set there was a cascading effect leading to escalation of violence. Over the past three years, the insurgency has claimed nearly 2000 lives. The conflict with the Muslims dates back to 1902 when Sultanate of Pattani in Soutnern most tip of the country was annexed by Thailand. Attempts to forcibly assimilate these ethnically Malay Muslims caused resentment amongst Muslims. The Muslim insurgency in Southern Thailand is still nebulous dispersed with a loosely defined organisational structure. However, among the major insurgent groups Barisan Revolusi Nasional-Coordinat(BRN-C), attani United Liberatiuon Organisation (PULO), Bersatu, Gerakan Mujahidin Islam Pattani (GMIP) are notable. Though it is essentially a local insurgency for greater political rights it has of late been given a Jehadi lavel by its leaders. The confused handling of the Islamic.
China:- In Xinziang autonomous region of China, Uighurs constitute the Muslim majority whose estimated population is around 15 millions. Civilisationally, close to Central Asia, Uighurs till 18th century were either ruled by distant Central Asian empires or not ruled at all. Annexed by China during the Qing dynasty, the Uighurs could never be culturally and politically integrated with the main land. After the advent of Communist rule in 1949, the Chinese government tried to marginalize Islam, settled the Hans to bring about a demographic change and undertake repressive measures to silence the voice of dissent. All this was resented by the Uighurs who considered it a serious threat to their religious, social and economic interests. The simmering discontent led to formation of East Turekstan National Congress which demanded creation of a secular, democratic government in Xingziang where political and economic interests of the original inhabitants were duly protected. They were also opposed to settlement of Hans Chinese in the region. The situation ,however, started deteriorating after early 90s. The bloody clash in the town of Baran in 1990 in which hundreds of Uighurs were killed proved to be a watershed point. The dismemberment of Soviet Union leading to creation of Central Asian Republics and the rise of Talibans in Afghanistan influenced the course of future events. Religious revivalism was discernible and Uighurs developed linkages with their Islamic neighbourhood. The erstwhile Sufi tradition of Uighur Muslims slowly started getting influenced by its more violent and radical varieties. Recently, “China is under threat of terrorists, separatists and extremists who often collude with foreign-terror organisations”. (Ref: Special Report – Peace Mission 2007 – Military Expert: Anti-Terrorism Is An Important Mission of Chinese Army). China, besides heavily banking on its military initiative through People’s Liberation Army has continued with it policy of demographic dilution of the Uighurs through Han settlements and other administrative measures which have not found favour with the Uighurs. The Chinese Special Report of Military experts on anti-terrorism stated that “The People’s Liberation Army has shouldered important tasks in taming the three evil forces as well as safe-guarding the country’s sovereignty” (Ref: Special Report – Peace Mission 2007 – Military Expert: Anti-Terrorism Is An Important Mission of Chinese Army).
Russia and Central Asia
The Northern frontier of Islam like deep in the steppes of the Russian Northern Caucasus and stretches as far north as Kazan . The anscient Turkic Muslim kingdom. After the final defeat of the Mongols in 1480, Russia subjugated Muslim-controlled territories in the late Fifteens to early Sixteens century. As the Soviet Union collapsed, the Islamic nationalist minorities asserted themselves and independent states of Tajikstan, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan and Kazakhstan were created. However, Russia was still left with some Muslim dominated areas in North Caucasus which included Chechnya, Baghestan. The Muslims in this area led by radical Islamists like Shamil Basaayev and Jordan-based Khattab raised banner of revolt demanding establishment of a North Caucascian Republic extending from Black Sea to the Caspician. They received both ideological and financial support from the Arabs. They also developed close linkages with the Al Qaida. It also received ideological support from Hizb-ut-Tahrir. The rebels claim allegiance of twenty millions Russians which include Tatars, Chechyans, Bashkirs and inhabitants of Daghestan.
Russian response to Islamic uprising was primarily militarily. Its policy was spelled out in two important documents, both formulated during Putin’s tenure as Head of the National Security Council of Russia. The doctrine characterising terrorist bases as illegal military formations, declared that they will be countered with all the might of Russia and Armed Forces. It also entered into a Secret Treaty with Commonwealth Independent States (CIS) and formed an Anti-terrorism Centre in Kyrgystan. China joined this in April 2001. The terrorists attacks and decisive military response led to series of high intensity engagements , with large number of casualties.
Shamil Basaayev was the cult figure of Chechyan uprising and his death in mid 2006 gave a severe blow to the Chechyan rebellions. Earlier movements self-styled President Abdul-Khalim Sudalayev was killed in June, 2006. BasaayEv, the Chechyan field commander was responsible for most of high profile attacks in the war for Chechyan independence, which included siege of a school in Deslan in September, 2004 in which 300 people died – mostly the children. His notoriety attracted many youth to the movement who wanted to take the war to the Russian people by making them their targets. Amongst the old guards now only Doku Umarov still remains but he is too weak to be consider as a substitute for Baasayev. One of the major shift that Umarov has brought about in the policy is that their future targets would be military and not the civilians. This has substantially brought down the level of violence in Chechnya.
Elimination of Basaayev and to a lesser degree of Dzhokhar Dudayev, Aslan Maskhadov, Adbul-Khalim Sadulayev and Omar Ibn al-Khattab. Have seriously eroded the striking capabilities of the Chechyans. The d rawing up of support from the neighbouring Islamic CIS countries and stricter vigil being kept by their governments have also come as a set back. The erstwhile channels of financing from Arab countries have also been throttled to a considerable degree on account of international cooperatiuon received by Russia, particularly from US and others. However, all these set backs are temporary and there is not dilution in ideological commitment and conviction of the Chechyan people to continue the Jihad. The foothold that Islamic radicalism have established is unlikely to be eroded in the wake of global spread of the Islamic radicalism in general and adjoining Central Asian countries, Afghanistan and Pakistan in particular.
Central Asia
Following the dissolution of Soviet Union, the newly emerged Central Asian republics of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan took a course different from the Baltic republics. In these nascent break away states, unlike the Baltics, there was no dominant urge for democracy, free enterprise and the freedoms which had been denied to them under the Communist regime. However freedom of religion and a new enthusiasm about their rich past and heritage seized their imagination. Communism which had suppressed their religious urge for nearly three quarter of a century was suddenly rediscovered. Momentous developments were taking place in the Islamic world in general and their contagious neighbourhood in particular, and they could not remain insulated from their influence. Ahmed Rashid a noted Pakistani journalist who visited these states a year after they gained independence observed that “I was besieged by people wanting to know about the world of Islam outside their valleys and mountain villages. Few people knew about the Islamic Revolution in Iran in 1979, the depth of Palestinian resistance to Israel or the mini wars that had been waged by Islamic militants in Kashmir, Algeria, Egypt and the Philippines. Many had forgotten their prayers and other rituals of Islam” (Ref. Jihad: The rise of Militant Islam in Central Asia by Ahmed Rashid)
Three factors influenced the course of events in these states. Firstly, the older generation which had passed the stories of ‘soldiers of Islam ‘who had resisted the 1917 Bolshevik revolution for long years giving a valiant fight, were remembered and revalidated. Their brutal repression and subsequent religious persecution was recapitulated by the new generations with a sense of spite and hatred; Secondly, the Soviet army had drawn heavily for its manpower from these areas. These youth –Tajiks, Uzbeks, Kazaks etc. – who had close civilisational affinity with the Afghan Mujahideens of various ethnic origins close to them started looking at their Islamic identity with a new sense of self –admiration. Presene of the Mujahideen in Afghanistan, drawn from various Islamic countries of the world, gave them an awareness of the strength and expanse of the Islamic Ummah (community of believers in Islam). The eventual defeat and withdrawn of the Soviet troops destroyed the invincibility image of a super power against might of Islam. Moreover, a large number of these conscripted soldiers became aware of their ethnic, linguistic and religious identity which they found was closer to these against whom they were fighting rather than those for whom they were fighting. Concurrently, the Muslims of the region also became aware of the Iranian revolution and the changes that were sweeping the Islamic world. It particularly influenced Tajiks who historically had special relationship with Iranians.
The third factor was the role of Pakistan in post Soviet withdrawal phase when it created Taliban and used it to spread its tentacles in Central Asia with the objective of establishing Soviet type regimes there. It thought to control the affairs of these oil rich land locked countries on the Islamic using Taliban regime as its proxy.
The West
West, particularly US, faces multi-faceted problems in relation to terrorism. Firstly, it is the common enemy of all the Islamic terrorists all over the world, irrespective of th local factors responsible for the conflict and the players involved. As US has global political and economic interests, this renders their citizens and interests globally vulnerable. In dealing with the states where these terrorist outfits are active they require a high degree of brinkmanship as often these require are mutually contradictory requirements which have to be reconciled. This often makes them suspects in the eyes of those very Islamic regimes whose interests it seeks to promote. Capability building and motivating different state governments to initiate effective counter-terrorist steps also proves difficult and problemtic. Mostly the states involved lack the capability or the intentions to act, or quite often both. Regimes, even with best of intentions, which come to power with support of the West soon lose their credibility and consequently the efficacy. The regimes of Karzai in Afghanistan and ……………………in Iraq are illustrative. This leads to their direct engagements which further complicate the problems and provides Islamists a ploy to propagate that Islam is in danger. West’s serious limitations of understanding the culture, ethos, language and delicate societal relationships leads to their adopting highhanded methods often resulting in use of disproportionate force causing heavy collateral damages. The other problem of the West’s is of the homeland security. Most of the Western countries have a large diaspora of Muslim immigrants from the Arab world and other Islamic countries. A good number of them have not been able to integrate themselves with the new societies of their adoption leading to social, economic and psychological conflicts. The Islamists back home find in them useful human material for recruitment. Organisations like Hizb-ut-Tahrir undertake series of steps to radicalize the Muslim youth. Tahrir though itself not a terrorist outfit is the conveyer belt to terrrorism. It is presently active in forty-five countries including most of the West European counties like UK, Germany, France, Italy etc. As observed by Zeyno Baran, Director of International Security and Energy Programs at the Nixon Centre “HT has been particularly successful at recruiting frustrated youth who have lost faith in the systems of the countries to which they or their parents came. As a senior European diplomat has put it, after joining HT, they turn from being rebels without a cause to rebels with a cause”.
The another problem is the inroads that the radicals and terrorist groups have been able to make within the civil societies
Contemporary Trends And Problems
In the last one decade, frontiers of Islamic radicalism, quick to be followed by Jehadi terrorism, have substantially expanded. The sapatial growth is accompanied by acquisition of more lethal and innovative strike capabilities by the terrorists in terms of skills and resources. The global counter terrorists efforts have been a mixed card of achievements and failures. Overall, the successes have been more tactical than strategic. There has been degradation of Al Qaida cadres including some o its senior operators like Khalid Sheikh, Mohammed Atef Abu Zubadeha etc. However, the outfit has revived itself not only in Afghanistan and Middle East but also new areas of Iraq, Lebanon, Algeria, Sudan, Turkey, West Europe etc. Jehadi ranks are showing exponential growth both in numbers and geographic expanse. Following are some of the main disturbing features of the contemporary scenario:
(a)More Muslims Falling Prey To Radical Ideology:
The major failure has been on ideological front. In the war of ideas the Jehadi ideology has neither been defeated nor isolated. The failure can primarily be attributed to (i) inability to create a powerful ideological movement within the Islamic community against terrorism to counter the Wahabi and Salafi ideologies. The weak voices of few clerics and Muslims intellectuals who have stood against Islamic radicalism lack credibility and are perceived as lackeys of the West; (ii) Non resolution of entrenched grievances against injustice, real and perceived, and fears of domination by the West; (iii) Disproportionate use of force in conflict areas. Heavy human losses of coreligionists seriously agitates Muslim psyche; (iv) Lack of concerted efforts to counter vicious religious propaganda by the Islamists through a highly networked non-terrorist radical organisations.
(b)Decentralisation of Jehadi terrorism
Mushrooming of independent terrorist groups which are not structurally linked to Al Qaida or any other trans-national organisation, but draw ideological inspiration from them in different parts of the world. The Jehadi movement today is highly decentralized and diffused and the threat from self-propelled cells, some of them totally unknown and comprising less than a dozen self proclaimed Mujahideens, have sprung up in hitherto unsuspected areas. US, Europe, Israel and the places where their citizens live or interests are involved figure high in their hit list. For some of the Pakistani and Bangladeshi based terrorists India remains the prime target area.
(c)Situation in Afghanistan:
Consolidation of Al Qaida and Taliban in Afghanistan contributed by many factors like shift in West’s focus to Iraq, dubious role of Pakistan, failure of Karzai government to deliver, rise in Poppy production to fund Al Qaida and Taliban have neutralized much of the advantage that accrued following international effort to control terrorist financing. The new recruitments to terrorist cadres and Taliban carving pockets of control in non- urban ares of Afghanistan have serious security implications.
(d)Developments in Iraq:
Iraq is one single factor that has most profoundly impacted Muslim psyche world over cutting across their sectarian, geographical or denominational differences. The conflict has become a cause celebre for the Jehadis world over and has generated high level of hatred and animus towards US and all those who are perceived to be its allies, including the US friendly Islamic states and leaders.
(e)Accredition In Financial Resources, Weapons, Technical Capabilities And Tactical Expertise:
The terrorists today have access to money, high technology and military hardware despite various initiatives taken to control, it at local and international levels. Easy commercial availability of equipment which can be used for terrorist operations has made the task of terrorists easier. Assistance from some regimes, though more covert and circumspect than before, has not fully stopped. Access to new technologies and equipment, communications facilities use of cyber space for propaganda, recruitment and communications etc have not been effectively checked. The use of dirty bomb or some other techniques for mass killings though not eminent, poses a probable long term threat. As evident from same seized documents and questioning of arrested terrorists, the thought has been engaging the minds of various terrorist groups and the possibility of their springing a surprise cannot be ruled out unless high grade operational intelligence capabilities are positioned in right places. Terrorists are quick to learn from their experience and develop defeat systems to technological or other operational counter measures taken by the governments. Adhering to ‘Time tested methods’ is increasingly proving to be an erroneous counter terrorist doctrine.
(f)Inadequacy Of Global Cooperation And Coordination In Counter-Terrorist Effort:
The global cooperation and coordination in international counter terrorist effort still leaves many gaps, at conceptual structural and operational levels. The anxiety of each nation to exploit the arrangement to its best advantage giving precedence to short term national interests over strategic global interests is a fundamental lacuna. The US and other Western countries perceived as pursuing their national interests under the garb of fighting international terrorism is soon emulated by others, often to the detriment of west’s interests When US made Pakistan as its principal ally in fighting terrorism, fully aware of its continued terrorist sponsoring role in Kashmir, it did not factor in Indian sensitivities. A preferred arrangement would have been to take India on board and convince Pakistan to stop support to all Islamic terrorists irrespective of their targets. Eventually the Americans themselves found that at the end of six year war and heavy deployment of its troops and resources the Islamic terrorism in the area was no where near containment and its epicenter shifted to the areas which were governed by its own ally. The flow of intelligence sharing, particularly the operational grade intelligence is selective shared, again on political considerations, mostly favouring the Western countries.
(g) Signs Of Fatigue In Some Nations:
Fight against terrorism is a war of endurance. There are indications that the past Sept. 11, 2001 resolve and determination is petering out and some countries are thinking of an exit strategy. There have been instances where the regimes have given concessions to the terrorists, either overtly or covertly, for some short term gain. The agreement of September 6, 2006 of Pakistan with Taliban is illustrative. Similarly, a soft approach towards Islamic extremists in Southern Thailand has emboldened them. The doctrine of making no concessions to the terrorists and not striking any deals is going to be much more important in future than ever before. The Jehadis who claim that the victory is well in the sight of late have started harbouring a feeling that the world is wilting under terrorist pressure. It only needs a final push. The policy of appeasement on the spurious argument of tactical compulsion could be a strategic disaster.
The Way Ahead
The above account brings out there distinct features (a) Fast growing geographic expanse of Islamic terrorism, (b) More fundamentalist radical ideology of Salafism substituting the moderals variety of Islam global maturating among Islamic terrorists, mostly under Al Qaeda franchise and (d) Sharp accretion in the offensive capabilities of the terrorists-availability of hardware funds and contacts to procure them.
The battle against terrorism has got to be fought at various levels and in various threatres. It is not with in competence only of the Army, Police, Intelligence and other agencies of the government who alone can bring about an end to the problem. It needs to be despite vastly superior state power of the terrorism fishtive states – military, economic, technological and political – the terrorist can bring organised societies and the states down to there knees by attacking critical targets. Striking at high vulnerability or densly populated areas; not only leads to colossal lose of life and property but generates a global fear that engulf millions which potentially can cause serious political instability or economic rupture. To combat and contain the problem the present generation of statesmen, politicians, strategic thinkers, military planners, intellectuals and the society at large has to take some a concrete measures. Some of the steps which could help ameliorate the critical position could include the following concere steps:
(a) The Jehadis too have some serious vulnerabilities and disabilities. Which need to exploitated one of their vulnerability is that their ultimate political objective of establishing an Ultra-conservative Islamic caliphate based on Shari’a is unpopular and unacceptable to the vast majority of Muslims. “Exposing the religious and political straitjacket that is implied in the Jehad propaganda would help to divide them from the audiences that they seek to persuade” (Ref: Declassified Key Judgments of the National Intelligence Estimate - Trends in Global Terrorism: Implications for the United States - Dated April 2006). Though it is true that not many Muslim intellectuals have openly and spiritedly come forward to oppose Jehad ideology, it is also true that no well known school of Islamic thought has openly come out in support of terrorism though many of them have accused the West also of indulging in terrorist activities. There is a need to engage these Islamic theologicians to evolve a code of conduct that will delgitimize activities of terrorists and their radical supporters.
(b) Need to define terrorism is another pressing requirement. The terrorists or the states supporting them should not be able to get away under the excuse of their being freedom fighters or people who are fighting for a just cause. While the existing UN resolutions relating to terrorism have been useful in the absence of a UN accepted Convention on Terrorism, they have not been able to make the desired impact. This has been held up for want of an agreed definition of terrorism.
(c) Locating the dark areas and activising the governments there to take action: In its present phase non-discript small terrorist modules have started mushrooming in most unexpected area. In some of these areas the governments are complacent, the terrorists consider such areas of special operational importance to them for carrying out their activities. Al Qaida activists have been able to transit through many such areas in the past where they were not subjected to usual checkings by the complacent staff. Large part of Africa are becoming increasingly lawless and cane become future centres of covert terrorist activities.
(d) Enhancing operational intelligence capabilities and its real time sharing with concern states: Most of the intelligence agencies including some of the best resourced organisations of the West really fall far short of required expertise and skills in collection of real time operational intelligence. Despite huge technical back up support and availability of resources, there is dearth of human talents capable of producing 1 quality human intelligence and undertaking pro-active operations. Such a capability needs to be built as an integrated international requirements. The intelligence sharing is still highly politicized and decisions on with whom to share, what to share, and how much to share are determined more by political considerations than genuine professional demands. Some of the states like Egypt, Syria, Lebanon, Pakistan, Indonesia, Afghanistan are very favourably placed to collect highly valuable intelligence regarding internatiuonal terrorism but their contribution has left much to be desired.
(e) Reducing the areas and intensity of conflict: while the root cause theory in dealing with terrorism is fraught with serious dangers and no cause should be acceptable for undertaking a terrorist action, political, economic and administrative initiatives which could reduce genuine grievances of the community must be initiated. How the societies get alienated and at what level alienation leads to exercise of violent options makes an interesting study. If terrorism has to be denied the vital human resource component, and imaginative response to tackle the potential recruits at psychological level would be necessary.
(f) Finding substitute ideology to express dissent: large number of issues on which the Muslims are agitated, actually are not religious issues but political issues. Radicals make an attempt to mobilized the dissent giving a religious context. This should be countered by providing non-religious contexts like nationalism, economic interests, social needs etc. to express themselves. The problems cannot be wished away and their resolutions always to the satisfaction of agitating party can also not be ensured. However, the politics of agitation can have a non-religious expressiuon. This will also help the process of conflict resolutions through negotiations and peaceful methods- an option for which the terrorists leave very little scope.
Al Qaida is expanding its influence at a dangerously rapid pace in different parts of the world. Sunni extremism is likely to continue at a major source of instability in Islamic regimes and high potential threat to the non-Islamic world. Commercial availability of advanced technology and financial prowess of the terrorists is likely to bring about sharp accretion in their striking capabilities. The world has to respond fast and decisively lest it degenerates into a serious civilisational threat.
References: -
1. Memo to EU: ‘We call it Islamic terrorism because it is terror inspired by Islam’ by Nick Cohen in ‘The Observer’ May 14, 2006.
2. “Has Religion made useful contribution to Civilisation? By Bertrand Russell.
3. Is Terrorism Tied to Christian Sect by Alan Cooperman, Washington Post June 2, 2003
4. Martin Luther King – ‘Beyond Vietnam – A time to Break Silence’ – Speech.
5. On Crusades’ by Tyerman 2006; Wikipedia- Christian Terrorism
6. Daily Mail 2nd July 2007, a feature by Hassan Butt.
7. Religious Terrorism – http: faculty.ncwc.edu/TOCONNOR/429/429 lect B.htm.
8. A Brief History of India – By Alian Danielore.
9. The Ethics of War in Asian Civilisation – A Comparative Perspective by Torkel Berkke.
10. Pain but not harm’. Some classical resources towards a Hindu just war theory’ Francis Coolney.
11. Statistics on terrorism by Johnston’s Archive under Terrorism, Counter-terrorism, and unconventional warfare.
12. Islamic Terrorism: From Retrenchment to Resentment and Beyond – by Lauren Langman and Douglas Morris, Loyola University of Chicago.
13. The growth of Islamic terrorism by Tusitala.
14. The growth of Islamic terrorism.
15. Fighting the war of ideas by Zeyno Baran: Foreign Affairs – Nov-Dec 2005
16. Ref: Abdullah, Azzam, The Lofty Mountain (London: Azzam publications, 2003
17. Taarn by, “Recruitment of Islamist Terrorists in Europe”, p.38
18. See “From Dawa to Jehad,” pp. 33-34
19. Bin Laden: ‘Serman for the Feast of sacrifice
20. Declassified Key Judgments of the National Intelligence Estimate - Trends in Global Terrorism: Implications for the United States - Dated April 2006
21. The Nest Attack by Deniel Benjamin